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This dissertation investigates the patterns of path dependence in intrastate 
conflicts. It is motivated by three research questions: What factors determine a particular 
outcome of a civil war? How strong is their impact? What are the causal mechanisms in 
play? To examine these questions, this study introduces a theory of path dependence to 
the study of intrastate conflicts that bridges the gap between analyses of the phases of 
contention.  
First, it examines the broad understanding of path dependence that highlights the 
impact of initial conditions on civil war outcomes. Then, this dissertation explores the 
narrower notion which focuses on the role of timing and sequence of internal factors and 
intervening events in shaping different resolutions to intrastate conflicts. Using 
multinomial logistic regression and event history models to analyze initial conditions, 
intrinsic features, and intervening factors in influencing the probability of particular civil 
war outcomes, this study identifies relevant agencies that can be utilized to shape 
solutions for current and future instances of armed civil conflicts. Finally, three case 
studies test the applicability of the path dependence theory through outlining the 
narratives, incorporating quantitative findings, and identifying causal mechanisms. 
The empirical findings of the initial conditions models emphasize the relevance of 
conflict spillover, non-lootable resources, and structure of bipolarity. An investigation 
 
 
into the factors that ‘lock in’ a particular civil war outcome highlights the role of UN and 
regional intergovernmental organizations in accelerating a compromise outcome; 
explains the variation in dynamics behind democratic and autocratic regimes; but 
surprisingly finds no support for the relationship between the size of the armed forces and 
conflict outcome. Although case study analysis supports the validity of the empirical 
results, it also points at the potential limitations of the quantitative design. Since this 
study follows a mixed methods approach, it effectively compensates for the drawbacks of 
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“Everything that has a beginning has an end.” 
The Oracle, The Matrix Revolutions 
 
War appears to be endemic to human history, yet it is a finite process. Every 
armed conflict that was started out of greed, grievance, misperception or overconfidence 
eventually loses its momentum and culminates in a cessation of violence. While we 
always strive to understand the underlying causes of war to potentially prevent it, once 
the armed conflict has started we leave it to its own devices as if it is impossible to 
understand the underlying causes of its termination. Closer examination of the millennia-
long scholarship on war indicates the disproportionate emphasis on how conflicts start, 
rather on why they end or the way they end. Contemporary inquiries into the nature of 
conflict focus on the causal contributions of motives and opportunities on the onset of 
hostilities, while overlooking the causality behind their termination. This study introduces 
the idea of path dependence to the study of civil wars by synthesizing the existing 
approaches to study of intrastate conflicts with discourses on process evolution in order 
to demonstrate how the initial conditions of war and tipping points shape the outcomes of 
conflict. 
 The increasing interest in the phenomenon of civil wars is not surprising given 
the tectonic trends in the global conflict dynamics. The technological, political, and 
economic progress of our civilization is closely related to the sophistication of the ways 
we kill each other. The nature of war, however, has changed in the past seventy years as 
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the number of wars between states has diminished, while conflicts within national 
borders have become more frequent (Figure 1). The advance of weapons of mass 
destruction and global confrontation between the victors of the Second World War 
shifted the dynamics of conflict to the intrastate level. The academic and policy worlds 
soon followed with the development of a new scholarly field that focused on the causes 
and consequences of civil wars. 
 
 




The primary contribution of the intrastate conflict research agenda was an inquiry 
into the factors that influence the probability of war onset. Recent scholarship moved 
beyond the causes of civil wars and investigated the dynamics of conflict, chances of its 
recurrence, and the impact of third party interventions. The main drawback of the current 
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state of affairs in the field of civil wars lies in the reductive approach that treats the 
conflict as the sum of different stages rather than a continuous process. Application of 
path dependence theory, however, allows for analysis of an intrastate conflict in its 
entirety. The main assumption about path dependence is rather intuitive and postulates 
that previous stages in the process make causal contributions to the subsequent stages – 
or in other words history matters. Originally applied to explain economic processes and 
technological transformations, path dependence theory was recently introduced by Paul 
Pierson into the study of political processes.
2
 He argued that the phenomenon of path 
dependence can be analyzed through a broader concept that focuses on the “causal 
relevance of preceding stages in a temporal sequence” and a narrow concept that 
investigates “social processes that exhibit increasing returns.”3 In this dissertation, I 
extrapolate path dependence theory to the study of intrastate conflicts and evaluate the 
explanatory power of both the broad and narrow definitions.  While the existing 
scholarship examines either separate phases of civil war or factors that affect its 
dynamics, the theory of path dependence bridges the gap between the onset of war, 
period of confrontation, and its outcome by examining the causal links between different 
periods. 
My analysis of seven decades of the intrastate armed conflict reveals similar 
patterns of war development that have not been limited to a particular geographic region 
or a time period. Across the instances of civil wars, certain initial conditions such as the 
presence of oil or hostilities in the neighboring countries have shaped the outcome of 
conflict, while other crucial factors such as ethnic diversity or abundance of easily 
                                                        
2
 Paul Pierson, “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics,” American Political 
Science Review Vol. 94, no. 2 (June, 2000): 251-267. 
3
 Ibid, 252. 
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extractable resources such as diamonds have no effect. Just as the initiation of war 
appears to be contingent on a set of greed and grievance factors, so do its outcomes 
largely depend upon the presence or absence of relevant onset features as well as tipping 
points. The idea of the internal capacity of the state and external interventions to have the 
power to shift the course of conflict and maximize the probability of government’s 
success, rebels’ victory, or a compromise lies at the core of the tipping point hypothesis. 
Here I argue that the state capacity represented by the size of government’s armed forces 
and regime type as well as the third party interventions by international, regional, and 
state actors can significantly alter the path of conflict and “tip” the scales of war. Indeed, 
the models of path dependence through the prism of tipping points reveal the importance 
of fluctuations in state capacity and the timing for interventions.  
Although path dependence theory effectively synthesizes fragmented scholarly 
approaches to the phenomenon of civil war, the true test of my findings lies in 
understanding the direction of current intrastate conflicts and predicting their outcomes. 
This study closely examines civil wars in Russian autonomous republic of Chechnya; the 
Democratic Republic of Congo; and Sri Lanka. Throughout these three cases of conflict 
between the central government and insurgents, common patterns in initial conditions and 
intervening factors have shaped the outcomes of conflict. Given the insights that theory 
of path dependence reveals about the dynamics of civil wars, it is valid to theorize about 
the potential developments of internal conflict in the war-torn eastern regions of Ukraine, 





From a Peaceful Revolution to an Armed Conflict: War in Ukraine 
 
To illustrate the significance of tipping points, one can consider the current war in 
Ukraine. The course of an intrastate conflict has been shaped by foreign military 
intervention as well as the tragic events surrounding the destruction of the Malaysian 
Airlines Flight 17. Along with unique initial conditions that were present at initiation of 
hostilities, these events have the capacity to determine the outcome of war.  
Since the demise of the Soviet Union and collapse of the bipolar system of 
international relations, the power distribution has shifted dramatically across the globe. 
The frozen conflicts that were kept intact by the rigid Cold War realities have been 
unraveled, which in turn produced the loci of instabilities and violence. An outbreak of 
the violent conflict in Ukraine; the breach of its sovereign borders; impending energy 
resources warfare; and ongoing exchange of sanctions between Western states and Russia 
bring the current state of affairs in Europe to a new threat level. Unlike unrest in 
Caucasus, Transnistria, and Central Asia, an intrastate conflict in Ukraine can be hardly 
classified as “frozen” considering the absence of hostilities in the past. Even after the 
Russian-Georgian war of 2008, the possibility of the Russian-backed insurgency or a 
direct Russian invasion has been considered probable, but highly unlikely. 
In the past ten years, Ukraine has gone through two fundamental socio-political 
processes: the Orange Revolution of 2004 and Euromaidan of 2013/2014. While the 
reasons behind the onset of the revolutions are somewhat similar since both were caused 
by the dissatisfaction with the political regime and its decisions, the way they progressed 
and the outcomes that they brought are astonishingly distinct. The Orange Revolution 
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brought millions of people on the streets in 2004 in a sign of protest against an election 
fraud of the aspiring presidential candidate Viktor Yanukovych. The peaceful character 
of the demonstrations and absence of hostilities from the police and other armed 
structures has made the Orange Revolution an example of non-violent resistance. 
Widespread corruption, rising authoritarian grip, and finally a last-minute 
decision to halt the signing of the Association Agreement with European Union in 
exchange for lavish credit from the Russian Federation have led thousands of people on 
the streets of Kyiv in the fall of 2013 to express their dissatisfaction and demand the 
signing of the agreement with EU. What started as a peaceful process quickly escalated 
into a brutal beating of the demonstrators who were primarily students. The next couple 
months have consolidated the citizens in the face of growing aggression of the 
presidential administration such as bloody clashes with special units of police, 
humiliation of protesters, their disappearance and, tragically, deaths. The apogee of 
conflict – deadliest clashes between Euromaidan demonstrators and armed units 




 – resulted in 
hundred people killed and thousands injured. Against all odds, demonstrators were able 
to hold their ground and push back the police. In the face of imminent repercussions, 
Yanukovych and his administration have fled the country and the provisional government 
has been established by the leaders of Euromaidan. 
The success of the protestors, however, has sent signals not only to other regions 
of Ukraine that have supported the escapee president, but also to the neighbors, including 
the Russian Federation which openly supported Yanukovych and his struggle against 
Euromaidan. On March 16
th
, 2014, the Crimean autonomous republic held the fictitious 
7 
 
referendum that was backed by “green people,” Russian forces that however did not have 
any insignia. In a landslide approval voting, Crimea declared independence that was not 
recognized by Ukraine or the international community, but has been widely deemed as a 
fair and just by Russia. Shortly after, Crimea joined the Russian Federation as a new 
administrative unit. Separatist tendencies have spread further in the southern and eastern 
parts of Ukraine. Scenarios similar to those in Crimea were executed in several oblasts, 
but only in Luhansk and Donetsk, were separatists able to find the support – and not in a 
small part due to the incoming financial and military assistance from the eastern 
neighbor. The ensuing Anti-Terrorist Operation carried out by the Ukrainian army and 
the National Guard is aimed at curbing the foreign military assistance to separatists and 
reestablishing constitutional order in Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts. 
A year-long intrastate conflict in Eastern Ukraine took the lives of thousands of 
soldiers and civilians. Although several definitions were given to this armed conflict 
including anti-terrorist operation, civil war, or Russian invasion of Ukraine, the term 
“hybrid war” has been widely used to capture the peculiarities of the foreign intervention 
conducted through the use of special forces, mercenaries, cyber attacks, and 
informational warfare in addition to providing military equipment and training for the 
insurgents. This type of tactics along with its permanent seat on the UN Security Council 
allowed the Russian Federation to claim its non-involvement into the intrastate conflict in 
Ukraine. Given this new trend in conflict dynamics that put the Baltic countries as well as 
Kazakhstan to alert, it is critical to trace both the onset factors that led to the outbreak of 
violence as well as intervening conditions that can ultimately change the course of war. 
These illustrate the importance of path dependence in civil wars. 
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Tipping the Scales of Conflict 
 
Current approaches to the study of intrastate conflicts are not equipped to delve 
into the peculiarities of a specific war in all its totality and tend to analyze factors that 
shape a particular stage of hostilities. Moreover, they rarely focus on the ongoing 
conflicts and the ways to solve them. The theoretical approach that I develop in this 
dissertation synthesizes path dependence and civil war scholarship to provide avenues to 
hypothesize about the possible courses that the conflicts can take in the observable future. 
From the path dependence standpoint, intrastate conflicts are shaped by the initial 
conditions during the start of the war as well as internal factors and external interventions 
that “tip” the scales of conflict. The war in Eastern Ukraine is no exception.  
In Ukraine, several onset factors that are traditionally associated in the civil war 
literature with the outbreak of conflict have provided causal contribution to the initiation 
of hostilities in the Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts. From the greed and grievances 
perspective, this region has both the motivation factor of the ethnic Russians that 
comprise approximately 35 percent of the population as well as opportunity factor of 
non-lootable resources (coal and shale gas).
4
 As subsequent chapters show, my 
quantitative analysis of the conflict dynamics for the past seventy years finds little 
evidence for connection between ethnicity and the outcomes of a civil war. At the same 
time, non-lootable resources such as oil appear to be connected with the minimization of 
the rebels’ chances to succeed. Since both coal and oil are non-lootable resources, it is 
valid to assume that separatists cannot easily finance their activities though coal mining. 
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The primary factor that contributed to the onset of intrastate conflict in Eastern Ukraine 
and could potentially shape its outcome is war contagion or spillover of hostilities. After 
the annexation of Crimea, the Russian Federation contributed to the outbreak of conflict 
by providing financial, military and technical support for pro-Russian insurgents. My 
analysis indicates that wars shaped by contagion are less likely to result in a 
government’s victory and more likely in a compromise.  
The caveat here is that war spillover is oftentimes associated with third party 
intervention. Indeed, Russian military intervention in the summer of 2014 has shaped the 
course of the war. Towards the end of July, separatists’ forces were in full retreat and 
Ukrainian forces were close to capturing their last strongholds. The incursions of regular 
Russian troops, which were constantly denied by Moscow, have shifted the tides of war. 
They led to heavy casualties on both sides and signing of provisional ceasefire agreement 
in Minsk in September, 2014. It is possible that the direct Russian involvement could 
have occurred earlier. Yet, the destruction of the Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 over 
Donetsk region on July 2014 has attracted international attention to the war in Ukraine 
and intervened into the strategic calculations. Both the Malaysian Airlines tragedy and 
Russian August invasion can be considered “tipping” points as they shifted the course of 
the conflict. This dissertation evaluates the impact of such tipping points on the outcomes 
of civil wars. Through a series of statistical inquiries and case studies, it identifies the 
patterns of path dependence in intrastate conflicts. In essence, I devise a study that 
answers the following questions: What factors determine a particular outcome of a civil 




Organization of the Dissertation 
 
This dissertation consists of seven chapters, bibliography and an appendix. The 
introductory chapter outlines the contemporary scholarship on intrastate conflicts; 
introduces the theory of path dependence as the framework for analyzing civil wars as a 
continuous process; and, discusses the central research question and methodological 
foundation of the dissertation. 
The second chapter of the dissertation introduces theoretical approaches to the 
study of war and security in general and intrastate conflict in particular. Here, I trace the 
development of the literature on the causes and consequences of war from the time of 
antiquity to the modern era. Next, I propose a classification of the intrastate conflict 
literature according to the phases of war that it addresses. Thus, my evaluation is focused 
on works that (a) analyze factors behinds the onset of civil wars; (b) elements that shape 
conflict dynamics; (c) the impact of third party interventions; and (d) debates around the 
ways civil wars are resolved. I provide an overview of sociological inquiries into 
contentious politics, state capacity, and causal mechanisms in civil wars. Furthermore, I 
evaluate the existing approaches to the path dependence and elaborate on the ways they 
can be applied to the study of intrastate conflicts. I extrapolate the broad and narrow 
notions of path dependence to evaluate the dynamics of civil wars. Evaluation of the 
impact of initial conditions on the outcome of a war builds up on the former concept, 
while the analysis of endogenous and exogenous tipping points investigates the latter 
definition of path dependence. Here, I also speculate about the causal mechanisms of 
tipping points such as the type of regime of the state in which war occurs, the 
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peacekeeping missions by the United Nations, or regional intergovernmental 
organizations. 
Chapter three outlines a detailed analysis of the research design, methodology, 
and explanatory variables. Here, I provide an overview of the existing approaches to 
defining a civil war and discuss the reasons behind my choice to utilize the Correlates of 
War Project’s definition of an intrastate conflict. By following the logic of mixed 
methods research, I devise three analytical frameworks to examine hypotheses pertaining 
to initial conditions and tipping points in shaping path dependence in civil wars as well as 
to examine the causal mechanisms behind them through case studies analysis. Finally, I 
discuss the design of the OTIC and the TPIC datasets that I develop and use to test the 
hypotheses of the first two analytical frameworks. 
The fourth chapter investigates whether the factors that lead to the start of the 
armed conflict may affect how civil wars are resolved. In this section, I briefly describe 
the logic behind the power of initial conditions, and follow with the output of the 
multinomial logistic regression analysis of the onset-termination hypotheses. I provide 
both the results with three civil war base outcomes and marginal effects to account for 
directionality and magnitude of the explanatory variables. I discuss the findings of the 
quantitative tests in the context of path dependence dynamics as well as in their 
relationship to the existing literature on intrastate conflicts. The examination of the 
opportunity and motivational factors, spillover effects, and control for the Cold War 




Chapter five of the dissertation addresses the narrow concept of path dependence 
in civil wars by evaluating the impact of endogenous and exogenous tipping factors on 
the outcome and duration of a civil war. Specifically, I focus on the timing and sequence 
characteristics of path dependence. The TPIC dataset reflects these features through 
structuring each new exogenous tipping point as a separate period during which the civil 
war may come to an end. Here, I apply a multinomial logistic regression analysis and 
three event history (survival) models to test the hypotheses derived from the narrow 
concept of path dependence. While the earlier inquiries into the analysis of civil war 
outcomes utilized parametric survival models and the most recent studies applied the Cox 
proportional hazards model, I argue that these approaches do not satisfy the main 
assumption about the dependence of competing risks in the outcomes of civil wars. 
Instead, I apply a semiparametric proportional hazards model developed by Fine and 
Gray that controls for the fact that three possible outcomes of intrastate conflicts are 
interdependent. Finally, I provide a comparative analysis of all three survival models to 
check the consistency of the findings across the specifications.  
 The sixth chapter of the dissertation offers a detailed examination of three cases 
of an intrastate conflict through the lens of initial conditions, tipping factors, and causal 
mechanisms of path dependence. The selection criteria of the cases reflect a variation in 
the civil war outcome, the presence of exogenous or endogenous tipping factors as well 
as in- and out-of-sample cases of civil wars. The three civil wars analyzed in this study 
are the First Chechen War that ended in the victory of rebels; Africa’s World War where 
warring sides reached a compromise; and, Second Sri Lanka Tamil Civil War that 
concluded with the success of the government. The first two intrastate conflicts were 
13 
 
included in the OTIC dataset, while conflict in Sri Lanka is a recent case that I have 
utilized to the test the predictive and explanatory power of the path dependence theory. 
The concluding chapter summarizes the main findings of the empirical models 
and discusses their applicability for the analysis of the individual cases of intrastate 
conflicts. Next, I outline theoretical and methodological implications of the path 
dependence theory in civil wars. I discuss here policy relevance and limitations of the 




Uncovering the intrinsic dynamics that shape the direction and outcomes of 
intrastate conflicts can improve our understanding of the most pervasive type of conflict 
in modern history. Undoubtedly, the frequency of civil wars will increase given the 
negative effects of globalization; the thawing of frozen conflicts; global nuclear 
stalemate; and the state of affairs in the contemporary security framework that has 
evolved to prevent interstate rather than intrastate warfare. This study offers an initial 
step toward identifying causal mechanisms that lead to unique civil war outcomes. Policy 
implications of this study can be used to shift the chances of the government’s or rebels’ 
success in conflict. Yet, caution should be exercised when interpreting the findings of the 










The Cold War nuclear stalemate diminished the probability of full-scale interstate 
war, but instead indirectly encouraged conflicts of smaller scale. The increasing number 
of intrastate conflicts during last fifty years produced a new way of thinking about 
conflict in international relations. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
emergence of asymmetric threats, scholars diverted their attention to the study of how 
conflict originates within the state; what influences its dynamics; and how it is possible to 
end the confrontation. This chapter examines the state of the field regarding intrastate 
wars, identifies the civil war sub-debates, and analyzes political science, sociology and 
formal modeling perspectives on internal conflicts. It elaborates on the definitions of civil 
wars; onset and termination; path dependence; tipping points; and other related notions. 
Furthermore, this section focuses on the development of path dependence scholarship in 
economics and political science literature and extrapolates its main findings to the sphere 
of intrastate conflicts. Finally, I provide a research design that captures the dynamics of 
civil war as a path dependent process that goes beyond juxtaposition of onset and 
termination cases. By introducing the concept of tipping points in civil wars and 
analyzing how these factors shape the path of a particular type of intrastate warfare, I 
substantiate not only the existence of the path dependence, but also uncover general 
trends behind civil war dynamics. 
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Debates in the Study of Intrastate Conflicts 
 
After the end of the Second World War, intrastate wars became the dominant type 
of a military conflict. In the wake of reassessing the post-Cold War distribution of power, 
identification of modern threats and challenges as well as determination of the 
contemporary meaning and role of security, scholars of international relations diverted 
their attention to the study of conflict within states. In the following section, I propose the 
analysis of the intrastate conflict scholarship through the prism of the evolution and 
current state of affairs in the civil war debate; discussion of the semantic and 
methodological approaches to the study of civil war; and outlining the limitations and 
areas for future improvement and development. First, I limit the scope of academic 
investigation to the mainstream international security scholarship that specifically 
addresses the notion of intrastate conflict.  The sociological and game theoretical 
viewpoints are analyzed later in this chapter. 
The last century was an era of a tremendous breakthrough in all spheres of 
development – space exploration, information revolution, global markets, the list can go 
on forever. At the same time, progress brought not only a better quality of life, but also a 
more efficient way of combating rivals at the domestic and international levels. Two 
devastating world wars revealed the horrific potential of humankind to exterminate its 
own kin at an unthinkable scope and rate. Only after the invention of the most deadly 
weapon, the nuclear bomb, did states realize the unbearable cost of war at the global 
scale. The common knowledge entered the realm of military and political thinking that 
16 
 
was best summarized by Albert Einstein: “I don’t know [what weapons will be used in 
the Third World War]. But I can tell you what they’ll use in the Fourth — rocks!”1  
The ensuing stalemate characterized the conflict dynamics of the Cold War 
period. Two superpowers separated the world into to spheres of influence and only at the 
peripheral regions using proxy states engaged in de facto military confrontation. 
Strategists on both sides developed new doctrines that adapted to the bipolar distribution 
of power. The bourgeoning neorealist school of thought has viewed bipolarity as the most 
stable form of international system. Indeed, the number of interstate wars has 
significantly decreased following the Second World War after the ensued Soviet-
American demarcation of the world. However, as the wars between states have become 
less frequent, confrontations within the national borders started to characterize global 
conflict dynamics. This tendency continued beyond the Cold War era, where intrastate 
wars were waged at the periphery of superpower rivalry or in the Third World.   
Academic interest in analyzing the phenomenon of civil war has largely resulted 
from the reassessment of security field after the end of the Cold War. Despite the 
growing frequency of intrastate conflicts and simultaneous decrease of wars between 
states since the Second World War, academic interest was largely focused on the latter 
type. The peak of intrastate conflicts in the early 1990s sent a signal about the changing 
security environment and attracted attention of policy-makers and scholars alike. While 
seminal inquiries into the nature of conflict within the states have originated before the 
peak of intrastate violence, the advance of quantitative research methods and 
accumulation of the recorded history of intrastate conflicts by Correlates of War project 
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and the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) catalyzed the academic discipline. 
Currently with no strict agenda on the table, the civil war debate incorporates a variety of 
research topics that are oftentimes interconnected between each other as well as with 
external scholarly discourses.  
Within the overarching intrastate conflict discipline, it is possible to identify 
several central sub-debates. The most diverse and prolific research topic addresses the 
reasons behind the onset of civil wars. This sub-debate attempts to capture the conditions 
and factors that stimulate or inhibit opponents in the internal conflict to engage in the 
armed hostilities. The second scholarly sub-debate focuses on the elements that 
characterize the dynamics of civil war. The third and arguably the most related to the 
discipline of international relations sub-debate revolves around the notion of third party 
interventions: when they occur, under what conditions, and whom do they support? 
Finally, scholars debate about the solutions to civil wars. While some view institutions or 
third party interventions as the answer, others consider partition of the state as the most 
viable solution. These sub-debates are, of course, not exhaustive determinants for the 
study of civil war and there exists a wider pool of so-called “gray areas” that in some way 
are related to the phenomenon of internal conflict. These are repression, genocide, 
secession, political violence, revolution, failed states, terrorism, and ethnic conflicts to 
name a few. However, since the primary focus of this study is the analysis of the 
intrastate conflict, the following overview of scholarship emphasizes four 
abovementioned sub-debates: onset, dynamics, third party intervention, and termination 
of the intrastate wars.  
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 As I argued earlier, the academic and policy awareness about the fact that civil 
war represents the bulk of conflict incidence across the world appeared only after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. Globalization trends revealed the existence of the conflict 
zones that previously were outside of the bipolar competition. Moreover, frozen conflicts 
that were contained by the military might of Soviet empire started to unravel in the early 
nineties. Civil wars in Yugoslavia, Caucasus, Transnistria, and other ethnically diverse 
regions have commenced following the vacuum of power. Aside from the collapse of 
empires and the advent of globalization, the United Nations, which was no longer a 
hostage of ideological rivalry, started to exercise its legitimate role of a peacekeeper and 
peace mediator and gave greater voice to the problem of internal conflicts. 
 Academic response to these structural transformations started to unfold in the 
early 1990s. During this period, several seminal works arguably “set the tone” for the 
subsequent understanding of the nature of civil wars. In 1994, David Singer and Melvin 
Small offered a new revised dataset on international and civil wars.
2
 The following year, 
James D. Fearon published the seminal work “Rationalist Explanations for War” in 
which he suggested the reasons why bargaining fails and states occasionally go to war, 
which can also be extended to analyze intrastate conflicts. Four years later, Paul Collier 
and Anke Hoeffler in “Greed and Grievance in Civil War” offered an examination of 
conditions that force actors to engage in intrastate rivalry by focusing on the grievances 
and opportunities for seizure of export commodities. In 2002, Gleditsch and other 
scholars from Uppsala Conflict Data Program in collaboration with Peace Research 
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Institute Oslo developed an Armed Conflict Dataset that provides conflict data from the 
period of 1946 to the present.  
While it is possible to arbitrarily distinguish scholarship on intrastate conflicts 
through the prism of schools of thought (institutional liberalism, structural realism, 
constructivism, etc.), it is more appropriate to classify the research contributions in terms 
of variable preferences and methodological approaches. Most of the articles under review 
have utilized statistical evaluation of intrastate conflicts; formal modeling; or a 
combination of both. It is also worthy of notice that the overwhelming majority of 
scholarship is the product of American and European academic environments; this fact 
can arguably limit the scope of ideas as well as the audience. Finally, it is worth noting 
that the United Nations and particularly the World Bank have expressed interest in the 
subject of civil wars and on multiple occasions have funded related projects. Thus, the 
World Bank in the 1990s sponsored a comprehensive project on the economics of 




The civil war debate does not revolve around one particular issue. Instead, it 
serves as an umbrella for several sub-debates, which touch upon various aspects of 
internal conflict. Here, I focus on various topics that reflect the complexity of the 
phenomenon of civil war and draw inferences about particular stages of internal conflict, 
characterize the intrinsic processes, and speculate about the external variables.  
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Onset of Intrastate Conflicts 
 
The first and probably most crucial question that the discipline attempts to answer 
is why civil wars occur in the first place. That is to say, scholars go beyond the traditional 
understanding of origins of war in faulty human nature or universal greed. Instead, they 
aim to apply robust methodological techniques and test models that are peculiar to civil 
war. The main points of contestation in this sub-debate are the conditions inside the state 
that lead to civil wars; underlying and immediate factors; economic and political 
preconditions; resources that could be used to instigate the internal conflict; and, the 
unique aims of potential rebel groups.   
A quite simple and straightforward yet very influential explanation of the 
outbreak of civil war was given by Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler in “Greed and 
Grievance in Civil War.”4 Their main argument is based on the supposition that the onset 
of civil war is dependent upon the motivation of rebel groups and opportunities to fulfill 
those motivations. Collier and Hoeffler argue that dissatisfactions of various social 
groups within the state, which in turn shape the motivations of rebels, are ubiquitous and, 
to a certain degree, always present. Previous literature on the civil war outbreak 
constantly emphasized various motivational factors, but failed to explain the relative low 
incidence of the actual internal military conflicts. Collier and Hoeffler hypothesized that 
rare occurrence of civil war is related to the lack of opportunities on the behalf of the 
rebel groups to enforce their grievances. Using econometric methods to test previous 
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models and their own ideas about the onset of civil war, the authors have analyzed 
seventy-nine intrastate wars in the time span from 1960 to 1999.
5
 
Aside from a wide variety of motive-based approaches to civil wars, Collier and 
Hoeffler highlight two seminal works that enhance our understanding of the internal 
conflict. The first alternative view on the motive-opportunity relations was offered by 
Herschel Grossman, who hypothesized about the importance of lootable resources, which 
provide sufficient incentives for rebel groups to engage in the hostilities.
6
 Another crucial 
refinement to the onset literature was made by Jack Hirshleifer through adding a new 
determinant of perception that effectively altered the dyad of motive and opportunity. 




After testing several greed and grievance models of civil war, Collier and 
Hoeffler concluded that opportunity rather than motivation is responsible for the outbreak 
of conflict. Among the opportunity variables, the authors identify the availability of 
finances (primary commodity exports), the cost of rebellion, and military advantage as 
the most significant factors.
8
 On the other hand, intuitively crucial motivational factors 
such as inequality, political rights, ethnic polarization, and religious fractionalization 
proved to be of a little significance (ethnic conflict, however, proved to be adversely 
related to the outbreak of conflict). Finally, the authors suggested that the significance of 
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The scholarship on the economic determinants of intrastate conflict onset has 
burgeoned following the introduction of the greed and grievance paradigm. In The 
Political Economy of Armed Conflict, Karen Ballentine, Jake Sherman and their 
colleagues emphasize the significance of the war economy in contemporary civil 
conflicts.
10
 Using as a starting pointed the theory developed by Collier and Hoeffler that 
diminishes the factors of ethnic heterogeneity; level of political rights; economic 
mismanagement; and regime type on the emergence of civil conflicts, Ballentine and 
Sherman evaluate the role of various natural resources as the “greed” factor. Furthermore, 
they offer a series of case studies, including Colombia, Nepal, Bougainville, Kosovo, Sri 
Lanka, and Burma, with the goal of moving beyond the dichotomous profit-seeking 
versus justice-seeking dichotomy of greed and grievance theory.  
The focus on six pivotal conflicts in different parts of the world offered a more 
robust understanding of specific preconditions for an intrastate war; mechanisms that 
trigger the conflict; and the solutions for peaceful settlement. The main advantages of 
such an approach are the assessment of cases at the regional and global scale; tracing 
comparisons between similar preconditions and outcomes of geographically distant 
conflicts; and evaluation of the effectiveness of tools that seek to reconcile the dispute.
11
 
While the large-n quantitative analysis of the intrastate conflict conducted by Collier and 
Hoeffler suggested that the majority of civil wars are triggered by the opportunity factor, 
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the more in-depth case study perspective suggests that the reality is far more complex and 
involves both economic and non-economic determinants.
12
  
One of the applications of the motive-opportunity dyad to analyze the 
peculiarities of civil wars in the African continents was proposed by Charles Cater.
13
 In 
the elaboration of the post-Cold War conflict dynamics in Africa, Cater tests four 
dominant theories of causes of war: economic predation; kleptocratic states; horizontal 
inequalities; and, weak states theories.
14
 Cater grounds the economic predation variable 
in Collier’s assumption about the salience of the rational striving for financial profit that 
explains predatory motives of intrastate groups.
15
 The correlation between the corruption 
of “shadow” state leaders and the rise of the warlords, observed by William Reno, 
associates the cause of civil war with the redistribution of wealth within this dyadic pair, 
thus explaining the phenomenon of kleptocratic states.
16
 Frances Stewart’s interpretation 
of “horizontal inequality” points to the regional, ethnic, class, and religious group 
identities that can be dissatisfied with its political participation, economic assets, 
employment and income inequalities, as well as its social access and situation.
17
 Finally, 
to explain the idea of the weak state, Cater refers to Ayoob’s findings on causes of civil 
war in developing countries. He emphasizes the weakness of these states that results from 
the excessive use of power to address internal problems due to the lack of political 
institutions and the dominance of military elements in dealing with domestic issues.
18
 
Through the prism of these four theories, Cater concludes that in the cases of Angola, 
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Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo, economic determinants could not 
explain the incidence of civil war. In reality, he observes, the intrastate conflicts in Africa 
are driven by “cyclical patterns of state failure and mobilization of resources for 
insurgency – each having interrelated economic and political dimensions.”19 
Different economic and political preconditions for civil wars still require a trigger 
or catalyst to transform financial, political or other motives into the practical action. To 
distinguish between the general preconditions and immediate triggers, Michael E. Brown 
offers a new framework that identifies underlying causes and then includes the proximate 
or permissive causes of internal conflict.
20
 In comparison with Collier and Cater, Brown 
does not consider political and economic factors to be sole explanations for the onset of 
intrastate conflict, but also adds structural and cultural variables. The weakness of states; 
intra-state security concerns; and ethnic geography contribute to the structural causes, 
while discriminatory political institutions; exclusionary national ideologies; inter-group 
politics; and elite politics fall into political factors group.
21
 The idea of economic 
problems; discriminatory economic systems; and the economic development and 
modernization issues are grouped under the social/economic causes of civil war. Finally, 




According to Brown these four underlying causes of internal conflict can be 
catalyzed under several conditions. The aggravation of the certain factor can be analyzed 
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within the framework of elite-level or mass-level catalysts and internal or external 
developments.
23
 Thus, the four combinations of triggering factors (elite/mass triggered 
versus internally/externally driven) or the sole impact of one of them can change the 
dormant character of the underlying cause and lead to the emergence of civil war.
24
 
Another influential theory for understanding the outbreak of civil war was 
developed around the earlier discussed idea of the primary export commodity or lootable 
resources. After Collier and Hoeffler identified primary commodity exports as the most 
influential factor in the onset of civil wars, several academic articles attempted to verify 
and improve their findings. The most prominent critique of the Collier and Hoeffler’s 
analysis was made by James Fearon in “Primary Commodity Exports and Civil War.”25 
Fearon challenges the argument that primary commodity resources are the main factor for 
funding insurgencies by referring to a similar study by Fearon and Laitin published in 
2003 that produced an opposite result where primary resources did not have an 
independent effect on the onset of internal conflict.
26
 Fearon explains these discrepancies 
by criticizing Collier and Hoeffler’s methodology and data manipulations. He argues that 
five-year cycles used in Collier and Hoeffler’s analysis fail to adequately capture the 
conflict onset since the problem of missing data causes the pool of observations to 
become extremely limited. Instead, through focusing on a country-year format and 
additional statistical techniques, Fearon was able to more systematically and consistently 
encompass the variables and observations, which revealed the weakness of the primary 
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commodity exports’ argument.27 Nevertheless, the author does not dismiss the role of 
primary commodities as a primary source of rebel funding, but stresses their diversity 
ranging from diamonds to drugs to oil exports. Fearon’s refined models revealed that it 
“seems unlikely that oil exports (or cash crops) predict higher civil war risk because oil 
provides better financing opportunities for would-be rebels,” but in fact fuel resources 
might “indicate a weaker state given the level of per capita income and possibly a greater 
‘prize’ for state or secessionist capture, both of which might favor civil war.”28  
While James Fearon primarily focused on fuel resources as indicators of civil war 
outbreak,  Päivi Lujala, Nils Petter Gleditsch and Elisabeth Gilmore in “A Diamond 
Curse? Civil War and a Lootable Resource” using novel data on diamond production to 
speculate about the impact of this export commodity on the onset of internal conflict.
29
 
The authors accept the general framework of understanding the civil war through 
motivation and opportunity factors, but also add the third dimension of identity, which 
manifests itself through group formation.
30
 These three determinants are crucial in 
analyzing the influence of natural resources, particularly of the lootable type. The ability 
of rebel group to loot resources may serve as a motivation for insurgency and opportunity 
for financing their activity as well as for building a group identity around a particular 
commodity. The discussion of lootable resources evolved primarily along the lines of 
geographical location, concentration of resources, and their type. Lujala, Gleditsch, and 
Gilmore focus on diamonds as a unique type of lootable resources. They elaborate further 
by distinguishing two groups of diamonds: primary diamonds located in the kimberlite 
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pipes (geological structures where diamonds are usually found) and controlled by 
government and secondary diamonds that are more easily excavated and extorted.
31
 This 
major distinction offered a novel insight into the onset dynamics of civil war. According 
to Lujala, Gleditsch, and Gilmore, diamonds do not generally affect the risk of internal 
conflict outbreak, but they do impact civil wars. Thus, the type of diamonds plays a 
critical role in the outbreak of civil war: secondary diamonds (lootable resource) can be 
easily exploited by rebel group, while primary mine-type diamonds minimize the risk of 
conflict onset.
32
 To sum up, diamonds have an influence on the civil outbreak under 
certain circumstances and further studies on lootable resources might benefit from this 
distinction.     
The role of ethnic rivalries and, consequently, causes of ethnic conflict has been 
an important dimension for the study of civil wars. The collapse of the Soviet Union and 
the spread of democracy coincided with the resurgence of nationalism and a spike of 
intrastate warfare. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner see this trend not as an accident, 
but rather as a complex phenomenon that encompasses the history of nation- and state-
building; the evolution of ethnic conflict; inconsistency between ethnic fragmentation and 
democratic polities; and, of international involvement in solving protracted ethnic 
violence.
33
 The collection of theoretical approaches to the study of ethnic conflict and a 
series of case studies that test these theories in the volume National and Ethnic Conflict 
edited by Michael E Brown, Owen R. Cote, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, 
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highlight the complex nature of the ethnic conflict.
34
 The overarching theme in this 
volume is the diversity of ideas rather than the sole consolidated approach about the 
causes of civil war. The authors generally agree on the intricacy of civil conflict and often 
advise unique multifaceted solutions for each particular case. They refer to the 
nationalism and ethnicity not only as inherent causes, but also as triggers of other internal 
and international factors of internal rivalry.  
An alternative view on the role of ethnic factors in the onset of internal conflict 
was developed by James Fearon and David Laitin in “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil 
War.” They posit that the spike of civil wars during the early 1990s was the result of the 
fifty-years-long protracted conflicts that had been revived after the end of the Cold War. 
Fearon and Laitin’s study of insurgency conditions suggests that “state weakness marked 
by poverty, a large population, and instability – are better predictors of which countries 
are at risk for civil war than are indicators of ethnic and religious diversity or measures of 
grievances such as economic inequality, lack of democracy or civil liberties, or state 
discrimination against minority religions or languages.”35   
Another crucial research area of the onset of internal conflict focuses on the aims 
of rebel groups through the introduction of the literature on motivational factors. David 
Sobek and Caroline L. Payne in the article “A Tale of Two Types: Rebel Goals and the 
Onset of Civil Wars” propose to classify civil wars in terms of legitimacy (in which 
rebels aim at changing the relationship between state and society) and replacement (in 
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which rebels aim at changing the government).
36
 The authors made an underlying 
assumption that the dynamics of conflict would be fundamentally different based on the 
goals that the rebels pursue. Thus, using Tilly’s “polity” model that explains the 
relationship between government, members of the society, and challengers that do not 
have low-cost access to resources, Sobek and Payne construed that in civil wars of 
replacement rebels are primarily concerned with the benefits of winning in order to get 
access to lootable resources.
37
 On the other hand, civil wars of legitimacy are more 
complex and presuppose longer duration and increased viability of rebellion by the 
possibility of lootable resources’ extraction.38 Their analysis reveals that the wars of 
replacement should be associated with short duration, where the longevity of rebels’ 
viability is not significant, but access to lootable resources is a primary concern. At the 
same time, Sobek and Payne observed for wars of legitimacy, motivated by the factor of 
viability/greed instead of grievance, “a fairly strong relationship between the viability 
measures and the risk of civil war of legitimacy onset, which only became stronger when 
the expected duration of the conflict increased.”39 
 
The Dynamics of an Intrastate Conflict 
  
The motivation, opportunity, identity triad is widely accepted as an overarching 
analytical framework for understanding the causes of civil wars. At the same time, 
previous studies utilized primarily multivariate models that require quantifiable variables 
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to test the core hypotheses of the study. Yet the pursuit for statistically significant results 
sometimes simplifies reality and fails to capture the intrinsic dynamics of civil war. 
Oftentimes, qualitative inquiries into the nature of intrastate conflict could uncover and 
describe the mechanisms and trends that are overlooked or discarded during the large-n 
analysis. 
A series of case studies of ethnic conflicts by John Mueller points out the 
heterogeneity of the social composition of the battling ethnic groups. By focusing on civil 
wars in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, Mueller advances the argument that the 
notion of ethnic wars as we know it is misguided. He suggests that “ethnic warfare more 
closely resembles nonethnic warfare, because it is waged by small groups of combatants, 
groups that purport to fight and kill in the name of some larger entity,” which is, by and 
large, passive and controlled by these combatant groups.
40
 Moreover, for the 
abovementioned cases, perennial hatred was not a primary factor for the perpetuation of 
the internal crisis. Instead, “bands of opportunistic marauders recruited by political 
leaders and operating under their general guidance” engaged in the looting and carnage 
that was later associated with the whole ethnic group.
41
 In Yugoslavia, Mueller argues, 
politicians might have been at the inception of the confrontation and sparking hatred, but 




Civil war in this region was characterized by a unique dynamic structure. In the 
first “takeover” stage, well-armed thugs recruited by political leaders emerged in the 
areas without central authority and police forces. Mueller points out that at this stage the 
                                                        
40
 John Mueller, “The Banality of ‘Ethnic War’,” International Security Vol. 25, no. 1 (Summer, 2000): 42. 
41
 Ibid, 42-43. 
42
 Ibid, 47-49. 
31 
 
general population felt confused rather than exhibiting hatred. In the ensuing “carnival” 
stage, these groups of thugs engaged in pillaging and looting that were occasionally 
joined by opportunistic marauders and other criminals. During the “occupation and 
desertion” phase, these criminal groups did not limit the hostilities to a single ethnicity, 
but terrorized the entire population in the region.
43
 In conclusion, Mueller remarks that 
ethnic war does not simply resemble Hobbesian bellum omnium contra omnes, but 
ethnicity appears to function as merely an ordering device, not a motivational factor. In 
cases where ethnic groups did engage in the uncontrolled war against everyone, 
organized criminal groups were behind the larger population. As the solution to such 
types of crises, Mueller suggests the provision of third party interventions and 
international policing. Finally, he makes a provocative inference about the possibility of 
ethnic war sparking anywhere if the conditions were similar to the discussed case since 
the thugs and criminal elements exist in every state. 
In a response to John Mueller, Anna Simons acknowledges the critical role of 
armed thugs in internal conflicts yet criticizes his emphasis on hatred as a primary 
motivation for ethnic conflict. She offers an alternative factor of fear, explaining that fear 
fueled by propaganda can unite citizens to take actions under the conditions of the state’s 
failure to provide the security.
 44
 Armed thugs and criminals spread fear through 
atrocities, which reawaken the previous experience of violence. Despite Mueller’s 
argument about the absence of hatred between ethnic groups, fear based on the previous 
history of violence stimulates the general population to restore violent behavior.
45
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Third Party Interventions in Intrastate Conflicts 
 
The phenomenon of external intervention in civil war is one of the most 
developed and contested subtopics in the literature on civil wars. One explanation for the 
popularity of this issue lies in the policy-related implications of third party interventions. 
Ironically, scholars who analyze this topic represent a predominantly American and 
European academic discourse, which might to an extent offer foreign policy suggestions 
for great power decision-making. The fact that the United States and lately the United 
Nations have engaged in a multitude of interventions ranging from humanitarian to 
security concerns stimulated scholarly endeavors to capture the conditions, motivations, 
and effectiveness of third party interventions. 
 A crucial aspect of third party interventions is the ability to sustain peace in the 
aftermath of civil war. Virginia Page Fortna in the article “Does Peacekeeping Keep 
Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace after Civil War” examines 
the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping operations in the post-conflict areas, specifically 
focusing on the intrastate cases. Previous multivariate models have offered mixed results: 
some studies suggest that comprehensive, multilateral efforts under the UN auspices do 
in fact allow for a longer-term more stable environment, while other more sophisticated 
approaches do not find the connection between third party intervention and lasting 
peace.
46
 Fortna argues for the refined approach in the analysis of the peacekeeping 
interventions by differentiating between the pre- and post-Cold War periods as well as 
between UN peacekeeping missions and operations by other organizations. Moreover, 
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she critically examines the way data is treated in previous research and points to some 
major drawbacks. Thus, previous data treated conflicts that resumed after twenty years 
and conflicts that resumed after two months similarly, which skewed perceptions about 
the effectiveness of the peacekeeping interventions. Moreover, Fortna emphasizes the 
peculiarities of each case, arguing that peacekeepers are usually sent to the areas where 
peace is rather fragile due to variety of factors, but not to areas where peace exists per 
se.
47
 Finally, the major caveat of the previous approach lies in the equal treatment of all 
peacekeeping missions without distinguishing between post-conflict operations and 
interventions during the ongoing civil war.  
After the revision of the previous data, Fortna came to the conclusion that 
peacekeeping interventions do prolong peace, but they have become more effective after 
the end of the Cold War.
48
 Among all types of peacekeeping missions, traditional and 
observer types had the strongest effect in reducing the risk of war outbreak, while 
multidimensional missions had a fifty percent chance of success.
49
 In sum, peacekeeping 
operations proved to be efficient and even though the “presence of international 
personnel is not a silver bullet, of course, it does not guarantee lasting peace in every 
case, but it does tend to make peace more likely to last, and to last longer.”50 
Civil wars tend to be contagious and neighboring states have an incentive to 
intervene in the conflict to prevent the outbreak of internal conflict within their own 
borders. While the possibility of the civil war spillover is a potential threat, it is important 
to identify under what conditions states are likely to intervene. Jacob Kathman in “Civil 
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War Contagion and Neighboring Interventions” devised a criterion to measure the civil 
war contagion likelihood and explains the historical precedence of such interventions. 
Using the traditional motivation-opportunity framework for understanding civil war, 
Kathman acknowledges that since war is very costly, state utilities in terms of 
opportunism or threat response should be sufficiently high. Yet previous research has not 
accommodated the proximity as a potential difference between interveners, which led 
Kathman to hypothesize that contiguous states are facing qualitatively different threats.
51
 
Consequently, the reasons behind state decision to intervene are based on “the attributes 
of the conflict state, the characteristics of the third party, and the affective dyadic links 
between the intervener and the war participants.”52 Kathman also prioritizes the research 
on the diffusion of interstate war to explain how geographic ties between neighbors that 
manifested in “ethnic affinities, security ties, and political relationships” can motivate a 
proximate state to engage in civil wars.
53
 The tests of intervention onset in terms of 
infection risk as a primary independent variable supports the hypothesis about the 
qualitatively different threats for neighboring states.  
A critical role of a third party intervention is to stop the atrocities and bloodshed 
associated with the civil war. While such an intuitive assumption seems to be the only 
one possible, empirical analysis is required to verify this relationship. Dylan Balch-
Lindsay and Andrew J. Enterline in “Killing Time: The World Politics of Civil War 
Duration, 1820-1992” examine whether third party interventions prolong or shorten the 
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duration of intrastate conflict.
54
 They combine the viewpoint of Patrick Regan who 
suggested that a third party intervenes to end the conflict quickly and cite Karl Deutsch as 
well as Rodolfo Stavenhagen who considered that “third parties intervene for less 
benevolent reasons, including lengthening the duration of a civil war in order to distract, 
or drain the resources of, rival states, or simply to plunder the resources of the civil war 
state itself.”55  
Balch-Lindsay and Enterline make an important observation by arguing that the 
decision to intervene is not only costly but also requires the understanding of the systemic 
dimensions in terms of domestic participants and other external actors. The originality of 
Balch-Lindsay and Enterline’s empirical testing of third party intervention relies on the 
assumption that civil war is embedded in the international system, which affects the cost 
and benefit analysis of the third parties.
56
 The results reveal that the duration of civil war 
is contingent upon the coherence of motivations of the third parties: “an equitable 
distribution of third party interventions corresponds to a greater likelihood that a 
stalemate will emerge and the civil war will endure for a significantly longer period of 
time.”57 This conclusion confirms the intuitive logic that the longevity of war is related to 
the effectiveness of goals and actions coordination between third parties. 
Previous studies about the impact on conflict duration of third party interventions 
on behalf of government or rebels have offered mixed results. In the article “Going in 
When it Counts: Military Intervention and the Outcome of Civil Conflicts,” Stephen Gent 
suggests that instead of conflict duration, one should consider the outcome as the primary 
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concern of third parties. He argues that military third party interventions are costly and 
therefore will commence only if the marginal effect from them will be at the highest 
point.
58
 The empirical analysis of this refined perspective on third party interventions 
revealed that the “relative capability of the rebels has a statistically and substantively 
significant impact on the likelihood that a conflict will experience a military intervention 
on behalf of the government and the rebels.”59 This finding supports previous claims 
about the utility maximizing strategy of the third parties. 
 
Solutions to Intrastate Conflicts 
 
 The most challenging question in the civil war debate is finding solutions to 
internal conflict. Articles discussed in this section provide empirical evidence for the 
partition based on ethnic or geographic principle as well as allowing for a victory of 
either side in conflict as possible opportunities to end civil war. 
 The existing literature on civil war suggests two different approaches for ending 
intrastate wars. The dominant majority of scholars agree that ending conflict through 
negotiated settlement as soon as possible is the top priority to halt human suffering as 
well as economic and political collapse. On the other hand, some scholars (Edward N. 
Luttwak and Robert Wagner) suggested that civil war should last until only one side 
emerges victorious, which is encapsulated in a catchphrase “give war a chance.”60 In 
order to test the validity of both arguments, Monika Duffy Toft in the article “Ending 
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Civil Wars: A Case for Rebel Victory?” conducts analytical and empirical tests and 
suggests that termination of modern civil wars requires both cooperation and avoidance 
of downplaying the punishment for both sides.
61
 The regression models that focused on 
the type of civil war termination revealed three major trends: 
First, civil wars ending in negotiated settlements are much more likely to recur. 
Second, negotiated settlements are no more likely to lead to democracy than other 
types of settlements. Rather, rebel victories are more likely to produce this result. 





These conclusions undermine the academic and policy-makers’ assumptions 
about the benefits of negotiated solutions. Extending the time horizon is imperative to 
judge the effectiveness of peace longevity and level of democracy. It appears that in a 
long run, such settlements lead to the recurrence of civil war and more bloodshed. On the 
other hand, rebel victory in the longer run establishes stronger peace conditions and 
provides gradual democratization. Toft argues that for negotiated settlements to be more 
effective than rebel victory, they should incorporate provisions of long-term benefits as 
well as punishment mechanisms enforced by third parties in case one side decides to 
defect from a negotiated settlement. 
Territorial partition is often considered a solution to an intrastate conflict. 
Nicholas Sambanis and Jonah Schulhofer-Wohl in the article “What’s in a Line? Is 
Partition a Solution to Civil War?” evaluate the costs and benefits of territorial partition 
and demonstrate the weakness of this argument through a series of empirical tests.
63
 They 
closely examine the ethnic security dilemma as an explanation for conflict reduction after 
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territorial partition by focusing on two crucial claims: “the claim that ethnic power 
sharing is particularly unstable and the related claim that ethnic identity is easily 
identifiable, making targeting of individuals for violence easier after ethnic war.”64 While 
this theoretical assumption makes a case for the effectiveness of territorial partition, 
Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl’s empirical models that focused on the recurrence of war 
following such peace transitions have shown no significant connections.  
In the response to the earlier studies by Nicholas Sambanis that refuted the 
effectiveness of partition, Carter Johnson in “Partitioning to Peace Sovereignty, 
Demography, and Ethnic Civil Wars” points at methodological and theoretical limitations 
of the previous research and makes a claim for the effectiveness of ethnic partition. 
Johnson views the main flaw of Sambanis’ analysis in using new borders instead of 
demographic separation of ethnic groups as the indicator for partition.
 65
 According to 
Johnson, introduction of the new Postpartition Ethnic Homogeneity Index (PEHI) to 
capture the effectiveness of partition revealed that “in all cases where the PEHI showed a 
complete separation of warring minorities, there were no war recurrences and no 
occurrences of low-level violence for at least five years after the end of the ethnic civil 
war.”66 
Another direction of inquiry into the termination of intrastate conflicts touched 
upon the factors that can explain a particular civil war outcome. By examining the impact 
of third party interventions on the civil process, Dylan Balch-Lindsay, Andrew K. 
Enterline, and Kyle A. Joyce have observed the effect of foreign support on the duration 
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of various civil war outcomes.
67
 In this rare study that looks at interactions among the 
stages of conflict, the authors applied a Cox competing risks model to analyze the time to 
different intrastate conflict outcomes while controlling for elements of separatists wars, 
factor of democracy, and economic development among others. Their findings indicate 
that foreign support increases the likelihood of the military success of the side that 
received assistance, while in the situation when third parties extend help to both sides of 
conflict, negotiated settlements does not appear to be a viable solution.
68
  
An alternative approach to explaining outcomes of internal conflicts was proposed 
by James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin in the paper “Civil War Termination.” Using a 
“random narratives” method to examine the causal mechanisms behind a civil war 
settlement, the authors have found that “civil wars will tend to end when there is a 
significant shock to the relative power or cost tolerance of one side or the other, such as 
the beginning or end of major foreign support to government or rebels.”69 Furthermore, 
the authors criticize the existing assumption about the clear distinction between military 
victory and negotiated outcome solutions on the basis that any civil war outcome already 
incorporates a degree of negotiation between warring sides. Instead, they propose to 
focus on center- and autonomy-seeking wars as a more applicable theoretical framework 
for the study of civil war termination.
70
 Finally, while focusing on examining case studies 
and not large-n statistical tests, Fearon and Laitin contended that foreign support and 
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Limitations of the Quantitative Approaches in the Study of Intrastate Conflicts 
 
Ted Robert Gurr’s “Why Minorities Rebel: A Global Analysis of Communal 
Mobilization and Conflict since 1945” and Michael D. Ward, Brian D. Greenhill and 
Kristin M. Bakke’s “The Perils of Policy by P-Value: Predicting Civil Conflicts” address 
the intricacies of intrastate conflict using quantitative methods. The scope and questions 
that the authors ask vary greatly. On one hand, Ted Gurr’s article is a clear example of a 
traditional approach for the analysis of internal conflict using statistical tools. On the 
other hand, Ward, Greenhill, and Bakke focus on broader issues of predictability and 
critique the pitfalls of using the very same statistical methods for determining the onset of 
conflict. 
 Emphasizing the state-centric focus of the previous research on conflicts, Gurr 
offers a new approach that focuses on the communal groups and asserts the main purpose 
of the research in testing “elements of a general model of the conditions under which 
communal groups mobilize for political action to assert and protect group interests.”72  
Gurr determines a dependent variable as an extent of a protest or rebellion that communal 
groups perpetrate against their governments in the 1980’s, and then opens a broader 
discussion about defining and categorizing communal groups. The author provides a 
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lengthy overview of peculiarities of ethnoclasses, ethnonationalitites, communal 
contenders, military sects and indigenous peoples, but also recognizes the theoretical 
complexity of cross-national study of such diverse actors that are broadly associated with 
the term communal groups. Through breaking down previous academic findings about 
motives behind protests and rebellions, Gurr determines the key aspects of the general 
model such as political action, grievances, and mobilization.
73
 For each of these core 
variables, the author develops a categorical codification. Furthermore, he creates 
additional indicators by adding economic, political, and demographic attributes as well as 
chronological periodization to the core variables. Not surprisingly, Gurr builds his central 
hypotheses on the effects of democracy and democratization on the severity of protest 
that a communal group will exercise: 
1. Institutionalized democracy facilitates non-violent communal protest.  
2. In democratizing autocracies, democratization is predicted to facilitate 
mobilization for violent communal protest and rebellion.  
Gurr does not go into detail while explaining methodological instruments he used 
for analyzing the behavior of the communal groups. The author confines himself to 
determining correlations between communal protest and rebellion indicators as well as 
providing exploratory regression analysis. However, since the author developed 
categorical dependent variables for his model, binomial regressions were utilized to 
determine the relationship between the indicators. What he lacked in methodology, the 
author compensated for in extensive analysis of findings. After providing a detailed 
overview of five group models and highlighting correlation nuances, Gurr created two 
complete models of Communal Protest and Communal Rebellion in the 1980s. Statistical 
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analysis of these models supports Gurr’s argument that mobilization and one of two types 
of grievances have a significant explanatory power in both Communal Protest and 
Rebellion.  
Outlining methodological shortcomings in the works of Ted Gurr, a renowned 
pundit in the sphere of conflict studies, is rather challenging. While many gray areas such 
as preoccupation with large-n comparisons, complications of codification, and 
peculiarities of groups were pointed out by the author, one can argue that greater 
attention could be given to clarifying the methodological basis of research. Since the 
study covers the period from 1945 to 1989, it might benefit from time-series analysis. 
Moreover, Gurr only briefly mentions the effects of the lag variable which are clearly 
important since such a large chronological period was examined.   
While Gurr denies the pursuit of maximizing the variance, his results depend 
entirely on identifying statistical significant relationships. In “The Perils of Policy by P-
value: Predicting Civil Conflicts” Michael D. Ward, Brian D. Greenhill and Kristin M. 
Bakke argue against an indivisible focus on statistical significance, and instead offer a set 
of tests to analyze the predictive efficiency of the often-cited models of civil wars. For 
their analysis, the authors utilize results from Fearon and Laitin’s article “Ethnicity, 
Insurgency, and Civil War” as well as Collier and Hoeffler’s “Greed and Grievance in 
Civil War.”74 Models of civil war occurrence developed by above-mentioned authors 
were used for building policy actions by the United States and the World Bank. Policy 
application of their findings speaks to concerns regarding the precision and dangers of 
self-fulfilling predictions. Ward, Greenhill, and Bakke argue that current models have to 
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be diligently scrutinized with a particular focus on the statistically significant variables. 
The authors subject Fearon and Laitin as well as Collier and Hoeffler’s models to the test 
of predictability based on the dichotomous indicator (war or no war) and amount of 
generated false positives.  
To illustrate the dependency of false and true positives in each model, the authors 
generated Receiver Operator Characteristic (ROC) plots for both models. The ROC plot 
describes the relationship between the conflicts that were predicted correctly to the 
number of false positives. Both models performed poorly as they produced almost the 
same amount of false negatives as positives when the threshold of statistical significance 
becomes lower. In the next test, the authors analyzed the predictive power of models by 
gradually removing the most significant variables. After excluding these indicators (GDP 
and Population), the authors observed that the new model with minimal predicting power 
outperformed previous models and inferred that “the inclusion of statistically significant 
variables can actually reduce our ability to make correct predictions.”75 While that 
analysis was performed using an existing dataset, Ward, Greenhill, and Bakke went 
further and introduced a cross-validation out-of-sample analysis. Using four smaller 
subsets of country-year observations, the authors tested each model and calculated the 
area under the curve (AUC) to determine predictive power. Although both models 
reached reasonable level of predictions, the authors notice that they didn’t suffer from 
overfitting.
76
 Yet again, new models that were less parsimonious but without statistically 
significant variables showed better results, rather than those where statistically significant 
indicator being the only covariate.  
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 While Ward, Greenhill, and Bakke’s study provides a substantial critique of the 
traditional approaches to conflict occurrence (including Gurr’s work), there are still a few 
drawbacks to point out. It is certainly true that the caution should be exercised when one 
claims that statistical significance is associated with the predictive power. At the same 
time, the authors do not propose a remedy for this conundrum aside from in-sample and 
out-of-sample validity methods. The overview of these two articles speaks to the 
limitations of the current empirical analysis in the sphere of intrastate conflicts. The 
research design of this study, which relies on the quantitative methods, addresses the 
issue of reliance on statistically significant variables by investigating their explanatory 
power through a series of case studies.  
 
Prospective Directions for the Debate 
 
 The civil war debate has been developing at a steady rate since the end of the 
Cold War through accumulation of knowledge and contestation of ideas. With some level 
of confidence, it is possible to characterize this debate as mature with defined topics, 
methodology, and exchange of ideas. However, the maturity of the debate does not mean 
that it has exhausted its analytical and factual potential, but instead suggests that the 
theoretical boundaries as well as seminal works have being largely outlined. The 
availability of prior large-n studies such as Correlates of War project and UCDP/PRIO 
datasets, chronological and cross-country extent of internal conflicts as well as the 
possibility of comparative analysis add up to the prevalence of empirical methods. While 
such studies give policymakers concrete results, which aim at general applicability, they 
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sometimes fall short due to problems of data availability and methodological 
manipulations.  
 The possible solution to the overwhelming reliance on statistical significance lies 
in applying statistical inferences to real-life scenarios, which will reveal the nuances not 
captured by the “wide-angle” lens. The second possible direction of further research 
might be based on incorporating new unique internal conflicts in which access to global 
social networks, application of modern warfare, and changing mindset of third parties had 
a tremendous impact. For example, this area of analysis can be applied toward 
understanding the phenomenon of the Arab Spring and its larger impact in the Middle 
East. Third, potentially productive avenue for future inquiries into the nature of intrastate 
warfare lies in exploring cultural and religious factors, globalization and mass media. 
These factors start to characterize heavily the dynamics of the contemporary civil wars 
such as crises in Syria and Iraq, while ignoring them arguably means failing to capture 
the future of intrastate conflict. 
 Overall, the civil war debate is characterized by the fragmentation of the central 
phenomenon of civil war into several sub-debates that analyze particular stages of 
internal conflict: onset, dynamics, third party intervention, and solutions. The dynamics 
of the intellectual exchange of ideas was heavily influenced by critical phases: 
compilation of the comprehensive intrastate conflict datasets; introduction of the 
motivation-opportunity-(identity) framework; elaboration of the resource extraction 
approach; and, empirical testing of civil war solutions. The civil war field, by and large, 
grew by borrowing the ideas from related disciplines (sociology, economics, psychology, 
etc.), elaboration of the statistical techniques, and accumulation of empirical evidence. 
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Finally, time really matters in this debate because a couple of decades from now it will be 
possible to clearly distinguish between the civil wars of the Cold War period, post-Cold 
War, and modern (2010+) types of internal conflicts. 
 
Sociological Approach to Civil Wars 
 
Following the quantitative revolution in social sciences, a growing locus of 
scholarship on causes and consequences of civil war shifted toward an empirical 
examination of conflict. The formidable quantitative inquiries into creating the typology 
of wars that consequently could be utilized to establish temporal and cross-sectional 
trends has fundamentally altered the debate about the existence of armed violence. Even 
this study of the onset and termination of civil wars falls under largely a similar paradigm 
of applying statistical methods for observing underlying links behind the armed conflict. 
While statistical models become more complex, empirical tests more robust, and p-values 
get smaller, the focus is shifting from viewing wars in their totality towards 
disaggregating the armed conflict into stages and examining each in as a separate 
phenomenon.    
Instead of making an argument against an empirical method, I advocate for the 
symbiotic approach between scholarship that uses large-sample-size quantitative models 
and sociological inquiries into contentious politics pioneered by Sidney Tarrow, Charles 
Tilly and Doug McAdam. The first body of literature, which I examined earlier, offers a 
methodological and typological background regarding the internal wars. The second 
paradigm that focuses on contentious politics bridges the gap between different stages of 
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conflict through offering an overarching framework of processes and mechanisms of 
contention.  
Several seminal works including Dynamics of Contention by McAdam, Tarrow, 
and Tilly and Contentious Politics by Tilly and Tarrow offer voluminous theoretical 
insights into the similarities between various forms of contention such as strikes, 
nationalism, democratization, social movements, revolutions and civil wars.
77
 In contrast 
to previous studies, the contentious politics paradigm generates an understanding of 
conflict in its totality by emphasizing the persistence of contention among agents within 
the society. Thus, instead of fitting the complex phenomena of social movements and 
civil wars within robust “artificial” limits that are quantifiable, Tarrow, McAdam, and 
Tilly offer the view of contention as a continuum that can fluctuate from the “contained” 
to “transgressive” phase.78 Such a theoretical framework is better equipped to highlight 
the importance of dynamic nature of the conflict.  
According the Tarrow, McAdam and Tilly, contentious politics is an “episodic, 
public, collective interaction among makers of claims and their objects when (a) at least 
one government is a claimant, an object of claims, or a party to the claims and (b) the 
claims would, if realized, affect the interests of at least one of the claimants.”79 
Furthermore, the degree of contentious politics can vary from the contained form where 
“all parties to the conflict were previously established as constituted political actors” to a 
transgressive form where “at least some parties to the conflict are newly self-identified 
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political actors” and/or “at least some parties employ innovative collective action.”80 In 
other words, politics is inherently contentious but the form of claim-making that is 
exercised varies from well-established “peaceful” mechanisms to innovative tactics that 
are “unprecedented or forbidden within the regime in question.”81 The majority cases of 
contentious politics such as social movements, civil wars or nationalism are transgressive 
in nature, meaning that they involve actions that exist outside the established rules of the 
game and that also means using violence to achieve the claims.  
In the Dynamics of Contention, the authors outline how environmental, cognitive, 
and relational mechanisms and processes explain the sudden shifts in the “sustained 
contentious episode: a regime collapses, a guerrilla group comes to power, a set of 
activists shift from terror to collaboration.”82 In terms of the current study, the 
mechanisms outlined by McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly correspond to the onset factors of 
civil war, while the sudden shifts in contentious politics fall neatly as the termination of 
the intrastate conflict. While the authors identify a wide variety of mechanisms such as 
the depletion of resources, individual commitments to collective action, brokerage, 
certification or coalition formation, all of them, in principle, serve as triggers to 
contentious shifts that are coterminous with the termination factors proposed in this 
study.  
The goal of the Dynamics of Contention is to explain how various forms of 
contentious politics, be it a social movement, democratization or even wars, have similar 
patterns of development. At the same time, Tilly and Tarrow in Contentious Politics 
suggest that in comparison to other form of contention, lethal conflicts including civil 
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wars have unique characteristics.
83
 The authors posit that “the high stakes of claim 
making and the problem of sustaining armed force” are factors that distinguish large-
scale lethal conflicts from other forms of transgressive contentious politics. Furthermore, 
they contend that despite these peculiar features, lethal conflicts do in fact follow similar 
mechanism.
84
 Here, Tilly and Tarrow warn against two common misperceptions about 
armed conflict: reasons behind large-scale wars lie not in the mind of perpetrators, but are 
complex and multifaceted; and not all large scale wars are unique, but rather follow 
certain general principles that con be discerned and compared.
85
  
In Contentious Politics, Tilly and Tarrow make a crucial observation about the 
possibility of the occurrence of lethal conflict. The primary determinant of the state’s 
ability to prevent the outbreak of violence rests in the character of the political regime 
that is reflected through the “capacity of its central government and its degree of 
democracy.”86 Tilly and Tarrow define capacity as “the extent to which governmental 
action affects the character and distribution of population, activity, and resources within 
the government’s territory.”87 Furthermore, they define democracy through the political 
rights, level of influence that citizens have over their government, and how well they can 
be protected against governmental agents.  According to the authors, fluctuations in 
capacity can lead to either regime split or transfer of power: “high-capacity states reduce 
the threat by making it difficult for anyone to create rival concentrations of coercive 
means with their territories,” while the “low-capacity states more often face precisely the 
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threat that some rival actor will build up a major concentration of coercive means and use 
it to topple the existing rulers.”88 
 Specifically, in regards to civil wars, Tilly and Tarrow identified two broader 
groups depending on the regime type: “relatively high-capacity regimes, however 
democratic or undemocratic, containing significant zones that escape central control” and 
“low-capacity undemocratic regimes.”89 Both the theory of transgressive contentious 
politics as well as linkage between contentious mechanisms and sudden shifts outlined in 
Dynamics of Contention and their application toward the armed lethal conflicts in 
Contentious Politics offer a theoretical and methodological ground for an investigation of 
the inherent relationship between the form of the intrastate conflict onset and its 
termination. The goal of this research is to establish the trends within this framework and 
explain them from both macro level approach and by looking at individual cases. 
The study of the state capacity as an element of contentious politics and by 
extension of intrastate conflict has its roots in the literature that investigates the impact of 
governance on the economic performance. In the seminal article “State Capacity and 
Economic Intervention in the Early New Deal,” Theda Skocpol and Kenneth Finegold 
have analyzed state capacity not through the prism of the ability of the government to 
intervene in the economic affairs of the state, but also through the efficiency of such 
intervention.
90
 Recent scholarship views state capacity as a necessary precondition for 
economic growth as it draws attention to “the authority of the state within its territory —
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the capacity to maintain order and enforce the laws — and the administrative capacity to 
develop, fund, and carry out its policies.”91  
In the interdisciplinary literature on conflict and development, weak state capacity 
has been widely associated with the fragile state and consequently with the higher risk of 
civil war or international conflict.
92
 Thus, Timothy Besley and Torsten Persson analyzed 
state capacity in terms of the fiscal capacity to collect taxes and legal capacity to support 
markets.
93
 Through modeling internal conflict dynamics, the authors have suggested that 
“high resource dependence may jointly trigger a high propensity toward conflict, low 
income, and low investments in legal and fiscal capacity.”94 Cameron G. Thies in the 
article “Of Rulers, Rebels, and Revenue: State Capacity, Civil War Onset, and Primary 
Commodities” using the predatory theory indirectly tests the assumptions put forth by 
Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow regarding the role of state capacity in the civil war 
onset.
95
 By assuming state capacity to be a function of its fiscal size and strength, Thies 
found no relationship between state capacity and the onset of civil war.
96
 At the same 
time, his inquiry into the role that various resources play in conflict suggested that many 
primary commodities, including oil, in fact enhance state capacity defined through fiscal 
dimensions.
97
 While administrative, bureaucratic or fiscal elements of a state capacity are 
obviously valid determinant of the government’s ability to intervene into economic or 
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social life of the society during periods of peace, factors of military capacity and quality 




Application of the Path Dependence Theory To the Study of Intrastate Conflicts 
 
Civil wars are complex and multifaceted phenomena. The starting point for the 
analysis of intrastate conflict dynamics lies in a choice that the researcher makes 
regarding the nature of this type of war. The choice is simple: civil wars are unique 
events and should be analyzed on case-by-case basis, or civil wars are inherently similar 
and the goal of the researcher is to uncover those commonalities. I adhere to the second 
approach and suggest that not only do intrastate conflicts follow common patterns in 
regards to their onset and termination, but also that the fluctuations in the initial onset 
conditions of conflict are responsible for differences of civil war resolution. In this study, 
I apply the concept of path dependence in intrastate conflicts as both the theoretical 
construction to explain the overarching dynamics of war and the analytic tool for testing 
hypotheses about the onset-termination dynamics. 
In addition to the initial research design that compares the instances of civil war 
onset and termination, an analysis of the civil war through the lens of path dependence 
requires establishing the common theoretical framework; application of the path 
dependence paradigm to the study of intrastate conflicts; and elaboration of the methods 
that are used to capture civil war dynamics. Although the idea of path dependence was 
thoroughly examined in the social science literature in the past decades, the wide variety 
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of notions that was generated in the recent scholarship offers competing rather than 
complementary definitions of the path dependence. 
.  
Characteristics of the Path Dependence 
 
While the idea of path dependence seems rather intuitive, it is critical to examine 
theoretical approaches to this multifaceted concept. The most common definition of the 
path dependence describes it as a process in which the outcomes are dependent on the 
choices that were made in the earlier stages.
99
 Yet, this simplistic understanding has been 
gradually revised to accommodate and explain a great number of phenomena in 
technological, economic, and political dimensions. Path dependence as a concept found 
its earlier description and application in the field of economics. The seminal work by 
Paul A. David, which focused on the famous success story behind the QWERTY 
keyboard, offered a platform for the subsequent debate about the nature of path 
dependence.
100
 David defined this phenomena as “one of which important influences 
upon the eventual outcome can be exerted by temporally remote events, including 
happenings dominated by chance elements rather than systematic forces.”101  
The essential quality of path dependence that he emphasized was its non-
ergodicity as “stochastic processes like that do not converge automatically to a fixed-
point distribution of outcomes.”102 Although the notion of ergodicity has a wide 
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application in the fields of mathematics, physics, and probability theory, in this study I 
adhere to the economic application of this concept. In simple terms, an ergodic system is 
one not susceptible to frequent changes meaning that the same theories can be applied 
repeatedly overtime to explain it.
103
 The idea of non-ergodicity was further developed by 
Paul A. David in the paper “Path Dependence, Its Critics and the Quest for ‘Historical 
Economics’.”104 Through the elaboration of path-independent processes whose dynamics 
“guarantee convergence to a unique, globally stable equilibrium configuration” and 
through defining ergodic stochastic systems as those where “there exists an invariant 
(stationary) asymptotic probability distribution that is continuous over the entire feasible 
space of outcomes – that is, a limiting distribution that is continuous over all the states 
that are compatible with the energy of the system,” David concludes that the non-ergodic 
processes are characterized by the inability to “shake free of their history, are said to 
yield path dependent outcomes.”105 Thus, his particular interest with dominance of 
QWERTY over other more efficient types of keyboards emerged from the hypothesis 
about the degree to which “history matters” in the economic analytical framework.  
 One of the earliest applications of the idea of path dependence in the sphere of 
political science revolved around the processes of development. According to Kevin 
Morgan, the seminal works of Albert Otto Hirschman The Strategy of Economic 
Development and Karl Gunnar Myrdal Economic Theory and Underdeveloped Regions 
ignited the interest in the notion of path dependence and “cumulative causation as the key 
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self-reinforcement mechanism.”106 While also not directly using the term of path 
dependence, Timur Kuran elaborates on the reasons behind the spontaneous onset of the 
revolutions in Eastern Europe in the late eighties and alludes to the power of the initial 
conditions.
107
 He builds up on the structuralist approaches to revolutions proposed by 
Theda Skocpol by emphasizing the distribution of thresholds and shifts in the public and 
private preferences of citizens.
108
 Kuran’s theory that focuses on revolutionary 
bandwagoning emphasizes the duality of an individual that is “powerless because a 
revolution requires the mobilization of large number” and, at the same time, “very 
powerful because under the right circumstances he may set off a chain reaction that 
generates the necessary mobilization.”109 Despite the fact that the idea of historical 
causality has been used by the students of politics for millennia and the elaboration of 
exactly how and why history matters occupied the minds of the prominent thinkers of old 
and new, it was still an economic approach to path dependence that shed new light on the 
power of cause and effect.  
 
Two Notions of Path Dependence 
 
The majority of recent scholarship on path dependence refers to Paul Pierson’s 
article “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics” as the bridge 
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from economic foundations to political applications of this phenomenon. While noting 
that earlier works in sociology did mention the importance of temporal factors, sequence 
or small-scale events, Pierson contends the overwhelming assumption in the field was 
that macro outcomes result from macro reasons.
110
 To investigate the application of path 
dependence in the social science, he elaborated on its main premise of increasing returns. 
According to Pierson, the idea of increasing returns can be applied in two ways:  
 First, they pinpoint how the costs of switching from one alternative to another 
will, in certain social contexts, increase markedly over time. Second, and related, 
they draw attention to issues of timing and sequence, distinguishing formative 
moments or conjunctures from the periods that reinforce divergent paths. In an 





 Pierson sees a wide applicability of path dependence in politics in terms of study 
of power asymmetries, collective action, and institutions. Yet, the traditional definition of 
path dependence as the impact of prior events on later outcomes seems to be limited in 
explaining the abovementioned instances. He argues that it is important not only to 
outline the path, but also to understand why things occurred in a particular manner. 
Building up on Margaret Levi’s elaboration of path dependence as a process in which the 
reversal from a particular course is costly (the notion of switching costs), Pierson 
suggests that the notion of increasing returns can also be analyzed as “self-reinforcing or 
positive feedback processes.”112 Reflecting on existing approaches to path dependence, 
he outlines a broader definition that highlights “causal relevance of preceding stages in a 
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temporal sequence” and a narrow definition emphasizing “social processes that exhibit 
increasing returns.”113 
 In his seminal article, alongside providing a definitional foundation, Pierson 
outlined conditions that are specifically relevant for path dependence processes in 
politics. Thus, under the narrower definition that stresses the factor of increasing returns, 
path dependence is characterized by multiple equilibria of the outcomes; contingency or 
the impact of small events that occur at the right moment; the critical role of timing and 
sequence; and inertia or resistance to deviate from the path.
114
 Adopting the analytical 
framework of path dependence implies the need for reassessment of the established 
approaches to understanding the political processes, be it institutional development or 
inquiries into asymmetries of power. 
In regards to the problem statement outlined in this study, it is imperative to 
analyze the applicability of the path dependence paradigm in analyzing the onset-
termination dynamics of intrastate conflict. According to Pierson, the key implication of 
path dependence for political science is the “need to focus on branching points and on 
specific factors that reinforce the paths established in these points.”115 Hereafter, I 
propose a theoretical framework that extends Pierson’s argument into the study of the 
intrastate conflicts. Table 1 below provides an overview of the path dependence 













Table 1. Comprehensive Research Design Framework. 
 Focus Approach 
Research Design A Initial conditions Quantitative large-n 
Research Design B Tipping points Quantitative large-n 
Research Design C Case studies Comparative qualitative 
 
 
The central point of inquiry in this study is the analysis of the relationship 
between the onset and termination of intrastate conflicts. Specifically, I hypothesize that 
the outcome of civil war, be it a victory of the government, compromise or success of the 
rebels, is intrinsically related to the factors which are commonly understood to have 
caused a particular intrastate conflict. Although it is possible to test empirically the 
correlation between the onset and termination variables (what I will label Research 
Design A), this approach, while satisfying the requirements for the broad definition of 
path dependence, tells very little about the dynamics of the process and the mechanisms 
involved.  
To investigate and explain fluctuations in civil war outcomes through the lens of 
civil war onset factors, it is imperative to treat an intrastate conflict as a path dependent 
process. Here, I borrow the narrow definition that was elaborated by Paul Pierson where 
increasing returns serve as a key determinant of the path dependence. Furthermore, I 
investigate the effect of branching points or tipping factors that are responsible for 
preventing the deviation from a particular course of action or in our case, civil war 
outcome (what I call Research Design B). This approach is also consistent with the 
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theoretical framework of contentious politics that I use to justify the importance of the 
comprehensive approach toward analyzing intrastate conflicts. Both Pierson in article 
“Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics” and Doug McAdam, 
Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow in Dynamics of Contention have highlighted the 





Path Dependence and Intrastate Conflicts 
 
Both approaches to understanding path dependent processes that are outlined in 
this chapter are self-sufficient in their own right. The initial research design that offers a 
large-n study of intrastate conflicts following the end of the World War II stresses the 
possibility of inherent correlation between onset and termination factors. It also treats the 
null hypothesis regarding the absence of such interrelation with equal attention, since the 
finding of no relationship between causes of civil wars and the ways they are solved can 
contribute to the critical debate about modern peacemaking efforts. An absence of path 
dependence will not only provide a better understanding about the nature of intrastate 
wars but also devise viable approaches toward mitigating the most prolific type of violent 
conflict. If the analysis finds no reasonable signs of path dependence in intrastate 
conflict, it would be valid to assume the uniqueness of each particular civil war and the 
need for an in-depth country-specific inquiry into nature of internal conflict. On the other 
hand, if the large-n analysis provides sufficient data to validate the claim of path 
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dependence in intrastate conflict, this alone will be enough to investigate further the 
possibility of the correlation/causation conundrum through proceeding to what I will 
label Research Design C that focuses on case studies. 
 In a sense, the comparison of the onset and termination of intrastate conflicts that 
I propose in Research Design A follows the logic of the broad definition of path 
dependence that Paul Pierson summarized as “causal relevance of preceding stages in a 
temporal sequence.”117 The observation of correlation or lack of thereof between the 
starting conditions and outcomes in internal warfare would satisfy the requirement for the 
broad definition of path dependence. Detecting path dependence in intrastate conflicts for 
the selected period of time would be substantial in itself not only because of the novelty 
of the methodological approach, but equally because of the research and policy 
implications. While contemporary scholarship has entertained the idea of path 
dependence in intrastate conflicts, it largely avoids the analysis of the broader definition 
of path dependence, instead attempting to evaluate the bargaining mechanisms rather than 
testing the overarching assumption.
118
 
 The broad definition of path dependence also allows for testing the presence of 
path dependence in intrastate conflict only through juxtaposing the onset and termination 
elements without justification for the possible intervening variables that could impact the 
course of the civil war. While it is possible that exogenous or endogenous forces can 
affect the outcome of the intrastate conflict, the requirement for observing path 
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dependence in the broad context is satisfied with the presence of at least two stages of the 
process. Since this will be the first attempt at testing path dependence in intrastate 
conflicts, it is not required to extend the process stages beyond the onset and outcome 
conditions. Upon the initial testing purported in the Research Design A, I proceed with 
elaborating the factors that could trigger changes in the outcome following the start of 
civil war.  
In Research Design B, the broad definition of path dependence is narrowed down 
to explain the dynamics behind the process through the introduction of factors that could 
account for the phenomena of increasing returns and switching costs. Both in the 
contentious politics and economics scholarship, these factors were suggested to be the 
tipping points or branching points respectively.
119
 The observation of path dependence in 
civil wars in a broader sense postulating “that what has happened at an earlier point in 
time will affect the possible outcomes of a sequence of events occurring at a later point in 
time” is crucial on its own.120 Yet, actually tracing mechanisms that could account for 
heightening the switching costs and increasing returns by testing the hypothesis of the 
tipping points will provide more fruitful research agenda and policy implications.   
While attempts have been made to transfer and adapt the logic of path dependent 
processes from the economic sphere to the political realm by outlining not only the 
mechanisms, but also characteristics of such processes, little attention was given to the 
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areas outside of power asymmetries, collective action, and institutions.
121
 Hereafter, I 
theorize about the applicability of W. Brian Arthur’s features of increasing returns and 
Paul Pierson’s review of path dependence characteristics of political process to the study 
of war in general and intrastate conflict in particular.  
In the seminal work Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy, 
which Paul Pierson utilized to extrapolate the logic of path dependence into political 
sphere, renowned economist W. Brian Arthur outlined four features that describe the self-
reinforcing mechanisms.
122
 These are multiple equilibria or unpredictability of the 
outcomes; possible inefficiency of the outcome; lock-in or inflexibility of the outcomes 
once the increasing returns are in play; and, path dependence or non-ergodic dynamics. 
While such self-enforcing or autocatalytic systems are observed in physics, chemistry, 
and biology, Arthur’s primary purpose was to search for such processes in the field of 
economics. Many scholars including Arthur turned to the dominance of certain 
technologies such as QWERTY or VHS as the most evident systems that exhibit 
increasing returns. Can intrastate wars exhibit the path dependence dynamics? While this 
question will be elaborated in subsequent chapters through a series of statistical tests, it is 
equally important to analyze internal warfare through the four features that Arthur 
suggested in the abovementioned work.  
As I have mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the nature internal conflict 
is still debated. The primary concern is whether we should treat each case of civil war as 
a unique phenomenon or suggest that there are similar patterns in civil war dynamics that 
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can be observed across temporal and spatial dimensions. I adhere to the second postulate 
and argue that we can uncover similarities throughout various instances of internal 
warfare. Whereas the recent scholarship on intrastate conflicts has been largely successful 
at “discovering” inherent tendencies in the civil wars’ onset, dynamics, and termination, 
the claims regarding the possibility of predicting the outcome of war have not entered in 
the mainstream literature.  
The second aspect of self-enforcing systems, the inefficiency of the outcome, 
stems from the assumption that war in itself is the suboptimal result that is more costly 
than peace. Following James Fearon’s seminal hypothesis about war as a failure of the 
bargaining process, it is valid to assume that in intrastate conflicts the outcome is 
oftentimes inefficient.
123
 The third feature, lock-in or inflexibility of switching to 
alternative outcomes, can also characterize intrastate conflicts. Later in the chapter, I 
elaborate the lock-in feature through outlining exogenous or endogenous tipping points in 
the course of civil war.  Finally, by juxtaposing the onset factors with the various 
outcome of intrastate conflict as I do in Research Design A, it is valid to assume that civil 
wars are non-ergodic systems where the differences in the earlier conditions influence the 
later stages. All four features that Arthur outlined for self-reinforcing systems (path 
dependent processes) in the field of economics can be applied to study of intrastate 
conflicts. 
If we agree with Carl von Clausewitz that war is simply a continuation of politics 
by other means, than perhaps we can also elaborate on the applicability of Paul Pierson’s 
characterization of path dependence processes in politics to the study of intrastate 
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conflicts. According to Pierson, path dependence in the narrower definition that stresses 
increasing returns in social processes is characterized by the multiple equilibria; 
contingency; a critical role for timing and sequencing; and inertia.
124
 Both Pierson and 
Arthur consider multiple equilibria or unpredictability of the outcome as the inherent 
feature of the path dependence. Indeed, in economic, political, and war dimensions it is 
increasingly complicated to predict correctly the outcome of the process. Pierson’s 
second characteristic, contingency or “relatively small events, if they occur at the right 
moment, can have large and enduring consequences,” can, although selectively, be 
applied to the study of intrastate conflicts.
125
 The power of small events – like the self-
immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi in 2010 that arguably sparked revolution in Tunisia or 
use of social media by activists to initiate revolution in Egypt the same year – has given 
rise to assumptions that small scale events could cause large-scale consequences. Yet, the 
countless incidences of similar actions like for example self-immolation by Tibetan 
protestors against Chinese rule did not led to the outbreak of civil war. These contrasting 
results highlight the third aspect of path dependence in political sphere, the critical role of 
timing and sequencing. Finally, Pierson’s feature of inertia that is consistent with 
Arthur’s lock-in characteristic can be found across the variety of intrastate wars. I argue 
that internal and external forces create a positive feedback and establish conditions under 
which switching to alternative outcomes is unlikely. I elaborate this assumption reflected 
in the Research Design B in the subsequent parts of this dissertation. 
 
 
                                                        
124
 Ibid, 263. 
125
 Paul Pierson, “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics,” American Political 
Science Review Vol. 94, no. 2 (June, 2000): 261. 
65 
 
Tipping Points in Intrastate Conflicts 
 
Four sub-debates in the field of intrastate conflicts that I outlined earlier in this 
chapter share the reductive approach. They generated valuable insights into the nature of 
war, yet rarely communicated between each other. Introduction of the path dependence 
theory offers a dialogue that connects different stages of conflict. Although theoretically 
there can be a multitude of factors that could and do intervene in the course of civil war, 
modern scholarship on intrastate conflict stresses the significance of certain internal and 
external determinants. Below, I outline several of these factors or tipping points that alter 
the flow of intrastate conflict. These factors can be grouped into two large categories. The 
first group is characterized by the presence of exogenous forces in the conflict such as the 
involvement of the United Nations as a global collective security institution; military 
peacemaking intervention by the regional intergovernmental organization; and, state-led 
third party intervention on the behalf of either rebels or the government.  
 
Table 2. Exogenous Tipping Points and Civil War Outcomes. 
Exogenous Tipping Point Civil War outcome 
UN intervention Compromise 
Regional IGO intervention Compromise 
State intervention for government Government wins 
State intervention for rebels Rebels win 
 
 
In the table 2, I summarize my expectations about the correlation between 
different exogenous tipping points and civil war outcomes. I argue that the presence of 
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United Nations forces in an intrastate conflict would be more conducive to a compromise 
outcome since the primary task of the peacekeeping missions is to prevent hostilities 
from warring sides and encouragement of a compromise rather than siding with either 
government or rebel counterpart. While UN peacekeeping activities are aimed at 
mediation and provision of avenues for peace dialogue, it is important to outline several 
caveats that could explain this peculiar outcome of internal conflict.  
The idea of peacekeeping was not originally integrated in the Charter of the 
United Nations, but rather appeared as a response to the changing dynamics of conflict on 
a global scale. Although civil wars and domestic unrest occasionally erupted, they were 
disproportionately less numerous than conflicts between nation-states. The pivotal change 
in the global conflict environment occurred in the second half of the twentieth century 
following the devastation of the Second World War, as the number of intrastate conflicts 
superseded the incidence of wars between the states.
126
  
 Despite the global ideological confrontation and de jure absence of provisions 
regarding peacekeeping, the United Nations were able to initiate lightly armed observer 
missions in the late 1940s with the aim of monitoring ceasefires and providing buffer 
zones between combatants. These were the United Nations Truce Supervision 
Organization and the Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan, which still maintain 
their presence in the Middle East and Jammu and Kashmir areas respectively.
127
 After 
mediating the Suez Crisis, peacekeepers started to be distinguished by the blue berets and 
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 Gradually, the idea of preventive diplomacy was 
incorporated in peacekeeping rhetoric. But it was not until the end of the Cold War that 
peacekeeping was able to unleash its true potential. 
 From 1989 onward, the number of peacekeeping operations and personnel 
significantly increased and the thinking behind these missions’ tactical and strategic 
purpose evolved. The traditional functions of peacekeeping such as monitoring ceasefires 
have been expanded “from helping to build sustainable institutions of governance, to 
human rights monitoring, to security sector reform, to the disarmament, demobilization 
and reintegration of former combatants.”129 The shift toward more humanitarian 
dimensions also required new types of actors such as police and civilian personnel, in 
addition to the military forces that still remain essential for security purposes.   
 In 2000, the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council conducted a 
series of high-level discussions on the future of peacekeeping called the Panel on United 
Nations Peace Operations. The final document prepared by a group chaired by Lakhdar 
Brahimi outlined the current state of peacekeeping’s major drawbacks and avenues for 
improvement. The Brahimi Report pointed out three strategic activities of the UN in the 
sphere of peace operations: conflict prevention and peacemaking; peacekeeping; and, 
peacebuilding.
130
 The first step, conflict prevention and peacemaking, aims at addressing 
the structural sources of conflict and, if the conflict has erupted, providing mediation and 
diplomatic solutions. The second step, peacekeeping, has evolved from the traditional 
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role of being a barrier between warring sides into a complex operation with the 
participation of civilian counterparts. Finally, it describes peacebuilding as a process of 
creating space for peace to thrive, which consists of “reintegrating former combatants 
into civilian society, strengthening the rule of law … ; improving respect for human 
rights through the monitoring, education and investigation of past and existing abuses; 
providing technical assistance for democratic development … ; and promoting conflict 
resolution and reconciliation techniques.”131 
 The transformation of UN peacekeepers from being merely buffer zones between 
two warring states to engaging actively in the internal conflict on behalf of one of the 
parties is a substantial factor for the objective analysis of the UN interventions as a 
tipping factor and is duly acknowledged in the present inquiry. While the role of UN 
forces as a tipping factor in intrastate conflicts tends to favor compromise-oriented 
solutions, the involvement of the regional intergovernmental organizations and its impact 
on the war outcome appears to be less straightforward. Regional inter-governmental 
organizations that intervene in intrastate conflicts vary significantly in terms of political, 
economic and military capacity to fulfill the mission; internal cohesion; and legitimacy in 
the country of involvement. Moreover, the majority of organizations that are actively 
intervening in intrastate conflicts were either formed following the end of the Cold War 
or relieved of the bipolar global gridlock that prevented them from an active engagement. 
Despite these differences, intergovernmental organizations such as the Organization for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the 
European Union, the African Union or the League of Arab States tend to intervene 
following the resolution from the United Nations and, therefore, abide to the same 





principles of halting the hostilities and securing peaceful solutions. Thus, it is possible to 
make a tentative hypothesis that the involvement of regional intergovernmental 
organizations is also conducive to a compromise solution. At the same time, the results of 
the tests could suggest the discrepancies of the outcomes due to the factors that have been 
discussed earlier. 
The role of third party interventions in the course of an intrastate conflict has been 
extensively examined in the scholarship on civil wars.
132
 The central focus in this 
subfield was generally on the duration of civil war or duration of peace after the civil war 
in case of third party interventions. Other areas of interest included the role of contagion 
in the decision of states or international organizations to intervene or decision-making of 
a third party based on the expectations of civil war outcome.  
A particularly interesting work for the current analysis of path dependence was 
Clayton L. Thyne’s study How International Relations Affect Civil Conflict: Cheap 
Signals, Costly Consequences in which he focused on the role of signals that states sent to 
the parties of intrastate conflict in terms of onset, duration and outcome. His 
comprehensive analysis suggested that the outcome of the civil war is “closely linked to 
expectations developed prior to the onset of rebellion.”133 Although Thyne bases his 
analysis on the bargaining theory of war to substantiate the role of signals that a third 
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party sends and claims that all stages on internal conflict are interrelated, his analysis 
does not make a direct claim about the existence of path dependence through increasing 
returns and switching costs in civil wars. Thyne’s findings suggest that external actors’ 
supportive or hostile actions toward the government do, in fact, influence the outcome of 
the conflict. Therefore, despite certain difference in the research design, Thyne’s 
conclusion could be contrasted with results of the present inquiry about the role of the 
exogenous tipping points in the civil war outcomes.    
 
Table 3. Endogenous Tipping Points and Civil War Outcomes. 
Endogenous Tipping Point Civil War outcome 
High military capacity Government wins 
Low military capacity Rebels win 
Democratic regime Compromise 
Autocratic regime Government wins 
 
 
The second group of tipping factors that is introduced into the models of intrastate 
conflict to test path dependence dynamics delves into the structural characteristics of civil 
wars (Table 3). The fluctuations in the parameters of these endogenous features could 
alter the course of the internal conflict through creating the environment in which 
switching toward the alternative outcome will be too costly. In a sense, endogenous 
factors are aimed at capturing the internal dynamics of civil war that exist outside of 
direct influence by either government or rebel forces. The two types of endogenous 
tipping points introduced in the present inquiry are the size of the government’s military 
forces and fluctuations in the regime type. 
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Both endogenous tipping factors were identified by Charles Tilly and Sidney 
Tarrow as determinants of the government’s ability to prevent the outbreak of conflict.134 
According to the authors, government capacity and the level of democracy shape the 
effectiveness of regimes in the contentious politics. Their definition of state capacity as 
the “extent to which governmental action affects the character and distribution of 
population, activity, and resources with the government’s territory” effectively captures 
all aspects of regime’s control during the non-war period.135 While focusing on tax 
extractive and bureaucratic features of a regime might be useful in analyzing the onset 
conditions for civil wars, understanding the dynamics of the armed conflict period 
requires focusing the attention on the military capabilities of a state. 
The capacity of the political regimes to crack down on rebels is an abstract notion 
that could encompass several determinants. The first indicator of a government’s strength 
is the availability of offensive military capabilities that can be construed in terms of 
armed forces size, its resolve, and training. Here, I focus on the military capacity defined 
through the number of military personnel available to the government to topple the 
rebellion. The logic of correlation between the size of the army and the onset, duration 
and termination of an intrastate conflict has been extensively examined in the scholarly 
literature.
136
 While not necessarily an effective predictor of the onset of civil war as are 
other military proxies such as the GDP per capita or military expenditures, military 
personnel per capita can provide better insights into the termination dynamics of 
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Another indicator of regime effectiveness in contentious periods is the level of 
democracy, which could be captured through the POLITY IV indicators. Tilly and 
Tarrow define democracy as the “extent to which people subject to a given government’s 
authority have broad, equal political rights, exert significant influence (e.g., through 
competitive elections and referenda) over government personnel and policy, as well as 
receive protection from arbitrary action by governmental agents such as police, judges, 
and public.”138 In a sense, the form of government whether it is more democratic or 
authoritarian could inform the outcome of the internal conflict by pointing at the options 
that the government has in combating the rebels. The ability of an authoritarian 
government to exercise military force on rebels without repercussions to its own political 
survivability would allow them to avoid pressures from their own population and 
therefore would have the ability to rally more resources to topple the rebellion. At the 
same time, the government that is neither authoritarian nor democratic does not have an 
advantage of rallying resources and is more likely to fail in combating rebel forces. It is 
harder to hypothesize about possible outcomes of civil war in democratic regimes since 
by definition the inclusive politics and influence over government’s actions should 
prevent the civil wars from occurring in the first place. Nevertheless, if intrastate conflict 
does occur and the regime maintains enough political features to be considered 
democratic, it is valid to assume that the existing mechanisms and institutions would 
enable rebels and the government to address the grievances peacefully and deliver a 
compromise outcome. 
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 The existing scholarship on civil wars dates back to the accounts of conflict 
within states in the ancient world. The development of perspectives on the causes and 
consequences of intrastate conflicts is associated with the historic milestones such as the 
end of the Second World War, nuclear stalemate, and the fall of the Soviet Union. 
Current debates in the sphere of internal armed violence revolve around four distinct 
areas: onset of war, conflict dynamics, third party interventions, and conflict outcomes. 
Furthermore, the study of intrastate conflicts has burgeoned in the recent years through 
focusing on interdisciplinary approaches that involved sociology and formal modeling. 
While certain methodological limitations imply the use of caution when devising policy 
implications for predicting the dynamics of civil wars, the burgeoning of the discipline 
not only highlights the relevance of understanding the nature of the most abundant form 
of armed violence, but also indicates the potential for innovative approaches to the study 
of intrastate conflicts.  
The justification proposed in this chapter regarding the intervening factors that 
influence the course of the civil war and fixate certain outcomes are not exhaustive, but 
primarily serve as a logical exercise to propose testable hypotheses. Thus, I theorize that 
these tipping points when introduced by the external actor into the intrastate conflict 
(exogenous group) or are triggered by the internal factors (endogenous group) lead to 
unique civil war outcomes by increasing returns for a particular path and consequently 
elevating costs of switching to an alternative course of action. In chapter 6, I proceed 
with devising and testing models of path dependence in intrastate conflicts based on these 
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exogenous and endogenous factors. Thus, I transform theoretical justifications regarding 
the impact of tipping factors proposed above into quantifiable parameters.      
Rather than filling a missing niche in the existing literature on intrastate conflicts, 
this study generates a novel argument about whether or not history matters in civil wars 
through juxtaposing the onset and termination elements. Furthermore, the current 
approach encompasses the sociological perspectives of Tilly, Tarrow and McAdam about 
the turning points in contentious politics and the theory of path dependence that was 
primarily elaborated through the inquiries in the field of economics. 
The following chapter elaborates on three research frameworks introduced here 
and describes methodological tools that are used for each section. Furthermore, I provide 
information about two datasets that I have created to test the hypotheses of the Research 
Design A and B. Finally, I outline independent, dependent, and control variables and 





METHODOLOGY AND OPERATIONALIZATION OF VARIABLES 
 
Identifying Intrastate Conflicts 
 
 The notion of war has entered the lexicon as violence became a norm in solving 
disputes between tribes, cities, and nations at the dawn of our civilization. It is certainly 
true that we have some general understanding of the term, but for the purpose of this 
dissertation I outline the definition of war and then highlight the difference between 
intrastate conflicts and other types of warfare. While trivial and pervasive, the notion of 
war can be boiled down to the intrinsic elements that define it. Yet, it is the details that 
allow us to distinguish war from other forms of violence. According to Merriam-Webster 
Online Dictionary, war can be defined as: 
a. A state of usually open and declared armed hostile conflict between states or 
nations; 
b. A period of such armed conflict.1   
This explanation, despite being rather vague, points to the traditional 
misconception that the right to wage wars primarily belongs to states and nations. 
Possibly a tribute to our past when interstate war was indeed one of the ways to solve 
disputes between nations, war nevertheless has evolved beyond the domain of states and 
nations. In fact, after the World War II the number of wars between countries has slowly 
decreased, while the incidence of armed conflict within states has been on a steady rise. 
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Following the quantitative revolution in the social sciences the primary approach in 
academia toward understanding the phenomenon of war lies in outlining a definition that 
will distinguish it from other types of conflicts. The fathers of quantitative revolution and 
founders of an influential Correlates of War project, Melvin Singer and David Small, 
have suggested defining war through the prism of violence. Thus, they contended that 
“not only is war impossible without violence (except of course in the metaphorical 
sense), but we consider the taking of human life the primary and dominant characteristic 
of war.”2 Indeed, the focus on violence and specifically on the numerical component that 
Singer and Small encapsulated in the number of battle-related deaths gives us an abstract 
distinction between various types of violence.   
If the primary focus in understanding war is violence captured in terms of war 
casualties, then what are the distinctions that make civil wars different from other forms 
of conflict? In order to operationalize the civil war, one must reflect on the intrinsic 
dynamics of this particular type of conflict. A wide variety of projects and academic 
inquiries have emerged in the last fifty years attempting to define civil war in terms of 
quantifiable variables. While it was obvious that for intrastate wars the central 
confrontation would occur between the actors within the national border, a boundary 
between the numbers of casualties that would distinguish civil war from civil conflict 
became a central point of a disagreement.   
Three seminal projects have advanced our understanding about the character and 
mechanisms of the civil war: the Correlates of War project; “Greed and Grievance in 
Civil War” by Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler; and the Uppsala Conflict Data Program 
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(UCDP) Armed Conflict Dataset. The war typology that the Correlates of War project 
offers has been constantly evolving to reflect the difference in the character of diverse 
forms of violent conflict. Thus, the initial distinction of international wars and civil wars 
that was proposed by Melvin Small and David Singer has been since updated to 
differentiate interstate, extra-systemic, colonial, intercommunal and other types of wars.
3
 
Meredith Reid Sarkees in the guide to the fourth version of the Correlates of War project 
dataset “The COW Typology of War: Defining and Categorizing Wars (Version 4 of the 
Data)” has suggested the following definition of civil wars: 
The classification of civil war was built on three dimensions: internality, types of 
participants, and the degree of effective resistance. In general, a civil war was 
defined as any armed conflict that involved; (1) military action internal to the 
metropole of the state system member; (2) the active participation of the national 
government; (3) effective resistance by both sides; and (4) a total of at least 1,000 




An important revision to the Correlates of War definition was made by Paul 
Collier and Anke Hoeffler who accepted the 1,000 deaths threshold for an internal 
conflict, but also suggested that “in order to distinguish wars from massacres, both 
government forces and an identifiable rebel organization must suffer at least 5% of these 
casualties.”5 The critics of the Correlates of War project arbitrary benchmark of 1,000 
deaths argued that it does not adequately reflect the dynamics of the modern internal 
conflict. Consequently, researchers at Uppsala Conflict Data Program suggested that the 
civil war must be defined as “a contested incompatibility that concerns government or 
territory or both, where the use of force between two parties results in at least 25 battle-
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related deaths in a single calendar-year.”6 In addition, if the government does not 
participate as an actor in the internal conflict it cannot technically be considered a civil 
war. In my study, I adhere to the definition developed by the Correlates of War project 
and construct a new dataset that tests path dependence in intrastate conflicts based on the 




 The primary goal of my research is to identify the patterns in the onset and 
termination dynamics of the civil wars. As stated earlier, the existing literature has 
focused extensively on each stage of the intrastate conflict, but has not inquired into the 
phenomenon in all its totality. Therefore, it is imperative to conduct a cross-sectional 
evaluation of these tendencies or lack thereof regarding the civil wars that have been 
recorded and systematized.  
The analytical framework of this dissertation relies on the mixed methods 
research paradigm. The initial inquiry into the correlation between the onset factors and 
civil war settlement options are conducted through several empirical tests. The 
subsequent elaboration of civil war dynamics introduces the exogenous and endogenous 
tipping points to substantiate the narrow definition of path dependence. This step requires 
empirical refinements of the original hypotheses by including the intervening variables 
that control for temporal and sequential assumptions of path dependence. Finally, I 
propose a series of case studies that examine the explanatory power of the empirical 
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findings regarding path dependence in intrastate conflicts. In sum, the proposed research 
design follows the logic of mixed methods.  
While I designate three separate research approaches, I do not suggest that they 
are sequential, such that I need to test the hypotheses of Research Design A to get to B 
and, finally, to C. Instead, I consider all three frameworks to apply simultaneously to the 
central point of inquiry about path dependence in intrastate conflicts. Therefore, the logic 
of the mixed methods approach is to test a theory from different angles where each 
research design has a specific role in analyzing the wider picture of civil war dynamics. 
As Poteete, Janssen, and Ostrom in Working Together: Collective Action, the Commons, 
and Multiple Methods in Practice suggest, “case studies and small-N comparative 
research designs offer advantages for concept and theory development as well as 
evaluation of hypothesized causal sequences and mechanisms.”7 Since the core aspect of 
this dissertation is to develop and test a theory about the path dependence dynamics in 
intrastate conflict, methodological pluralism is required to investigate macro level 
hypotheses and delve into nuances through micro-level case studies. 
In order to determine the overarching patterns between the start and end of civil 
wars and influence of endogenous and exogenous tipping points, two comprehensive 
datasets, Onset-Termination of Intrastate Conflicts (OTIC) and Tipping Points in 
Intrastate Conflicts (TPIC), are introduced here that incorporate data from the Correlates 
of War (COW) project Dataset of Intra-State Wars v. 4.1 and the Dataset of National 
Material Capabilities v. 4.0; James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin’s dataset for the article 
“Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War”; the POLITY IV Project Dataset; Nathan Black’s 
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contagion dataset from “When Have Violent Civil Conflicts Spread? Introducing a 
Dataset of Substate Conflict Contagion”; the Diamond Dataset (DIADATA) by Elisabeth 
Gilmore, Päivi Lujala, Nils Petter Gleditsch & Jan Ketil Rød; Third Party Peacekeeping 
Missions, 1946-2012 (Version 3.0); and, the World Development Indicators dataset.
8
  
The current OTIC database consists of 127 cases of civil war that encompass immediate 
post-World War II period and span until the most recent episodes of an intrastate conflict 
that were codified in Correlates of War project.  
A series of multinomial logistic regressions are utilized to test the hypotheses 
regarding the dynamics of the termination and the onset of civil wars. Specifically, 
multinomial logistic regressions are applied to test the relationship between civil war 
outcomes and onset factors for Research Design A. The analysis of the impact of tipping 
factors in Research Design B involves the investigation of the temporal dimensions of 
conflict. To analyze the impact of the internal and external factors that could lock in the 
particular outcome of the conflict, I introduce a survival analysis framework. In 
particular, I investigate the competing risks assumptions regarding the interaction 
between multiple outcomes of civil wars and explanatory variables using the Cox 
proportional hazards model and the Fine and Gray method for competing risks model. 
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The analysis of the three cases outlined in the Research Design C requires a qualitative 
approach with the focus on application and elaboration of path dependence in specific 
instances of intrastate conflict.  
 
Research Design A 
 
 Given the broad definition of path dependence, the outcome of the civil war, 
whether it is the victory for government, compromise or victory of rebel forces, is 
dependent upon the factors that are considered to be behind the onset of the intrastate 
conflicts. The model that tests this argument encapsulates various types of the onset 
determinants such as the presence of lootable resources (secondary diamonds); an oil 
exporting economy; religious and ethnic fractionalization; possibilities of civil war 
spreading to other countries (contagion); and, a dummy variable for the period during and 
after the Cold War. The following hypotheses encapsulate the proposed interactions 
between onset conditions and civil war outcomes. 
 Hypothesis #1. Civil wars in countries with the presence of the lootable resources 
(secondary diamonds) are more likely to end up in the victory of rebels. Conflict or 
bloody diamonds are commonly known factors in sparking armed confrontations in 
various regions of the world. In an article “A Diamond Curse? Civil War and a Lootable 
Resource,” Lujala, Gleditsch, and Gilmore argued about the influence of secondary 
diamonds on instigating ethnic intrastate conflict.
9
 Thus, it is imperative to examine if 
diamonds continue to have an important role after the initiation of the hostilities. 
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Hypothesis #2. Civil wars that occurred in countries with an oil-exporting 
economy are more likely to end up with victory by the government. There is a formidable 
body of literature that connects oil with intrastate conflicts. In their seminal article, 
Fearon and Laitin have observed the effect that oil has on the outbreak of civil war.
10
 
Given these dynamics it is valid to assume that this lootable resource will also be pivotal 
in shaping the outcomes of civil conflicts. 
Hypothesis #3. Civil wars in countries that were affected by the conflict contagion 
are more likely to end up with rebels’ victory. By and large, previous analysis of the 
geography of conflict suggests that when a civil war erupts, neighboring states are likely 
to be affected by the spillover of the hostilities. Moreover, a country does not need to be 
located in the close proximity of an intrastate conflict to be affected by the armed 
violence. In the modern age, indirect financial and military contribution to spark the 
conflict can be provided by states and non-state groups located in different regions and 
even continents. Specifically, these tendencies apply to ideological or religiously 
motivated spillover of conflict. Here, I aim at evaluating whether or not these indirect 
causal contributions influence resolutions of civil wars.     
 Hypothesis #4. Civil wars in countries that are characterized by religious 
homogeneity are more likely to result in government’s victory. Alternatively, if civil wars 
occur in countries that are characterized by religious heterogeneity, they are more likely 
to result in rebel’s victory. 
Hypothesis #5. Civil wars in countries that are characterized by ethnic 
homogeneity are more likely to result in government’s victory. Alternatively, if civil wars 
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occur in countries that are characterized by ethnic heterogeneity, they are more likely to 
result in rebels’ victory. Ethnic and religious tensions are traditionally identified as the 
culprits for internal violence. Yet, quantitative studies found little support for ethno-
religious causes of intrastate conflict onset.
11
 Case studies analysis, however, proved to 
be more fruitful in understanding the dynamics of war in ethnically and religiously 
diverse societies. My analysis aims at empirically testing the impact of these factors on 
the ways civil wars are resolved. To clarify a theoretical design of this section, table 4 
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Table 4. Research Design A. 
 
DV IV CV 
Hypothesis #1 
   
Civil wars in countries with the presence of 
the lootable resources (secondary diamonds) 









   
Civil wars that occurred in countries with 
the oil-exporting economy are more likely 








   
Civil wars in countries that were affected by 
the conflict contagion are more likely to end 







   
Civil wars in countries that are 
characterized by religious homogeneity are 
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Civil wars in countries that are 
characterized by ethnic homogeneity are 
more likely to result in government’s 
victory. Alternatively, if civil wars occur in 
countries that are characterized by ethnic 
heterogeneity, they are more likely to result 














Research Design B 
 
Throughout the history of civil wars, the international community had 
occasionally to intervene in order to prevent the continuation of violence. While the 
official reasons behind the involvement of the United Nations peacekeepers such as 
preventing humanitarian disaster or separation of warring sides is widely known and 
openly stated, it is imperative to trace whether or not the intervention of the UN is 
correlated with one of the three intrastate conflict outcomes. Aside from the involvement 
of the UN that is oftentimes paralyzed by the power play of the permanent members at 
the Security Council, insufficient resources or the will to intervene in civil wars, regional 
intergovernmental organizations are becoming a decisive factor in shifting the odds of the 
internal conflict. Since interventions by United Nations (H6) or the regional organizations 
(H7) that require the mandate from the Security Council are geared toward mitigating the 
conflict rather than assisting one of the interested parties, the pursuit of compromise 
appears to be the most logical outcome.   
Unlike the global and regional intergovernmental organizations, states or state-led 
coalitions can interfere in the course of the civil war with or without the UN approval and 
do not necessarily pursue a peaceful solution. I expect to observe a higher probability of 
government victory given that the third party state supports government forces (H8). In 
contrast, if the state intervention supports rebels, I expect the rebellion to succeed (H9). 





Table 5. Research Design B Exogenous Tipping Points. 
Exogenous Tipping Point Civil War outcome 
UN intervention Compromise 
Regional IGO intervention Compromise 
State intervention for government Government wins 
State intervention for rebels Rebels win 
 
 
 In Contentious Politics, Tilly and Tarrow make an intriguing observation about 
the possible reasons behind the occurrence of lethal conflicts. Thus, the primary 
determinant of the state’s ability to prevent the outbreak of violence rests in a character of 
political regime that is reflected through the “capacity of its central government and its 
degree of democracy.”12 According to the authors, fluctuations in this capacity can lead 
to either regime split or transfer of power: “high-capacity states reduce the threat by 
making it difficult for anyone to create rival concentrations of coercive means with their 
territories,” while the “low-capacity states more often face precisely the threat that some 
rival actor will build up a major concentration of coercive means and use it to topple the 
existing rulers.”13 Specifically, in regards to civil wars, Tilly and Tarrow identified two 
broader groups depending on the regime type: “relatively high-capacity regimes, however 
democratic or undemocratic, containing significant zones that escape central control” and 
“low-capacity undemocratic regimes.”14 
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 Traditionally, state capacity has been widely examined in the scholarly literature 
through the prism of economic and administrative performance, economic intervention 
and development.
15
 In recent years, the notion of state capacity has been widely applied 
to the study of conflict and its dynamics.
16
 Although different determinant are used to 
capture the effects of state capacity such as tax burden, economic interference, the ability 
of a state to extract resources, in this study I focus on the size of government’s military 
personnel as a proxy for a state capacity during the intrastate conflict.
17
 Specifically, I 
created a variable based on the Correlates of War National Material Capabilities dataset 
that encompasses military capacity as a ratio of all military personnel to the total of 
state’s population.  
 Thus, I hypothesize that the civil wars in which the state has high military 
capacity are more likely to be conducive to the success of the government (H10). 
Likewise, if the state maintains only a small military force, rebels are more likely to 
succeed (H11). Alongside military capacity, I test the degree of democracy in the 
outcome of a civil war. Given that the country has democratic institutions in place, I 
hypothesize that the government and rebel forces are more likely to enter into a 
compromise agreement (H12). I expect to observe the success of the government if the 
state regime is authoritarian (H13). Furthermore, it is crucial to test the interactions 
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between military capacity and regime type to capture their influence on the outcome of 
intrastate conflict. Table 6 summarizes theses hypotheses. 
 
Table 6. Research Design B Endogenous Tipping Points. 
Endogenous Tipping Point Civil War outcome 
High military capacity Government wins 
Low military capacity Rebels win 
Democratic regime Compromise 
Autocratic regime Government wins 
 
 
Research Design C 
 
 The overarching trends between onset and termination of intrastate conflicts and 
the impact of tipping factors that substantiate path dependence are empirically tested in 
this study. In this section, rather than focusing on large-n and small-n testing, I intend to 
develop a causal narrative about the impact of initial conditions on the outcome of civil 
wars. I select three cases based on outcome criteria such as the civil war that ended with 
the government victory; civil war that culminated in the success of rebellion; and a case 
of a compromise outcome. The cases that I review in this dissertation are the First 
Chechen War of 1994-1996; Africa’s World War (the Second Congo War) of 1998-2002; 
and, the Second Sri Lanka Tamil Civil War (Eelam IV) of 2006-2009. Chechen and 
Congolese intrastate conflicts are part of the OTIC dataset, while the Second Sri Lanka 
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Civil War is a recent war and analyzed in this study to test the applicability of the 
quantitative tests to out-of-sample cases. In sum, the focus of the analysis is the impact of 
exogenous and endogenous factors on the increasing returns and amplification of 
switching costs in each of cases. 
 
Operationalization of Variables 
 
As a foundation for the Onset-Termination of Intrastate Conflict dataset, I utilize 
a Correlates of War (COW) project Dataset of Intra-State Wars v.4.1 that I modified by 
limiting the instances of civil wars chronologically to the period from 1945 to 2007. In 
the period after World War II, bilateral and then multilateral system of international 
relations have fundamentally shifted from the previous periods. Furthermore, I have 
excluded four out of seven types of internal wars that Meredith Reid Sarkees has 
identified in the Correlates of War project Dataset of Intra-State Wars: “the war was 
transformed into another type of war; the war is ongoing as of 12/31/2007; stalemate; 
and, conflict continues at below war level.”18  
The primary reason for excluding the abovementioned outcomes is to provide 
more robust inferences regarding the possibility of the path dependence in intrastate 
conflicts. It is also worth noting that according to the Correlates of War project dataset 
there can be four types of intrastate conflicts: civil wars for central control, civil wars 
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over local issues, regional internal, and intercommunal.
19
 In the time frame that I use for 
my dataset, the majority of intrastate wars are civil wars for central control or over local 
issues with the exception of the First Nigeria Christian-Muslim war (1999-2000) and the 




The single dependent variable that I utilize in this study is the outcome of the 
intrastate conflict is obtained from the Correlates of War (COW) project Dataset of Intra-
State Wars v.4.1. Three possible intrastate conflict outcomes are: 
1 – Side A (Government) wins 
2 – Side B (Rebels) wins  




Lootable Resources (Primary and Secondary Diamonds) 
 
The current literature on civil wars highlights the importance of lootable resources 
such as precious stones, narcotics and other valuable, easily transportable goods in 
sparking intrastate conflicts. For my dataset, I focused primarily on the industry of 
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secondary diamonds mining. Since this type of diamond extraction does not require 
heavy equipment to mine and the end product is easily transportable, it becomes a 
lucrative source of enrichment and contention. To capture diamonds as the onset factor in 
civil wars, I turn to the DIADATA that was developed by Elisabeth Gilmore, Päivi 
Lujala, Nils Petter Gleditsch & Jan Ketil Rød and focused on recording the diamond 
occurrence across the globe.
20
 According to the authors, the account of diamond 
occurrences “was compiled through an intensive literature search of academic databases 
and journals, national geological survey reports, and industry databases and reports.”21  
DIADATA encompasses the record of both the year of discovery and the year 
when the location was mined for primary and secondary diamonds. To juxtapose 
adequately the presence of diamonds with the particular intrastate conflict, I had to clarify 
the geographical presence of this factor. For example, I designate a war to be influenced 
by lootable resources if diamonds were discovered during the occurrence of intrastate 
conflict and within the region of conflict. In contrast, if in Russia diamonds were 
discovered in 1946 but in the Ural Mountains, it had no impact on intrastate conflicts 
between Bolsheviks and Ukrainian Partisans in 1945-1947 or Forest Brethren of Baltic 
region in 1945-1951. Since there is no conclusive evidence of diamond production during 
Paraguay war of 1947 and Seventh Colombian civil war (1948-1958) both instances are 
codified 0. 
1 –primary or secondary diamonds are present 
0 – no diamonds 
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Occasionally, intrastate wars can be influenced by the spillover of the conflict 
from the neighboring states or influenced by the external actors. The factor of contagion 
has been extensively debated both in terms of definitions and quantitative ways to capture 
this phenomenon.
22
 The critical aspect of codifying the contagion factor is whether or not 
to consider possibilities of war spillover not only from immediate neighbors, but also 
from geographically distant locations. I adhere to the latter assumption and thus 
incorporate the contagion variable from Nathan Black’s Dataset of Substate Conflict 
Contagion, 1946-2007.
23
 He defines contagion as the phenomenon that occurs when “a 
substate conflict makes a causal contribution to the onset of a civil war in another 
state.”24 Furthermore, Black outlines the distinction of his notion of contagion from the 
one which focuses on the neighboring states: “my definition allows contagion to occur 
between non-contiguous states; instead of only considering pairs of states which border 
each other, I consider pairs of states in the same ‘neighborhood,’ where each 
neighborhood is a region of geographically and historically similar states that influence 
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one another’s internal politics.”25 Finally, Black is explicit about the plausibility of war 
contagion only if the instigating state adopts one of three actions:  
Evangelization, the deliberate sponsorship of nascent rebel groups abroad by a 
state that has experienced a violent regime change; Expulsion, the deliberate 
transfer of combatants across borders by a state in conflict; and Meddling with 
Overt Partiality, the deliberate interference in another state’s substate conflict that 




In his dataset, Black gives an extensive analysis of the possibility of contagion 
within intrastate conflict dyads from 1946 to 2007. In my dataset, I adapt Black’s 
codification of contagion through binary variables to the instances that I shortlisted from 
the Correlates of War dataset (government wins, compromise or rebels win). The 
following codification focuses on incidence of contagion: 
1 – actual contagion observed  
0 – no contagion 
 
Non-lootable Resources (Oil Exports) 
 
In contrast to scholarship that evaluates the impact of lootable resources on civil 
war, identifying the non-lootable determinants of intrastate conflict goes a little further 
than outlining the presence of primary or secondary diamond deposits in a given state. 
Among the plethora of the non-lootable resources such as oil, gas, metals, and others, the 
primary role as a factor in internal conflict dynamics is given to the access and 
production of oil. In this study, I utilize the oil exports indicator that was developed and 
codified by James Fearon and David Laitin for their article “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and 




 Ibid, 9. 
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Civil War” as the onset variable for non-lootable resources. In their dataset, Fearon and 
Laitin proposed a binary variable for oil exporting countries by identifying “country-
years in which fuel exports exceeded one-third of export revenues, using World Bank 
data.”27 In the addendum to their original paper, the authors specified their technique for 
outlining the variable:  
We next created a binomial variable marking country years that had greater than 
33% fuel exports. This dichotomous variable was then extended forward for each 
country for the most recent years if these lacked data, and backwards for missing 
years prior to 1960, on the assumption once countries come “on line” for oil 
production they generally stay there (this assumption was checked to a significant 
extent by going through the data and making country-specific inquires where we 




Since their dataset is limited chronologically to the year 1999, I have used the 
same approach to outline the missing country-year observations from 1999 to 2007 (15 
observations in total) by referring to fuel export indicators from the World Development 
Indicators (WDI) dataset. The factor of fuel exports as a percentage of merchandise 
exports was not available for Chad and Liberia. According to the WDI dataset, Chad’s 
merchandise exports accounted for $3,080,945,195 in 2005.
29
 In the report “Chad's Oil 
Troubles,” Carin Zissis provided the value of Chad’s oil exports in 2005 which was equal 
to $400,000,000 in direct revenue.
30
 Thus, Chad in 2005 oil exports accounted for only 
13% of its overall merchandise exports and it is codified in the dataset as 0. CIA World 
Factbook 2002 does not indicate oil or other energy resources as export products of 
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Liberia during the period of the Fourth Liberian War.
31
 Therefore, Liberia is codified as a 
non-oil exporting country. 
1 – an oil exporting country 




To measure the ethnic factor as the determinant of the civil war onset, I borrow an 
indicator for ethnic fractionalization that was developed by Fearon and Laitin in 
“Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War.” The authors have compiled this index based on 
the ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF) methodology outlined in Atlas Narodov Mira 
with data added from CIA World Factbook, Encyclopedia Britannica, and the Library of 
Congress Country Studies.
32
 According to Fearon and Laitin, ethnic fractionalization can 
be determined by measuring the “probability that two randomly drawn individuals in a 
country are from different ethnolinguistic groups.”33  
In my dataset, I extrapolate the ethnic fractionalization index into the binary 
variable through codifying any country observation where the index is 0.15 or smaller as 
ethnically homogenous societies (0) and a country observation where the index is larger 
than 0.15 as ethnically heterogeneous societies (1). 
0 – ethnically homogenous societies 
1 – ethnically heterogeneous societies 
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Differences in religious beliefs are commonly attributed to instigation of conflicts 
including civil wars. Religious diversity in a given country can arguably be used to 
measure the impact of religion on the onset of intrastate conflict. For this study, I use 
Fearon and Laitin’s religious fractionalization index that they proposed in “Ethnicity, 
Insurgency, and Civil War.” This index is modeled after the ethnolinguistic 




In this study, I similarly extrapolate the religious fractionalization index into the 
binary variable through codifying any country observation where the index is 0.15 or 
smaller as religiously homogenous societies (0) and country observation where index is 
larger than 0.15 as religiously heterogeneous societies (1). 
0 – religiously homogenous societies 




The contemporary scholarship on intrastate conflicts introduces the factor of 
regime type either as a primary explanatory variable or a control factor for the onset or 
duration of civil war. In this study, I investigate the role of regime type in the path 
dependence dynamics of a civil war by analyzing how it can be associated with a 
particular conflict outcome. The most widely used source of data regarding regime type 
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and the elements that determine whether the regime is democratic, anocratic or autocratic 
is the POLITY IV Project.
35
 I utilize the Revised Combined Polity Score (POLITY2) that 
codes countries on the scale from 10 (most democratic) to -10 (least democratic) and also 
better adapted for time series analysis. Thus, I created three dummy variables for each 
regime type: 
10 to 6 – democracy 
5 to -5 – anocracy 
-6 to -10 – autocracy 
Finally, for the research design that focuses on the duration of conflict by 
analyzing the total duration rather than annual duration, I averaged out the Polity score by 
calculating the mean of total years minus first and last years if the war lasted more than 




The ability of a government to extract resources, control population or impose its 
will using military resources has been extensively examined in the modern literature on 
conflicts.  In this study, I do not focus on the efficiency of bureaucracy or the ability to 
extract taxes effectively, and instead consider the size of the government military forces 
to be the most applicable proxy for state capacity during the war period. While a state 
does really on bureaucracy and taxes to control its population, it seems reasonable to 
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assume that these elements would be jeopardized during the armed conflict (especially 
for the territory controlled by the rebels). At the same time, the functionality of the armed 
forces in principle remains the same during peaceful and conflict periods.  
To capture the military capacity of the government, I use the National Material 
Capabilities dataset (v. 4.0) of the Correlates of War project. This dataset offers six 
elements of state capabilities including the size of military personnel. I adjust this number 
by calculating military capacity as a ratio of military size to the total population. For the 
survival analysis that examines the total duration of civil war and not annual intervals, I 
constructed the following formula to capture the average military capacity. 
Average military personnel per 1,000 = 
                                          
                     
 
Due to the character of several civil wars, it is important to discuss missing values 
and alternative sources to substitute missing data: 
 The Georgian War of 1991-1992 started on December 26, 1991 and ended in 
March of 1992. Since the missing value for 1991 in NMC accounts only for five 
days, it is reasonable to use the value for 1992 instead. 
 The Second Somalia War of 1991-1997: following initial confrontation between 
governmental and rebels forces in 1991, the Somali National Army and other 
security forces were disbanded.
36
 Thus, the missing values can be treated as no 
military personnel and codified it as 0. 
 The Dniestrian Independence War of 1991-1992 started on December 26, 1991 
and ended on July 2 of the following year. The missing value for 1991 can as well 
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be downplayed due to the war occurring primarily in 1992. Thus, the value for 
1992 is used. 
 During the Third Somalia War of 2006-2008, the government troops of Somalia 




 The NMC dataset does not provide information about the size of Armed Forces of 
Liberia during the Second Liberia Civil War of 1992-1995 for the years 1994 and 
1995. The World Development Indicators dataset shows that the Liberian army 
size was 21,000 strong in 1995.
38
 For the year 1994, I combine the average of 
armed forces size of the previous and subsequent years.  
 According to the World Development Indicators dataset, the armed forces 
personnel in Liberia during the Third Liberia Civil War of 1996 accounted for 




The United Nations Intervention 
 
While technically not an intervention, peacekeeping missions of the United 
Nations are undoubtedly an intervening factor in the course of intrastate conflicts. 
Interventions on the behalf of the United Nations varied in essence, scope, and size. 
Nevertheless, it is critical to understand whether or not this global security organization 
can be a tipping point that establishes a path dependent solution to civil wars. Using the 
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dataset on third party peacekeeping missions compiled by Mark J. Mullenbach, I matched 
UN peacekeeping with the records of civil wars for the period from 1945 to 2007. 
40
 His 
dataset includes not only the incidence of intervention but also the objectives of every 
mission. Thus, it is worth noting that the majority of the intervention had been aimed at 
observing a ceasefire or monitoring disarmament and disengagement of warring sides. 
 
Intervention by Regional Intergovernmental Organizations 
 
To capture the role of regional intergovernmental organizations I used the same 
Mullenbach’s dataset “Third Party Peacekeeping Missions, 1946-2012 (Version 3.0).”41 
Most of the missions that were led by regional IGOs were aimed at the military 
observation of ceasefires. IGO intervention is a dummy variable. 
 
Intervention by States in Support of Rebel Forces or the Government 
 
The original Correlates of War dataset on intrastate conflict that I used to outline 
three outcomes to civil wars also has information on the timing of third party intervention 
by the state and the side they chose to support.
42
 Thus, I introduce the dummy variables 
for state intervention on the behalf of the government and on the behalf of the rebel 
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 With the onset of the Cold War and the ensuing bipolar system of international 
relations there was hardly a place on the globe that was out of the interest for two 
superpowers. Therefore, I include in this dataset the dummy variable for the Cold War to 
control for the period before and after bipolar confrontation. 
1 – intrastate conflict occurred during the Cold War 




The Correlates of War dataset has missing values for some of the entries for days. 
I substitute the missing values for days by the middle of the month – day15. One entry for 
third party intervention in the Mozambique Civil War of 1982-1992 was missing values 
for month and day. I consider the third party intervention to have started at the beginning 









The mixed methods research framework outlined in this chapter provides a 
comprehensive evaluation of the theory of path dependence.  By focusing on the broad 
and narrow concept of path dependence, I outline hypotheses that test overarching trends 
behind initial conditions and outcomes of civil wars as well as analyze the impact of 
tipping points in shaping conflict dynamics. Furthermore, I introduce two datasets for 
testing path dependent dynamics in civil wars and describe the logic behind the selection 
of multinomial logistic regression analysis and event history (survival) models. In 
subsequent chapters, I provide an empirical analysis of two notions of path dependence, 
while also evaluating their explanatory power by applying the findings into several cases 






QUANTITATIVE EVALUATION OF THE ONSET CONDITIONS AND OUTCOMES 




 The central point of inquiry in this chapter is to identify the relationship between 
factors that could instigate intrastate conflicts and three possible civil war outcomes. 
Adopting the broad notion of path dependence that postulates the influence of earlier 
stages of the process onto the latter stages, I hypothesize about the influence of the initial 
conditions on the civil war dynamics. I argue that if intrastate conflicts are initiated in the 
presence of lucrative lootable resources or energy reserves such as oil, ethnic or religious 
heterogeneity, or by the means of contagion from other conflict areas, a specific civil war 
outcome, be it the victory of the government forces, compromise, or success of rebels, is 
intrinsically connected with a distinct onset factor. Following a series of multinomial 
logistic regression analyses, several onset factors such as oil exports, contagion and the 
Cold War appeared to have an influence on the outcome of the civil war. Nevertheless, it 
is equally important to acknowledge the factors that had no effect on the way intrastate 
conflict ended such as secondary diamonds, ethnic and religious fractionalization since 






Multinomial Logistic Regression Analysis 
 
While the majority of conflicts that occurred from the period following the end of 
World War II ended up with the government’s victory and only less than a fifth witnessed 
the success of the rebels as can be seen in Table 7, the results of the multinomial logistic 
regression models illustrate that the compromise outcome is strongly related with certain 
onset conditions. Table 8 provides the output of the regression models given three 
different base outcomes. Table 9 provides the analysis of marginal effects for three 
different intrastate conflict outcomes. 
 
Table 7. Descriptive Statistics of the Onset Factors and Outcomes of Civil Wars Models. 
Outcome Freq. Percent Cum. 
Government Wins 71 55.91 
55.91 
 





22 17.32 100.00 






























































































































127 127 127 127 127 127 
Statistical confidence levels: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 










Table 9. Marginal Effects of the Onset Factors and Outcomes of Civil Wars Models. 
 
Marginal effects 














































No, of observations 127 127 127 
Statistical confidence levels: *p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
Oil, Contagion, and the Cold War 
 
 The underpinning assumption about the interrelation between the onset and 
termination factors that I have outlined in the previous chapter has been partially 
confirmed. Among the factors that are considered in the scholarly literature on intrastate 
conflicts to be the determinants of the civil war onset, an oil exporting economic structure 
and, to an extent, a factor of contagion are found to be related to a particular civil war 
outcome. Moreover, the control factor of whether or not an intrastate conflict occurred 
during or after the bipolar confrontation between superpowers has had a substantial 
impact on the way the particular war has ended. In a sense, considering the path 
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dependent process in intrastate conflicts through the prism of importance of previous 
stages (onset factors in this case), it is reasonable to claim that certain onset conditions do 
indeed influence to outcome of the conflict. Now that we have confirmed the presence of 
path dependence, it is imperative to discuss the directionality and magnitude of the onset 
factors that proved to be significant as well as to interpret the meaning of the factors that 




Energy resources and specifically oil have been usually associated with intrastate 
conflicts. The notions of a resource curse and an oil curse have been widely popularized 
in the media as the explanations for the lack of development or reasons for instigating 
armed conflicts. These hypotheses have been tested by James Fearon and David Laitin 
who in “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War” have concluded that “the ‘median country’ 
had a 10% chance of civil war over a decade, whereas the same country as an oil 
exported would have an estimated 21% chance.”1 Similar assumptions were provided by 
David Collier in “Natural Resources, Development and Conflict: Channels of Causation 
and Policy Interventions” where he argued that “in many situations, natural resources will 
be located in regions where some political groups – albeit often on the fringe – are 
already claiming autonomy” and thus oil and other natural resources can provide 
additional reasons for armed conflict outbreak.
2
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My analysis of the path dependence dynamics in intrastate conflicts showed 
substantive and statistical significance for the factor of countries with oil exporting 
economies. Thus, in comparison to the base outcome of the government’s victory, the 
rebels win outcome will be less likely if the country in conflict has the oil exporting 
economy. Conversely, if the base outcome is a success of rebels, the government victory 
is more likely given that the country has more than a third of its exports revenues in oil 
(H2). The analysis of marginal effects of three outcomes suggested that if the country has 
an oil-exporting economy, the probability of the rebel victory decreases by 25 percentage 
points.  
Even though Fearon and Laitin have found the significant effect that oil exporting 
economies have on the outbreak of the intrastate conflict, they nevertheless expressed 
their concern about the tendency of states whose exports are heavily influenced by oil to 
be associated with a weaker state apparatus. The argument revolved around an 
assumption that “oil producers tend to have weaker state apparatuses than one would 
expect given their level of income because the rulers have less need for a socially 
intrusive and elaborate bureaucratic system to raise revenues – ‘a political Dutch 
disease’.”3 At the same time, Fearon and Laitin discarded the proposition that oil is a 
good indicator for financing the rebels and instead hinted at the other lootable resources. 
Can these two propositions regarding the role of oil in the onset of conflict explain the 
likelihood of government to succeed and rebellion to fail?  




 James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” The American Political 
Science Review Vol. 97, no. 1 (Feb., 2003): 81. 
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Given the assumption of an oil exporting economy as a proxy for weak state 
apparatus and factor in the higher likelihood of conflict outbreak, my analysis suggests an 
intriguing finding about the higher probability of the government succeeding in a civil 
war. The explanation can lie in a second aspect of the oil factor as a source for funding 
the military activities. While not a readily available option for rebels, oil offers more 
opportunities for the government that has the technology and infrastructure to utilize this 
resource. It is also worth noting that marginal effects analysis negates the statistical 
significance of oil in terms of government’s victory. At the same time, the substantive 
and statistical significance of oil in terms of rebels’ prospects for success remains 
consistent in both tests. The adverse effect of an oil exporting economy on the likelihood 
of rebels’ victory outcome can be partially explained through the lens of funding sources. 
In order to gain the benefits from oil resources, the rebel forces would need to control the 
whole production process including the extraction, storage, transportation, and refinery. 
Therefore, in the presence of an oil exporting economy, rebel forces would require 
absolute victory to control the production cycle. A similar requirement applies to 
government, yet the analysis suggests that central forces are more likely to be effective in 











The issue of war contagion has been widely circulated in the media and has found 
support among scholars who investigated this phenomenon. Halvard Buhaug and Kristian 
Skrede Gleditsch in “Contagion or Confusion? Why Conflicts Cluster in Space” find 
evidence for the neighborhood effect in the spillover of conflicts.
4
 Erika Frosberg in her 
dissertation “Neighbors at Risk: A Quantitative Study of Civil War Contagion”  provides 
new evidence on the conflict contagion effect through focusing on sources and targets 
while specifying the importance of various factors such as ethnic composition, length of 
borders, mountains and others.
5
 Nathan Black further elaborated on the various contagion 
factors and provided substantive evidence for the spillover effect.
6
 
Scholarship on contagion in intrastate conflict provides sufficient evidence for the 
presence and impact of this phenomenon. My analysis further suggests that contagion has 
a disproportionate effect on the likelihood of the government chances of winning the 
conflict and a compromise solution. Given the base outcome of the success of 
government’s forces, an intrastate conflict is more likely to result in a compromise if it 
was caused by contagion. Likewise, if the base outcome is a compromise, the government 
is less likely to topple the rebellion and would likely to seek a peaceful resolution. These 
findings are both statistically and substantively significant and support my hypothesis 
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about the effect of contagion as a path dependent determinant of civil war. Marginal 
effects analysis does not support my H3 that implied the success of rebels in a country 
affected by war contagion. Instead, the results of the analysis suggest that the probability 
of the government victory decreases by 17 percentage points while the chances of a 
compromise outcome increase by 12 percentage points.  
Several possible mechanisms can explain the effect of contagion on the dynamics 
of the intrastate conflict. First, if the intrastate conflict was instigated by the another civil 
war, the rebels forces from the sender state could provide not only indirect financial 
support and supply of weapons, but also innovative practices and techniques such as the 
use of social media during the Arab Spring. Second, the success of civil wars in the states 
that caused the contagion may unite the factions that are fighting against the central 
government and rally their resolve and strength. Finally, the effect of contagion provides 
the incentives for other states to intervene in the conflict to curtail the possibility of civil 
war in their own territory or to prevent the spread of armed conflict in the region. All 
these factors undermine the ability of the government forces to succeed, but, at the same 
time, they do not provide enough leverage for the rebels to achieve a decisive victory 
either. The likelihood of the compromise outcome might stem from possibility of the 
involvement of external forces to mitigate the spread of the war contagion. In the 
subsequent chapters, I test the role of third party interventions as the exogenous tipping 






The Cold War 
 
It is not a secret that the bipolar stalemate that followed after the Second World 
War has dominated all areas of economic, political, and security relations between states. 
Two superpowers, the United States of America and Soviet Union, virtually divided the 
globe into spheres of interest. On one hand, there was a system of alliances and bilateral 
security arrangements led by the US. On the other hand, the Warsaw Pact and other 
communism-inclined states followed the lead of the USSR in world affairs. While these 
two regions have enjoyed relatively limited armed conflict incidence after 1945, countries 
that have found themselves in the so-called Third World appeared to be heavily affected 
by the superpower confrontation. Both sides systematically provided assistance to rebels 
or governments depending on their ideological postures through not merely expressing 
moral support, but by offering financial, military, and technical resources.  
Therefore, the results of including the control variable that captured the time 
period before and after the Cold War proved to have strong substantive and statistical 
significance. Given the base outcome of the government’s victory, success of the 
rebellion or compromise outcome proved to be less likely during the Cold War. At the 
same time, given the base outcome of rebels’ victory or compromise, the intrastate 
conflict was more likely to result in the success of the government if the intrastate 
conflict occurred before 1991. The test of marginal effects suggests that during the Cold 
War the probability of the government’s success in intrastate conflict increased by 26 
percentage points, while the compromise outcome decreased by 16 percentage points.  
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During the period of the Cold War, two superpowers had a disproportionate 
impact not only in international relations in general, but also on the dynamics of intrastate 
conflicts in particular. The support for rebels or governments during civil wars was 
determined through the lens of Realpolitik, rather than the notions of human rights and 
responsibility to protect. The focus on the human security in third party interventions is a 
relatively novel concept that was initiated through the United Nations peacekeeping 
efforts only after the collapse of the bipolar system of international relations. 
Paraphrasing the famous saying attributed to Franklin Roosevelt’s assessment of 
Nicaraguan ruler Anastasio Somoza that even though Somoza was a ruthless dictator, he 
was nevertheless our ruthless dictator, it becomes clear that the full-fledged support of the 
loyal dictatorial regimes was an acceptable course of action against the possibility of 
communist rebellions. This logic equally applies to the Soviet Union that defended 
dictatorial regimes in North Korea, Cuba and other countries to safeguard their influence 
across the globe. This unequivocal adherence to national interests rather than 
humanitarian concerns has defined the success of government forces and failure of 
peaceful settlements during the Cold War.   
 




 The impact of lootable resources on the outbreak of intrastate conflict has 
supporters among the general audience where the topic of blood diamonds was 
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popularized in the movie industry as well among scholars of civil war. Political scientists 
at PRIO, Päivi Lujala, Nils Petter Gleditsch and Elisabeth Gilmore, reported in “A 
Diamond Curse? Civil War and a Lootable Resource” the findings that support the claim 
about the impact of secondary diamonds on the possibility of the specific type of civil 
war onset (ethnic war).
7
 At the same, they found that primary diamonds had the adverse 
effect on the possibility of the war outbreak. While their findings may hold true for the 
intrastate conflict onset, secondary diamonds were found to have no statistical 
significance across all three civil war outcomes. This finding is rather interesting in a 
sense that even if the secondary diamonds are an easy source for financing the rebels’ 
cause as I have outlined in the H1, in reality the presence of this type of lootable 
resources does not significantly affect a particular civil war outcome. 
 While secondary diamonds might present a substantial risk for intrastate conflict, 
they are not likely to provide a decisive upper hand to either government or rebels, nor 
are they conducive to the compromise solution. However, secondary diamonds as a proxy 
for lootable resources does not capture other potential sources for funding rebellions. The 
inclusion of data on narcotic substances and other alluvial gemstones could shed new 
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Ethnic and Religious Fractionalization 
 
 Following the multinomial logistic regression analysis, I also found little support 
for the H4 which states that civil wars in the countries that are characterized by religious 
homogeneity are more likely to result in government victory; and H5 which suggests that 
if civil wars occur in the countries that are characterized by the ethnic heterogeneity, they 
are more likely to result in rebels’ victory. In contrast to diamonds, onset factors of ethnic 
and religious fractionalization were found by James Fearon and David Laitin in 
“Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War” to have little substantive and statistical 
significance.
8
 Similarly, the output of the regression analysis finds no support for ethnic 
heterogeneity as the possible factor in determining path dependent dynamics in intrastate 
conflicts. While the religious fractionalization factor had exhibited a slight indication of 
statistical significance when taking the base outcome of a government victory and a 
compromise, it proved to have no statistical significance when tested for the marginal 
effects. 
 Ethnic and religious diversity are equally unlikely to instigate intrastate conflict or 
to determine its outcome. The fact that the state has multiple ethnic groups and various 
religious adherents or the society is characterized by ethnic and religious homogeneity, 
does not provide sufficient evidence to consider these two factors as determinants of path 
dependence in intrastate conflict. Echoing the findings of David Collier and Anke 
Hoeffler regarding the prevalence of opportunity-motivated onset of civil wars over 
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greed-motivated models, it is valid to extrapolate this assumption towards the outcomes 




 The inquiry into the path dependence in civil wars through the broad concept 
provided evidence for the interaction between the initial conditions and the outcomes of 
conflict. Unlike previous scholarship that has suggested the prevalence of the opportunity 
factors over grievance variables in explaining the outbreak of conflict, current study does 
not provide such a clear cut distinctions for the factors that shape the solutions to civil 
wars. Instead, the palette of onset conditions appears to be eclectic as it highlights the 
importance of oil exporting economy; contagion; religious fractionalization; and the Cold 
War. The logic behind the diversity of the explanatory variables lies in the alteration of 
calculations of the warring sides. Thus, while secondary diamonds can provide incentives 
for the rebels to start a war, they do not guarantee successful outcome for them or the 
government. Arguably, different mechanisms enter the strategic and tactical calculations 
of the counterparts in the course of an intrastate conflict. These dynamics can be 
examined through the narrow concept of path dependence that focuses on the role of 
timing and sequence. Therefore, in the next chapter I outline endogenous and exogenous 











 The analysis of intrastate conflicts through the lens of path dependence provides 
sufficient evidence of the presence of interrelation between the onset conditions and the 
outcome. Indeed, the results suggest that certain factors at the initial stages of conflict 
impact the probability of the specific civil war outcome. While these findings support the 
general argument of the dissertation, further investigation into the mechanisms that “lock 
in” a unique path to the civil war outcome is required to understand the underlying 
dynamics of path dependence.  
 In this chapter, I analyze intrastate conflicts through the prism of the increasing 
returns framework that was elaborated by Paul Pierson in the article “Increasing Returns, 
Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics.”1 Specifically, I focus on the temporal 
dimensions of conflict and the effect of tipping points on the probability of the specific 
outcome and increasing the cost of switching to alternatives. I classify tipping points in 
terms of the internal or endogenous characteristics of the state in which civil war 
occurred and through external or exogenous shocks that influence the direction of a 
conflict. Thus, I elaborate on Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow’s insights regarding the 
role of state capacity in determining the outcome of the civil war to control for 
                                                        
1
 Paul Pierson, “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics,” American Political 
Science Review Vol. 94, no. 2 (June, 2000): 251-267. 
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endogenous impact. To examine exogenous shocks, I rely on the well-established 
scholarship regarding the role of third party interventions on the duration and outcome of 
civil wars. I also test the impact of several onset factors that may influence the outcome 
after the initiation of the conflict. These control variables are the presence of lootable and 
non-lootable resources; ethnic fractionalization; and religious fractionalization. 
Ultimately, I anticipate to observe how external and internal tipping points influence the 
dynamics of intrastate conflicts and influence the likelihood as well as duration of a 
particular outcome.  
  
Narrow Definition of the Path Dependence 
 
 In “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics,” Paul Pierson 
extends the economic understanding of path dependence and the notion of increasing 
returns to the domain of political science. According to Pierson, political life analyzed 
through the framework of increasing returns is characterized by multiple equilibria of the 
outcomes; the role of small events that occur at the right time; a critical role of timing and 
sequencing; and inertia or resistance to deviate from the path.
2
 I argue that these 
characteristics can be equally applied to the study of intrastate conflicts, which in turn 
would characterize it as a path dependent process.  
 The dependent variable that I utilize to test path dependence hypotheses in the 
dissertation is the outcome of civil war. For this study, I limited the inquiry into the cases 
where government victory, rebels’ success or compromise has been observed. The 
Correlates of War dataset extends the possible outcomes to encompass stalemate, conflict 
                                                        
2
 Ibid, 263. 
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continuation at lower level, ongoing conflict or transformation into another type of war. 
This variety of outcome supports the first characteristic of a path dependent process, 
namely, multiple equilibria of possible conclusions. As my previous analysis suggested, 
the power of relatively small events such as the factor of contagion can also be applied to 
the dynamics of the intrastate conflict. The investigation of the temporal dimension of 
these events through the models that I propose in this chapter would further support the 
increasing returns argument. Similarly, the role of timing and sequencing in intrastate 
conflict can be verified using the temporal models that trace the influence of tipping 
points on the civil war outcome. Finally, observing strong statistical and substantive 
evidence that the onset factors do in fact determine the outcome of the intrastate conflict 
and consequently identifying similar results in temporal models would suggest that the 
resistance to change argument can be applicable to the study of intrastate conflicts.  
The first assumption of the narrow definition of path dependence, existence of 
multiple equilibria, is consistent with three possible outcomes of an intrastate conflict, yet 
the second factor that underlines the power of small events is more challenging to 
conceptualize.  The answer to what constitutes a ‘small event’ in an intrastate conflict 
appears to be rather subjective. If for example one considers the intervention by the UN 
peacekeepers to be a game changing event in the civil war, does the relative size of the 
mission matter? Or can the presence of international peacekeeping contingent in itself be 
deemed as a big event? While the discussion of the role of micro events is relevant in the 
context of intrastate conflicts, I argue that satisfying the other three conditions of the 
narrow definition of path dependence is sufficient to apply the abovementioned 
theoretical framework to the study of civil wars. 
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 In this chapter, I specifically address the third and fourth characteristic of the 
path dependence dynamics: the role of timing and resistance to change. By using survival 
model analysis, I expect to examine not only the interrelation between endogenous and 
exogenous tipping points, but also the influence of these factors on the duration of an 
intrastate conflict. Thus, I test the impact of these factors by using parametric survival 
models (Weibull distribution); Cox proportional hazards models; and, proportional 
hazards models for the subdistribution of a competing risk proposed by Jason P. Fine and 
Robert J. Gray. Also, before testing the temporal dimensions of an intrastate conflict, I 
test the role of tipping factors and onset conditions through multinomial logistic 
regression analysis. 
 
Multinomial Logistic Regression Analysis 
 
 Table 10 provides the results of the marginal effects of three outcomes of 
intrastate conflicts. I outline here the coefficients of marginal effects rather than the 
output with three different base outcomes since with the former approach it is easier to 
interpret the directionality and magnitude of the explanatory variables. I test both 
exogenous and endogenous tipping factors along with variables for secondary diamonds, 
oil exporting economies, ethnic fractionalization, and religious fractionalization. I did not 
include the contagion factor in the analysis since it becomes theoretically irrelevant after 
the start of confrontation, unlike other onset factors that retain their impact across the 




Table 10. Marginal Effects of the Narrow Concept of Path Dependence Models. 
 
Marginal Effects 
Variable Government Success Rebel Success Compromise 
Democracy 
0.31 -0.36* 0.05 
(0.2) (0.21) (0.11) 
Autocracy 
0.14 -0.08 -0.06 
(0.1) (0.09) (0.07) 
Military personnel 
0.01 -0.005 -0.002 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
United Nations 
intervention 
-0.06 -0.1 0.16** 
(0.14) (0.12) (0.07) 
Regional IGO 
intervention 
-0.37** 0.19 0.19* 
(0.17) (0.14) (0.1) 
State intervention 
for government 
0.12 -0.17 0.05 
(0.13) (0.12) (0.08) 
State intervention 
for rebels 
0.04 0.03 -0.07 
(0.16) (0.13) (0.1) 
Secondary 
diamonds 
0.11 -0.01 -0.1 
(0.13) (0.11) (0.08) 
Oil exports 
0.05 -0.2 0.15* 
(0.13) (0.13) (0.08) 
Ethnic 
fractionalization 
-0.13 -0.01 0.14 
(0.12) (0.1) (0.09) 
Religious 
Fractionalization 
0.24 -0.09 -0.15* 
(0.15) (0.13) (0.08) 
Statistical confidence levels: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
  
Both oil exports and religious fractionalization remain substantively and 
statistically significant here and in the initial conditions model that I have tested in the 
previous chapter. While religious fractionalization decreases the probability of a 
compromise outcome by roughly 15 percentage points in both models, the factor of oil 
exports in new model now indicates the increase in probability of a compromise outcome 
and has no effect for a rebel victory. The analysis further suggests that in democratic 
regimes the likelihood of the rebel victory decreases by 36 percentage points, while 
autocratic regimes or size of the armed forces do not appear to be related with any of 
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three outcomes. UN peacekeeping forces, as I have hypothesized, are more conducive to 
the compromise outcome. Thus, presence of the “blue berets” increases the likelihood of 
the compromise by 16 percentage points. The peacekeeping missions by regional 
intergovernmental organizations are also increasing the likelihood of the peaceful 
settlement, yet they also decrease by 37 percentage points the possibility of the 
government’s victory. In contrast to the missions lead by intergovernmental 
organizations, state interventions that supported government or rebels did not have an 
effect on the particular outcome of an intrastate conflict.    
 
Parametric Survival Model (Weibull) 
 
 The contemporary scholarship on intrastate conflicts offers several approaches to 
the analysis of the temporal dimensions of civil wars. Depending on the knowledge about 
underlying distribution, baseline hazard or survival time, scholars have adopted different 
models to test for the civil war duration. Oftentimes, to test for the robustness of the 
analysis, the scholarship incorporates both parametric and semi-parametric models.
3
 In 
this chapter, I apply two most frequently used models, the Weibull parametric survival 
model and the Cox semi-parametric survival model. In the table 11 and 12, I report 
hazard coefficients and hazard ratios using Weibull parametric survival model. The 
duration in this model is measured in days. 
 
                                                        
3
 Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier, Dan Reiter and Christopher Zorn, “Nonproportional Hazards and Event 
History Analysis in International Relations,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol. 47, no. 1 (Feb., 2003): 
33-53; Halvard Buhaug, Scott Gates and Päivi Lujala, “Geography, Rebel Capability, and the Duration of 




Table 11. Coefficients of the Parametric Survival Model (Weibull). 
 
Weibull Coefficients 
Variable Government Success Rebel Success Compromise 
Democracy 
0.53 -1.26 0.13 
(0.46) (1.15) (0.89) 
Autocracy 
0.25 -0.32 0.07 
(0.25) (0.4) (0.51) 
Military 
personnel 
0.003* -0.01 0.002 
(0.001) (0.02) (0.01) 
United Nations 
intervention 
-0.38 -0.56 0.59 
(0.42) (0.52) (0.47) 
Regional IGO 
intervention 
-0.45 0.73 3.4*** 
(0.52) (0.57) (1.25) 
State intervention 
for government 
-0.3 -1.02* -0.93 
(0.35) (0.53) (0.72) 
State intervention 
for rebels 
0.12 0.19 -1.19 
(0.4) (0.51) (0.79) 
Secondary 
diamonds 
-0.06 -0.13 -0.84 
(0.26) (0.46) (0.58) 
Oil exports 
0.35 -0.57 1.41** 
(0.28) (0.67) (0.7) 
Ethnic 
fractionalization 
-0.47 -0.1 1.25 
(0.3) (0.46) (0.94) 
Religious 
Fractionalization 
0.45 -0.13 -1.01* 
(0.41) (0.58) (0.53) 
_cons -6.17*** -4.26*** -15.87*** 
 
(0.71) (0.92) (3.72) 
ln_p _cons -0.22** -0.58*** 0.61*** 
 
(0.1) (0.15) (0.21) 









Table 12. Hazard Ratios of the Parametric Survival Model (Weibull). 
 




Rebel Success Compromise 
Democracy 
1.7 0.28 1.14 
(0.79) (0.33) (1.02) 
Autocracy 
1.29 0.73 1.08 
(0.33) (0.29) (0.55) 
Military personnel 
1* 0.99 1 
(0.001) (0.02) (0.01) 
United Nations 
intervention 
0.68 0.57 1.81 
(0.29) (0.3) (0.86) 
Regional IGO 
intervention 
0.64 2.07 30.02*** 
(0.33) (1.18) (37.61) 
State intervention 
for government 
0.74 0.36* 0.4 
(0.26) (0.19) (0.28) 
State intervention 
for rebels 
1.12 1.21 0.3 
(0.44) (0.61) (0.24) 
Secondary 
diamonds 
0.94 0.88 0.43 
(0.25) (0.41) (0.25) 
Oil exports 
1.42 0.56 4.12** 
(0.4) (0.38) (2.86) 
Ethnic 
fractionalization 
0.63 0.91 3.49 
(0.19) (0.42) (3.27) 
Religious 
Fractionalization 
1.58 0.88 0.36* 
(0.65) (0.51) (0.19) 
_cons 0.002 0.01 0 
 
(0.001) (0.01) (0) 
ln_p _cons 0.8 0.56 1.85 
 
(0.08) (0.08) (0.38) 









Endogenous Tipping Points 
 
 Among three endogenous tipping factors, only the size of the governmental forces 
appeared to be statistically significant for the Government success model. Thus, the size 
of the military personnel increases the hazard rate and decreases the duration of the 
intrastate conflict. At the same time, the analysis of the hazard ratio suggests that the 
increase in the hazard rate is insignificant.  
 
Exogenous Tipping Points 
 
 According to the model, interventions by regional intergovernmental 
organizations are decreasing the expected duration in the compromise outcome, while in 
government success and rebel success models it had no effect. The hazard ratio for a 
regional intergovernmental organization implies a substantial increase in the hazard rate. 
Furthermore, the analysis suggests that when individual states are intervening to support 
the government, the expected duration of conflict actually increases in the rebel success 
model. Thus, foreign state intervention on the side of government decreases the hazard 
rate by 64%. 
 
Onset (Control) Factors 
 
 Consistent with the multinomial analysis, the factors of oil exporting economies 
and religious fractionalization are statistically significant in survival models. Thus, non-
126 
 
lootable resource of oil decreases the expected duration of conflict (increasing the hazard 
rate by 312%), while religious diversity increases expected duration (decreasing hazard 
rate by 64%) in the compromise model. 
   
Cox Competing Risks Proportional Hazards Model 
 
Recent scholarship on the duration and outcome of civil wars utilizes the Cox 
semi-parametric model for analyzing competing risks.
4
 While this model has advantages 
over parametric models since it does not rely on the distributional assumptions and does 
require information about the baseline hazard for estimating hazard ratio, the data under 
the analysis must meet two requirements to satisfy the application of the Cox model. The 
first assumption is the non-informative censoring, which stipulates that the missing 
observations occurred at random (opposite to informative censoring were missing 
observations are not at random).
5
 The second assumption is the proportionality of hazard 
functions over time.
6
 The dataset on intrastate conflicts that I am using for the analysis 
does not have missing values, thus satisfying the first assumption. To evaluate the 
proportional hazards assumption, I tested all three outcomes of intrastate conflicts. For 
the rebel success model, the factor of democracy violated the proportional hazards 
assumptions. Following the technique proposed by Box-Steffensmeier, Reiter, and Zorn, 
                                                        
4
 Dylan Balch-Lindsay and Andrew J. Enterline, “Killing Time: The World Politics of Civil War Duration, 
1820-1992,” International Studies Quarterly Vol. 44, no. 4 (Dec., 2000): 615-642; Dylan Balch-Lindsay, 
Andrew J. Enterline and Kyle A. Joyce, “Third-Party Intervention and the Civil War Process,” Journal of 
Peace Research Vol. 45, no. 3 (May, 2008): 345-363; Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier, Dan Reiter and 
Christopher Zorn, “Nonproportional Hazards and Event History Analysis in International Relations,” The 
Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol. 47, no. 1 (Feb., 2003): 33-53. 
5
 Judith D. Singer and John B. Willet, Applied Longitudinal Data Analysis: Modeling Change and Event 
Occurrence, (New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 318. 
6
 Ibid, 516. 
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I have interacted democracy with the natural logarithm of time and introduced a new 
variable into the rebel success model.
7
  
I used the Efron method for handling ties in all three models. Following the 
approach outlined by Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, and Joyce, I have estimated civil war 
days as the unit of analysis.
8
 There are 127 cases of intrastate conflicts from 1945 to 2007 
and total of 536 spells (observations). Similarly to the previous parametric survival 
model, I am testing the effect of endogenous (democracy, autocracy, and military 
personnel) and exogenous (UN, IGO, and state interventions) tipping factors that are 
time-varying covariates and onset factors (secondary diamonds, oil exporting economies, 
ethnic and religious fractionalizations) that are time-invariant covariates. In the tables 13 











                                                        
7
 Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier, Dan Reiter and Christopher Zorn, “Nonproportional Hazards and Event 
History Analysis in International Relations,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol. 47, no. 1 (Feb., 2003): 
44. 
8
 Dylan Balch-Lindsay, Andrew J. Enterline and Kyle A. Joyce, “Third-Party Intervention and the Civil 
War Process,” Journal of Peace Research Vol. 45, no. 3 (May, 2008): 354. 
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Table 13. Coefficients of the Cox Survival Model. 
 
Cox Proportional (Coefficients) 




-0.08 -1.81 7.72*** 0.29 










0.44* -0.35 -0.34 -0.8 
(0.26) (0.45) (0.46) (0.73) 
Military personnel 
0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.04 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
United Nations 
intervention 
-0.1 -0.25 -0.26 1.8*** 
(0.55) (0.7) (0.71) (0.68) 
Regional IGO 
intervention 
-0.16 1.14* 1.18* 2.78*** 
(0.83) (0.68) (0.68) (0.86) 
State intervention 
for government 
-0.16 -1.79** -1.82** -1.36 
(0.34) (0.86) (0.86) (0.86) 
State intervention 
for rebels 
-0.86 0.78 0.77 -46.42 
(0.92) (0.53) (0.53) (0) 
Secondary 
diamonds 
-0.01 -0.27 -0.31 -1.2 
(0.3) (0.48) (0.5) (0.8) 
Oil exports 
0.71** -0.44 -0.52 1.88** 
(0.28) (0.63) (0.68) (0.79) 
Ethnic 
fractionalization 
-0.86*** -0.32 -0.3 -0.32 
(0.32) (0.47) (0.45) (0.59) 
Religious 
Fractionalization 
0.65 -0.33 -0.36 -1.42** 
(0.53) (0.58) (0.58) (0.57) 







                                                        
9
 Rebel2 model provides hazard ratios of the Cox competing risks model after testing for the violation of 
the proportional hazard assumption. The factor of democracy violated the proportional hazard assumption 
and, thus, I multiplied it by the natural logarithm of time.   
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Table 14. Hazard Ratios of the Cox Survival Model. 
 
Cox Proportional (Hazard Ratios) 
Variable Government Rebel Rebel2 Compromise 
Democracy 
0.92 0.16 2254.74*** 1.33 










1.55* 0.71 0.71 0.45 
(0.41) (0.32) (0.33) (0.33) 
Military personnel 
1.01 0.99 0.99 1.04 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
United Nations 
intervention 
0.9 0.78 0.77 6.02*** 
(0.5) (0.54) (0.54) (4.09) 
Regional IGO 
intervention 
0.85 3.12* 3.24* 16.12*** 
(0.71) (2.12) (2.22) (13.89) 
State intervention 
for government 
0.85 0.17** 0.16** 0.26 
(0.29) (0.14) (0.14) (0.22) 
State intervention 
for rebels 
0.42 2.18 2.17 0 
(0.39) (1.16) (1.15) (0) 
Secondary 
diamonds 
0.99 0.77 0.74 0.3 
(0.3) (0.37) (0.37) (0.24) 
Oil exports 
2.04** 0.64 0.59 6.55** 
(0.57) (0.41) (0.4) (5.15) 
Ethnic 
fractionalization 
0.42*** 0.72 0.74 0.73 
(0.13) (0.34) (0.34) (0.43) 
Religious 
Fractionalization 
1.91 0.72 0.7 0.24** 
(1.01) (0.41) (0.41) (0.14) 










Endogenous Tipping Points 
 
 Following the Cox proportional hazards model analysis, the factor of the military 
personnel has lost its effect on the government success and is no longer statistically 
significant. At the same time, a new approach has suggested that in the government 
success model autocratic states are more likely to decrease the expected duration of 
conflict (Figure 2).   Thus, autocratic regimes increase the hazard rate by 55% in the 
conflict that end up with the government’s victory. Democracy is statistically significant 








Figure 3. The Role of Democracy in a Rebels’ Success Model. 
  
Exogenous Tipping Points 
 
 As I hypothesized earlier, the United Nations peacekeeping interventions are 
statistically significant in the compromise outcome model. UN peacekeepers decrease the 
time to compromise outcome and increase a hazard rate by 502% (Figure 4).  Similar 
effect is observed for the interventions by regional intergovernmental organizations. 
However, this type of intervention decreases not only the expected duration of 
compromise outcome (Figure 5), but also expected duration of rebel victory (Figure 6). 
Finally, as one can see in the Figure 7, state intervention supporting the government 




Figure 4. UN Intervention in a Compromise Model. 
 




Figure 6. Intervention by Regional IGOs in a Rebels’ Success Model. 
 
Figure 7. State Intervention for Government in a Rebels’ Success Model. 
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Onset (Control Factors) 
 
 In addition to oil exporting economies and religious fractionalization that were 
significant in the parametric model, ethnic fractionalization was found significant and 
negatively related in the government success model. Thus, ethnically heterogeneous 
societies increase the expected duration of conflicts that ended in the success of 
government (Figure 8). In contrast, if the country is an oil producing economy, the 
duration of civil war will decrease given the success of the government (Figure 9). In the 
compromise outcome model, non-lootable resource of oil was found to decrease the 
duration of conflict (Figure 10), while religious fractionalization on the opposite 
increased the time of civil war (Figure 11).  
 
 




Figure 9. The Role of an Oil Exporting Economy in a Government’s Success Model. 
 




Figure 11. The Role of Religious Fractionalization in a Compromise Model. 
 
Competing Risks Analysis Using Fine and Gray Model 
 
  Traditional approaches to the analysis of the competing risks have utilized the 
Cox model for the cause-specific hazard functions. By assuming the non-informativeness 
and using identical predictors across the different outcomes, it is possible to conduct 
parallel tests and then compare the results.
10
 Yet, according to Montfort, Fennema, and 
Ghidey: “in the presence of competing failure events that impede the event of interest, a 
standard analysis using Cox regression is able to produce incidence-rate curves that either 
(1) are appropriate only for a hypothetical universe where competing events do not occur 
                                                        
10
 Judith D. Singer and John B. Willet, Applied Longitudinal Data Analysis: Modeling Change and Event 
Occurrence, (New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 592. 
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or (2) are appropriate for the data at hand, yet the effects of covariates on these curves are 
not easily quantified.”11 Therefore, to account for the presence of competing risks, I 
utilize the semiparametric proportional hazards model for the subdistribution developed 




The underlying assumption in this study is that the outcomes of the civil war such 
as the government victory, success of the rebels or compromise are influencing each 
other. In a sense, the increase in the risk of a particular outcome should decrease the risks 
for the occurrence of other outcomes. Thus, under the condition that the competing risks 
for three outcomes are not independent from each other, it is more appropriate to estimate 
the cumulative incidence.
13
 In the Figure 12, it is clearly seen that the likelihood of the 
government success outcome is significantly higher after approximately 1,000 days of an 
intrastate conflict. At the same time, the probability of rebel success and a compromise 
outcome are similar throughout the whole period.  
 
                                                        
11
 Kees van Montfort, Peter Fennema, and Wendimagegn Ghidey, “Competing Risks and Survival 
Analysis,” in Developments in Statistical Evaluation of Clinical Trials, ed. Kees van Montfort, H.L. Oud 
Johan, Wendimagegn Ghidey, (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 2014), 91. 
12
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13
 Vincenzo Coviello and May Boggess, “Cumulative Incidence Estimation in the Presence of Competing 





Figure 12. Cumulative Incidence (CI) Functions for Civil War Outcomes. 
  
In the tables 15 and table 16, I report the coefficients and sub-hazard ratios 
respectively of the Fine and Gray competing risks model. While the earlier examined 
parametric survival model and cause specific survival model are critical steps in 
understanding the path dependence dynamics in civil wars, they are also useful for 









Table 15. Coefficients of the Fine and Gray Competing Risks Model. 
 
Coefficients 
Variable Government Rebel Compromise 
Democracy 
0.18 -1.68 1.71** 
(0.49) (1.14) (0.69) 
Autocracy 
0.52* -0.35 -1.13 
(0.27) (0.47) (0.86) 
Military personnel 
0.01 -0.02 0.03 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.03) 
United Nations 
intervention 
-0.54 -0.47 2.12*** 
(0.58) (0.77) (0.64) 
Regional IGO 
intervention 
-1.03 0.89 1.95** 
(0.81) (0.72) (0.77) 
State intervention 
for government 
0.3 -1.58* 0.04 
(0.31) (0.87) (0.74) 
State intervention 
for rebels 
-0.7 0.95* -16.4*** 
(0.74) (0.57) (0.8) 
Secondary 
diamonds 
0.32 -0.18 -0.6 
(0.3) (0.48) (0.59) 
Oil exports 
0.33 -0.77 1.16* 
(0.29) (0.62) (0.67) 
Ethnic 
fractionalization 
-0.35 0.03 0.56 
(0.34) (0.46) (0.72) 
Religious 
Fractionalization 
0.83 -0.38 -1.94*** 
(0.52) (0.6) (0.63) 











Table 16. Sub-Hazard Ratios of the Fine and Gray Competing Risks Model. 
 
Sub-Hazard Ratios 
Variable Government Rebel Compromise 
Democracy 
1.2 0.19 5.54** 
(0.58) (0.21) (3.83) 
Autocracy 
1.67* 0.7 0.32 
(0.45) (0.33) (0.28) 
Military personnel 
1.01 0.98 1.03 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.03) 
United Nations 
intervention 
0.58 0.62 8.35*** 
(0.34) (0.48) (5.31) 
Regional IGO 
intervention 
0.36 2.42 7.06** 
(0.29) (1.74) (5.42) 
State intervention 
for government 
1.34 0.2* 1.04 
(0.41) (0.18) (0.77) 
State intervention 
for rebels 
0.5 2.58* 1E-07*** 
(0.37) (1.46) (1E-07) 
Secondary 
diamonds 
1.37 0.84 0.55 
(0.42) (0.4) (0.32) 
Oil exports 
1.39 0.46 3.18* 
(0.4) (0.29) (2.14) 
Ethnic 
fractionalization 
0.7 1.03 1.75 
(0.24) (0.48) (1.26) 
Religious 
Fractionalization 
2.28 0.69 0.14*** 
(1.2) (0.41) (0.09) 
Statistical confidence levels: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Robust standard errors are 
in parentheses. 
 
Endogenous Tipping Points 
 
 The analysis of the government success model through the Fine and Gray 
competing risk test indicates that the impact of autocratic regimes on the expected 
duration of an intrastate conflict. Thus, civil wars in states with authoritarian 
governments tend to be shorter, increasing the sub-hazard ratio by 67 percentage points. 
It can be seen in Figure 13 that after 2,000 days of war the autocratic regime factor 
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increases by 20 percentage points the probability of government success. The factor of 
democracy appeared to be statistically significant in the compromise outcome model. In 
intrastate conflicts that ended up in a peaceful settlement, the democratic regime variable 
tended to decrease the expected duration of war. Furthermore, democracy dramatically 









Figure 14. CI Function for Democracy Factor in a Compromise Model. 
  
Exogenous Tipping Points 
 
 Both the intervention by the United Nations and regional intergovernmental 
organizations are statistically significant and positively related in the compromise 
outcome model. The presence of the UN peacekeepers and forces under the command of 
the regional IGOs has an equally substantial effect on lessening the duration of the wars 
that ended in a compromise. Both types of intervention increase the probability of a 
compromise by 10 percentage points after 3000 days of fighting (Figures 15 and 16). 
State interventions that support the government tended to prolong the duration of the 
conflict in the rebel success model and also reduce the probability of the rebellion’s 
success (Figure 17). In contrast, when states intervened on the behalf on the rebels, these 
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civil wars appeared to be shorter and the chances of rebellion to succeed increased by 20 
percentage points after 1000 days of conflict (Figure 18). However, such interventions 
tended to prolong intrastate conflicts that ended with the compromise outcome, even 
though the decrease in the hazard rate was rather small. 
 
 






Figure 16. CI Function for IGOs Intervention Factor in a Compromise Model. 
 




Figure 18. CI Function for Rebel-biased Interventions in a Rebel’s Success Model. 
 
Figure 19. CI Function for Rebel-biased Interventions in a Compromise Model. 
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Onset (Control) Factors 
 
 While lootable resources (secondary diamonds) have not been statistically 
significant in all survival models, the factor of an oil exporting economy appears to be 
relevant throughout the entire study. Fine and Gray competing risks analysis indicates 
that oil is statistically significant in the compromise outcome model and indicates the 
shorter duration of civil war when this non-lootable resource is present. Furthermore, oil 
increases the cumulative incidence of a compromise outcome (Figure 20). Finally, the 
test revealed that it takes longer for the compromise outcome to be achieved in the 
societies with high religious diversity. The probability of the compromise outcome is 7 
percentage points lower if the society is religiously heterogeneous (Figure 21). 
 
 


















Current Findings and the Existing Literature on the Outcomes of Intrastate 
Conflicts 
 
 The results of four different tests including multinomial logistic regression 
analysis and three types of survival analysis provide sufficient support for the assumption 
about the application of a narrow definition of path dependence to the study of intrastate 
conflicts (Tables 17 and 18). Overall, the findings are predominantly consistent across all 
models both in terms of statistical significance of the factors and their explanatory power. 
Although all four tests are equally valuable to validate the robustness of the 
results, Fine and Gray competing risks model is used here as the primary test since this 
method satisfies the narrow definition of the path dependence. Thus, focusing on the type 
of an intrastate conflict termination through the prism of competing risks to satisfy the 
multitude of outcomes assumption; codifying each intervention by third parties as a new 
event that could end war to satisfy the sequence and timing assumption; and, finally, 
observing statistically significant factors to satisfy the inertia assumption make both the 
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 Hazard ratios of the Cox competing risks model after testing for the violation of the proportional hazard 
assumption. Since the factor of democracy violated the assumption, I multiplied it by the natural logarithm 
of time.   
Table 17. Event History (Survival) Analysis of Intrastate Conflict Outcomes. 
 
Government Rebel Compromise 
 




F&G Weib Cox F&G 
Democracy 
1.7 0.92 1.2 0.28 0.16 
2254.
74*** 
0.19 1.14 1.33 
5.54*
* 
(0.79) (0.45) (0.58) (0.33) (0.18) 
(4903.
83) 
(0.21) (1.02) (1.03) (3.83) 
Autocracy 
1.29 1.55* 1.67* 0.73 0.71 0.71 0.7 1.08 0.45 0.32 
(0.33) (0.41) (0.45) (0.29) (0.32) (0.33) (0.33) (0.55) (0.33) (0.28) 
Military 
personnel 
1* 1.01 1.01 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.98 1 1.04 1.03 

































0.2* 0.4 0.26 1.04 




1.12 0.42 0.5 1.21 2.18 2.17 2.58* 0.3 0 
1E-
07*** 





0.94 0.99 1.37 0.88 0.77 0.74 0.84 0.43 0.3 0.55 
















0.7 0.91 0.72 0.74 1.03 3.49 0.73 1.75 




1.58 1.91 2.28 0.88 0.72 0.7 0.69 0.36* 0.24** 
0.14*
** 
(0.65) (1.01) (1.2) (0.51) (0.41) (0.41) (0.41) (0.19) (0.14) (0.09) 
Democracy 
*ln(time) 
     
0.16*
**     
     
(0.06) 
    
Statistical confidence levels: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
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 0.31  -0.36*  0.05 
 (0.2)  (0.21)  (0.11) 
Autocracy 
 0.14  -0.08  -0.06 
 (0.1)  (0.09)  (0.07) 
Military 
personnel 
 0.01  -0.005  -0.002 
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
United Nations 
intervention 
 -0.06  -0.1  0.16** 
 (0.14)  (0.12)  (0.07) 
Regional IGO 
intervention 
 -0.37**  0.19  0.19* 























0.09 0.11 -0.07 -0.01 -0.02 -0.1 
(0.12) (0.13) (0.11) (0.11) (0.08) (0.08) 
Oil exports 
0.2 0.05 -0.25** -0.2 0.05 0.15* 
(0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.08) (0.08) 
Ethnic 
fractionalization 
-0.05 -0.13 -0.03 -0.01 0.08 0.14 
(0.12) (0.12) (0.1) (0.1) (0.09) (0.09) 
Religious 
Fractionalization 
0.18 0.24 0.02 -0.09 -0.16* -0.15* 



































The analysis of endogenous and exogenous tipping points as well as control 
factors provided not only support for the path dependence in intrastate conflicts, but also 
hinted at mechanisms at play that could shed the light on the reasons behind a particular 
civil war outcome. Both the Cox proportional hazards model and the Fine and Gray 
competing risks model provided strong evidence for the role of the United Nations and 
regional intergovernmental organizations in decreasing the duration of the civil war that 
resulted in the compromise. Similarly, the multinomial regression model and survival 
analysis approach indicated that both the UN and regional IGOs are likely to increase the 
probability of a peaceful settlement solution (H6 and H7). These results suggest the 
strong evidence that peacekeeping missions do indeed minimize the conflict duration and 
lead to a compromise outcome. Furthermore, Virginia Page Fortna in “Does 
Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace after 
Civil War” finds evidence that once the civil war is over, peacekeeping forces help 
maintain peace for longer periods.
15
  
Yet, one has to be cautious about this particular finding for two reasons. First, the 
United Nations has a record of sending its troops to the locations where there is a peace 
to keep. In other words, this international organization is likely to send troops to solve 
intrastate conflicts where the prospects of the compromise are readily attainable. Second, 
the primary objectives of the UN peacekeepers and forces from such IGOs as the African 
Union, ECOWAS, League of Arab States, European Union, and Commonwealth of 
Independent States are to observe ceasefire or monitor disarmament and disengagement 
of warring sides. Therefore, such mission statements indicate that the UN and IGOs 
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 Virginia Page Fortna, “Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of 
Peace after Civil War,” International Studies Quarterly Vol. 48, no. 2 (Jun., 2004): 286. 
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appear to be facilitators of the ascending compromise outcome rather than instigators. 
Yet again, it is possible that these international bodies first broker a compromise outcome 
through diplomatic means and then provide peacekeepers. In such scenario, the role of 
the UN and regional IGOs as the lock in mechanisms for the compromise path 
dependence can be valid. 
Competing risks tests have found no support for my hypothesis about the effect of 
the state intervention for the government forces on the likelihood of the government 
success outcome or changes in its duration (H8). While not affecting the government 
victory outcome, state intervention for the government forces prolonged intrastate 
conflicts where rebels eventually succeeded. In contrast, when a third party state provided 
military support for the rebels, the time till the rebel forces would succeed tend to 
decrease (H9). This is an important finding given the voluminous scholarly debate 
regarding the impact of state interventions on the outcome of civil wars. Thus, Stephen E. 
Gent in “Going in When it Counts: Military Intervention and the Outcome of Civil 
Conflicts” using Patrick M. Regan dataset that sets the bar for the civil wars at 200 
fatalities and applying Cox proportional hazards model, has found similar results in 
regards to rebel-biased interventions and the probability that rebels will win.
16
 However, 
his analysis further suggested that the rebel-biased interventions are also associated with 
the negotiated settlements outcome and that government-biased interventions have no 
effect on the way the civil war will end.
17
  
In the article “Third-Party Intervention and the Civil War Process” Dylan Balch-
Lindsay, Andrew J. Enterline, and Kyle A. Joyce have conducted a similar study that 
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 Stephen E. Gent, “Going in When it Counts: Military Intervention and the Outcome of Civil Conflicts,” 
International Studies Quarterly Vol. 52 (2008): 722. 
17
 Ibid, 724-725. 
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focused on the type of third party intervention and its influence on the civil war 
outcome.
18
 They have used an earlier version of the Correlates of War dataset with the 
1000 battle related deaths threshold for the intrastate conflicts for the period from 1816 
till 1997, while my study focused on the period after the Second World War until 2007. 
Similarly to Stephen E. Gent, the authors applied the Cox proportional hazards model to 
test hypotheses about civil war outcomes. Their finding about the statistically significant 
and positive impact of rebel-biased interventions on the likelihood of the rebel victory is 
consistent with Stephen E. Gent’s results and my conclusions. Yet, in their study rebel-
biased interventions were found to be negatively associated with the government victory 
and positively with the compromise, while government-biased interventions were found 
to shorten the duration of the compromise and the government success outcomes. The 
variability in the conclusions between the studies can be caused by several factors. The 
first factor is the difference in the datasets between the thresholds in civil wars fatalities. 
The second element is the difference in the time periods under investigation. The third 
factor is the variability of explanatory factors across studies. Finally, the difference in the 
results can be explained by fact that the previous studies have utilized Cox proportional 
hazards models assuming the independence of the outcome risks, while I applied Fine 
and Gray model that incorporates the dependent risks assumption.
19
 This approach is an 
important contribution of my study to the scholarship on intrastate conflicts. 
The role of regime type and military capacity in the determining the civil war 
outcome has been an equally heated debate in the scholarship on intrastate conflicts. In 
crafting the hypotheses regarding the impact of endogenous tipping points on locking in a 
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 Dylan Balch-Lindsay, Andrew J. Enterline and Kyle A. Joyce, “Third-Party Intervention and the Civil 
War Process,” Journal of Peace Research Vol. 45, no. 3 (May, 2008): 345-363 
19
 Ibid, 355. 
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particular conflict outcome, I mostly referred to the assumptions put forth by Charles 
Tilly and Sidney Tarrow in Contentious Politics.
20
 By extending their observations 
regarding the ability of a state to prevent the outbreak of the rebellion through the prism 
of the regime type and capacity into the likelihood of a particular intrastate conflict 
outcome, I suggested that high military strength of the government armed forces should 
be related to the government victory outcome. However, throughout all four tests, 
military capacity has not been associated with the government success, rebel victory or 
compromise outcome. A 2004 study by Karl R. DeRouen, Jr. and David Sobek 
employing a data from Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis on civil wars from 1944 
till 1997 has found strong support for the role of armed forces across all civil war 
outcomes.
21
 The contrast in findings can be partially explained by the Research Design 
And testing methods, yet it is critical to further investigate the factor of military capacity. 
While military capacity might not be a critical tipping point in determining the 
path of the civil war, regime type has appeared to affect the intrastate conflict outcome. 
Thus, as hypothesized democratic regimes tend be associated with the compromise 
outcome (H12). Furthermore, democracies tend to decrease the duration of the conflict 
that ends in the negotiated settlement. While hypothetically democratic societies are 
characterized by the mechanisms to addresses grievances to prevent conflicts, they are 
not immune from civil wars. However, the presence of democratic institutions implies 
credible mechanisms for establishing a dialogue between the government and rebels and 
provides space to address grievances for both sides. Autocratic regimes, on the other 
hand, lack such mechanisms, but also can afford to ignore public opinion that usually 
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 Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow, Contentious Politics (Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2007). 
21
 Karl R. DeRouen, Jr. and David Sobek, “The Dynamics of Civil War Duration and Outcome,” Journal of 
Peace Research Vol. 41 no. 3 (2004): 312. 
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prefers peaceful settlement to prolonged bloody war. My analysis further supports this 
assumption as autocratic states are largely associated with the government success 
outcome and the decrease in its duration (H13). The majority of the civil war literature 
that aims at explaining the outcome of conflict treats regime type as a secondary 
explanatory variable or simply a control factor that should be included in the tests. 
Furthermore, the democracy variable is given preference to anocratic or autocratic 
regimes in these studies.
22
 My analysis, however, incorporates both regime types and 
offers inferences about their impact on the civil war outcomes and duration. While 
Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow have suggested that undemocratic regimes are more 





 The analysis of the narrow concept of path dependence through the framework of 
three event history models revealed statistically and substantively significant tipping 
points that have the capacity to shape the outcomes of a civil war. The factor of 
government’s military strength appears to have no effect on the way intrastate conflicts 
are resolved. At the same time, the regime type of democracy was found to be conducive 
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to a compromise resolution, while government’s victory was more likely in autocratic 
states. Interventions by UN and IGOs decreased the time of a civil war and ultimately led 
to a negotiated settlement. Rebel-biased interventions increased the chance of the 
rebellion’s success, whereas state-based interventions increased the duration of a civil 
war. In the subsequent chapter, I apply the results of broad and narrow models of path 
dependence to three cases of civil wars to investigate causal mechanisms that shape the 










 The investigation into the broad and narrow notions of path dependence has 
supported the hypotheses about the influence of the initial conditions as well as temporal 
and sequence factors on the outcomes of intrastate conflicts. Viewing civil wars as an 
overarching process rather than the sum of different stages offers a novel perspective on 
the dynamics of the conflict and mechanisms that have the potential to lock in a particular 
settlement option. This chapter outlines the stories of three civil wars, incorporates the 
findings from onset factors and tipping points models, and proposes causal mechanisms 
that explain the particular outcome of an intrastate conflict. 
 While there is no commonly agreed approach in social sciences as to what 
constitutes a case study, I adhere to the supposition put forth by Poteete, Janssen, and 
Ostrom in Working Together: Collective Action, the Commons, and Multiple Methods in 
Practice that views the case study through the prism of the unit of analysis since it “offers 
an empirical interpretation of the theoretical subject of study.”1 Indeed, a focus on a 
specific civil war through outlining the development of conflict in general and crucial 
milestones in particular, provides a compelling test for the models and addresses possible 
limitations of the study. 
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 The case selection for this chapter was based on the way the intrastate conflict 
ended as well as the presence of endogenous and exogenous tipping points. Thus, three 
cases that are analyzed in this study are the First Chechen War of 1994-1996 that resulted 
in the victory of rebels; Africa’s World War (Second Congo War) of 1998-2002 in which 
a compromise between warring sides was achieved; and, the Second Sri Lanka Tamil 
Civil War (Eelam IV) of 2006-2009 where the government toppled the rebel forces. The 
last case was not included in the original dataset and is introduced here to test the 
applicability of my findings for out-of-sample civil wars. Each case study involves a brief 
account of the war, discussion of the initial conditions, evaluation of the tipping factors’ 
















The First Chechen War of 1994-1996 
 
Table 19. Overview of the First Chechen War. 
Outcome Rebels’ Victory 
Regime Type Anocracy 









State intervention for 
government 
No 
State intervention for 
rebels 
No 
Secondary diamonds No 
Oil exports Yes 
Contagion Yes 






Overview of an Intrastate Conflict 
 
The roots of the First Chechen War can be traced back to the history of the 
policies conducted by the communist regime toward the local populace. Yet, a direct 
impetus for the independence of Chechnya lies in the chaos and vacuum of power that 
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resulted after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Many autonomous republics within the 
Russian Federation felt that the appropriate moment had come for the proclamation of 
national rights and liberties in the light of the weakening grasp of Moscow. Indeed, many 
autonomous entities sought to proclaim independence in the early nineties. However, 
after the first president of Russia, Boris Yeltsin, succeeded in establishing control over 
the turbulent political system, many autonomous republics searched for a new agreement 
with the central authority.  
As of 1994, Moscow managed to negotiate federal treaties with the majority of 
the autonomous republics, including powerful and independence-seeking Tatarstan.
2
 And 
if in the case of Tatarstan, agreement was achieved by relatively peaceful methods, 
relations with the Republic of Chechnya included the use of force in 1991 and 1992, 
which after a severe repulse from the Chechen government of Dudayev forced Russian 
troops to conduct a covert operation in the fall of 1994.
3
 John P. Hardt and his colleagues 
provided insight into the reasons for the Chechen crisis and argued that “Dudayev has 
made numerous extreme, hostile statements against Russia, and some suggest that Yeltsin 
bears a personal animus against Dudayev.”4 Therefore, animosity between Russian and 
Chechen leaders multiplied by decentralization tendencies after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union appeared to be significant factors that predetermined the First Chechen War. As of 
the year 1994, the situation in Chechnya escalated significantly and under these 
circumstances Boris Yeltsin opted for decisive actions. 
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Initial attempts of the federal government to solve the conflict through engaging 
the Chechen opposition to seize the Chechen capital, Grozny, on November 26, 1994 
failed. The assistance of the Russian Federal Counterintelligence Service in this operation 
did not alter the outcomes of the attack. To put things in perspective, in their account of 
the Chechen conflict, Trenin, Malashenko, and Lieven compare the November 1994 
attack on Grozny to the Bay of Pigs invasion.
5
 Unable to localize conflict to only 
Chechen authorities, Yeltsin decided to engage in a full-scale campaign that would 
include regular troops. After massive air strikes, ground forces started a march toward 
Grozny in December of 1994.
6
 The war lasted for almost two years and resulted in the 
signing of the Khasav-Yurt agreement in August, 1996. In fact, this treaty stipulated the 
de facto defeat of Moscow in the First Chechen War. Analyzing the reasons for Russian 
failure to establish control over Chechnya, one could be startled by the situation when a 
former “superpower” loses a war to a significantly weaker opponent. The first factor that 
led to Moscow’s defeat was the disastrous situation at the strategic and tactical levels of 
Russian military decision-making. Other factors were political intrigues within the 
Russian government and a worsening economic situation. However, despite all these 
drawbacks federal troops succeeded in confronting Chechen insurgents in conventional 
battles and controlling the majority of Chechen territory. So what forced Moscow to give 
concessions to Chechen separatists and sign an unfavorable agreement? 
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The disintegrative tendencies in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union 
continued to haunt newly independent republics, including the Russian Federation. In the 
Caucasus, several frozen conflicts erupted in Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan in the 
early 1990s and sent ripples across the region. Decentralization tendencies in Chechnya 
were undoubtedly encouraged by similar outbreaks in the neighboring republics. Yet, the 
factor of contagion appeared to be inconsistent with the findings of the quantitative 
models of initial conditions as Chechen rebels succeeded in confronting the federal forces 
and securing victory. As I have argued in chapter 5, the spillover of the civil war brings 
innovative tactics into the battlefield. While the rebels were not able to withstand Russian 
forces in conventional warfare since federal forces have significant advantage in airpower 
and artillery, they succeeded in using asymmetric tactics involving a guerrilla 
counteroffensive and terrorist attacks. The findings of the model suggested that 
government is less likely to succeed in civil wars caused by contagion, while, at the same 
time, compromise outcome becomes more likely. In a sense, success of the Chechen 
rebels can be interpreted as de facto defeat of the federal forces, but also as a negotiated 
settlement as de jure Chechnya still remained part of Russia after Moscow Peace Treaty 
of 1997. 
An oil-exporting economy as the onset factor has been associated with the 
decreasing chances of the rebels to succeed in the intrastate conflict. Yet, in the case of 
First Chechen War the role of oil appeared to be more complex. In the initial model of 
path dependence that focused on the initial conditions, I codified the impact of oil 
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through identifying countries where this non-lootable resource accounts for the third of 
the merchandise exports. While Chechnya has historically contained both oil deposits and 
refining capabilities, the fraction of Chechen oil in overall Russian production was 
relatively low.
7
 Thus, war in Chechnya has not influenced the capabilities of the Russian 
government to deploy forces or support military activities. This caveat must be taken into 
account when interpreting the results of the large-n studies of intrastate conflict, 
especially if the dataset contains observations for large countries like Russia. 
I have argued in previous chapters that rebel forces are unlikely to benefit from 
the oil as this resource is not easily extractable, transportable and thus does not provide 
immediate financial benefits. Yet, Anna Politkovskaya, a Russian journalist and human 
rights activist who was assassinated allegedly due to her professional work, provided 
insight into the role of oil during the conflict in Chechnya. In her book A Dirty War: A 
Russian Reporter in Chechnya, Politikovskaya argued that oil wells served as a payment 
for the supporters of the Chechen rebel leaders.
8
 Moreover, given the unpopularity of the 
war in Russia, pervasive corruption, and dominance of criminal warlords, lucrative 
business emerged in Chechnya that involved the criminal elements from Russia and 
Chechen bandits trading in the spoils of war, including oil.
9
 Therefore, looking at the 
micro level of civil war in Chechnya, the oil factor might have increased the chances of 
the rebels’ victory. 
Finally, the factor of religion during the First Chechen War played a role both in 
the terms of Russian and Chechen confrontation as well as the dynamics within the 
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rebellion. The competing risks analysis suggested that in religiously diverse societies, 
warring sides take a longer time to reach a compromise. In the case of Chechnya, 
overwhelmingly Muslim rebel forces opposed religiously diverse but increasingly 
Orthodox Christian federal forces. Within the separatist movement, two approaches 
defined the actions of the rebels: a moderate wing that has led by Chechen President 
Dudayev and a radical wing led by military commander Basayev who adhered to the 
Wahhabist traditions. Whereas religiously driven rhetoric was used by the Chechen 
troops to rally support against federal forces and impeded the compromise decision, 
infighting within the separatist movement appeared to be a greater issue both in terms of 





The First Chechen War was an isolated intrastate conflict in a sense that there was 
no foreign military intervention or international peacekeeping mission. The international 
community remained largely an observer in this civil war. Russia as the successor of the 
Soviet Union retained one of the largest military forces and nuclear arsenal making a 
third party intervention a risky endeavor. Finally, as the permanent member of the United 
Nations Security Council, Russia had the opportunity to veto any decision of the body 
and insisted on considering the Chechen conflict an internal affair. 
Although Russia made significant transformations in its political system after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, it has been defined as neither autocracy nor democracy in 
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the POLITY IV dataset. The analysis of the civil war outcomes through the prism of 
competing risks suggested that authoritarian regimes favor government success outcome, 
while democratic societies prefer compromise. Russia during the period of the First 
Chechen War was arguably a combination of the democratic transformations alongside 
growing authoritarian powers of President Yeltsin, especially in the aftermath of Russian 
Constitutional crisis of 1993. In sum, exogenous and to a lesser extent endogenous 




Traditional interpretations of the success of the rebels during the First Chechen 
War point at political and economic instability within Russia as well as poor Russian 
military decision-making and planning. Yet, if one considers the framework of path 
dependence in its narrow sense, it becomes increasingly useful to consider the impact of 
small events as well as the role of timing and sequence during the intrastate conflict. In 
case of the First Chechen War, the power of small events can be analyzed through prism 
of terrorist tactics by Chechen separatists. Moscow appeared to be unprepared for 
asymmetrical warfare that on the other hand had a significant impact not only on the 
government, but also on Russian society as a whole. Two major terrorist attacks by 
Chechen separatists appeared to be crucial determinants of Moscow’s defeat in the First 
Chechen War.     
The most striking act of terrorism that the Russian government experienced 
during the First Chechen War was the raid on a hospital in Budennovsk on June 14, 1995. 
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During this attack hundreds of hospital personnel and patients were taken hostage. 
Interestingly, the attack occurred at the end of spring of 1995 when Russian troops 
achieved significant success over Chechen separatists and forced them to retreat to 
mountainous regions.
10
 Two suppositions explain the change of separatists’ tactics. Some 
conspiracy theorists trace connections between the terrorist leader, Basayev, and the 
Russian government arguing that certain officials were interested in the continuation of 
the war.
11
 Other sources claim that the attack on Budennovsk was a coincidence triggered 
by accident.
12
 Another perspective on this incident is offered by Dianne Leigh Sumner 
who cites the leader of terrorists during the Budennovsk attack, Shamil Basayev: “They 
say that Budennovsk was terror. And the fact that the Russian Air Force is bombing our 
villages every day – that is not terror? ... [Budennovsk] was a response reaction. We were 
compelled to resort to extreme means in order simply to survive. I am not a bandit … 
Russia is breaking all the international laws and the United Nations does nothing.”13 In 
sum, various evidence suggest that the attack was well planned and unexpected which 
also explains its effectiveness. 
The Budennovsk massacre lasted six days. On June 14, 1995 approximately one 
hundred rebels led by Basayev entered the city where they met other rebels that were 
spread around Budennovsk. The targets of Basayev troops were a hospital, maternity 
clinic, bank, communication center, town hall, and the local internal affairs department, 
which they failed to seize.
14
 The element of surprise and swiftness of the attack shocked 
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Russian authorities even more so since the city was located outside of the conflict zone 
and virtually meant the spillover of war outside of Chechnya. As federal forces 
surrounded the city, Basayev demanded “amnesty for all Chechen fighters and free 
elections for Chechnya.”15 Already killing 91 people in the initial attack on the city, 
rebels proceeded with the execution of hostages after several unsuccessful siege attempts 
by Russian forces. Basayev was holding almost 1,500 hostages including pregnant 
women.
16
 These factors forced Moscow to make concessions to terrorists and accept their 
demands for a cease-fire and “direct negotiations between Russia and Chechen President 
Dudayev.”17 
The stalemate period appeared to be very short for establishing a bilateral 
agreement and the active fighting was restored. Once again Chechen separatists failed to 
withstand federal troops in conventional warfare. Under such circumstances, the rebels 
made a decision to utilize similar terrorist tactics. This time the target of the rebels 
became the hospital in town Kizlyar of the neighboring republic Dagestan.
18
 On January 
9, 1996, 256 Chechen separatists lead by Salman Raduyev entered Kizlyar and captured 
the hospital with around 2,000 people. On their way, separatists destroyed an airfield and 
killed 25 civilians. This time the rebels decided not to stay on the premises, but to move 
back to Chechnya using hostages as a “live shield”.19 However, federal troops were also 
ready for decisive actions and blocked the road near village Pervomayskoye where 
Chechen rebels were supposed to pass. Near the village, they captured another 100 
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civilians and 37 soldiers and took cover in the neighboring building. Five days of 
negotiations did not bring any changes since this time Russian authorities refused to 
negotiate with the rebels and planned a siege. The ensuing three days of fighting could 
have resulted in a complete Russian victory, but Chechen separatists received 
reinforcement and partially succeeded to retreat (their leader Salman Raduyev also 
escaped).
20
 Leaving 150 terrorists and 40 hostages killed, this operation could be 
evaluated as neither a success nor a failure for Russian forces, while the objectives of the 
terrorists also were not achieved. 
Once again the decision-making process toward the Chechen attacks ironically 
became a hostage of a political process. Yeltsin’s appointment of the FSB head 
responsible for hostage conflict resolution, Barsukov, can be evaluated as a critical 
mistake since Barsukov spent his entire career at the Kremlin and had only vague 
experience in dealing with terrorist attacks.
21
  This fact along with the government’s 
failed attempts to raise public approval led to a significant drop of president’s approval 
rating as “millions of television viewers saw him telling clumsy lies and looking as if he 
were absolutely out of touch with reality.”22 In contrast with Budennovsk, federal troops 
had not considered the possibility of negotiations and launched a full-scale siege paying 
less attention to the hostage casualties. The results of the operation were devastating: a 
high toll of hostage casualties and the escape of Chechen separatists, multiplied by the 
public dissatisfaction with the war, became the final nails in the coffin of the First 
Chechen War.  
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 These unfavorable outcomes for Moscow were the result of the lack of 
preparation of the federal forces for new Chechen tactics. However, a bigger cause 
behind the defeat of the federal forces was Russian political decision-making.  Lilia 
Shevtsova argued in Yeltsin's Russia: Myths and Reality: “the actions by the 
Chechens…rocked all of Russia and temporarily paralyzed its leadership.”23 Moreover, in 
this particular period a greater confrontation remained at the high political level. Being on 
a foreign trip, the Russian president gave an order to utilize military force against rebels 
who attacked the hospital.
24
 When the siege ended with a debacle, Prime Minister 
Chernomyrdin entered the scene by succeeding in negotiations with the rebels to release 
the hostages. The acceptance of Basayev’s demands meant a huge strike against Russian 
military prestige. At the same time, the Communist-led opposition in Duma tried to adopt 
an impeachment resolution against Yeltsin. Despite the fact that the attempt was 
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Africa’s World War (the Second Congo War) of 1998-2002 
 
Table 20. Overview of Africa’s World War. 
Outcome Compromise 
Regime Type Anocracy 









State intervention for 
government 
Yes 
State intervention for 
rebels 
Yes 
Secondary diamonds Yes 
Oil exports No 
Contagion Yes 






Overview of an Intrastate Conflict 
 
 The presence of conflict seems to be endemic to the region of equatorial Africa. 
With the advent of the era of colonization, it has experienced one of the most devastating 
violent outbreaks. Throughout almost five hundred years of the European occupation and 
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about sixty years of independence, violent conflicts became part of the history. 
Humanitarian disasters, wars for resources, and political struggles are mundane headlines 
of the news from this part of the African continent. Part of the problem lies, obviously, in 
the historical development of the region during colonial times and, specifically, the way 
these territories were divided, administered, and eventually tied to the metropolis. While 
various factors contribute to the onset and dynamics of the modern conflict in equatorial 
Africa, the underlying problem is the colonial legacy. 
 The most vivid and tragic example is the present day Democratic Republic of 
Congo. Since its independence in 1960, the vicious cycle of violence, corruption, and 
secessionism has paralyzed the state and condemned the society to suffering the 
consequences of constant fear and socioeconomic deprivations. The last two decades 
brought unparalleled destruction as the country faced civil wars, massive human rights 
violation, and de facto humanitarian catastrophe. Several factors are crucial to the 
dynamics of the conflict within the DRC: ethnic violence, the presence of hostile 
neighboring countries, natural resources, weakness of central government, and 
secessionist movements. At the same time, the involvement of the United Nations, 
African Union, and participation of the world’s major powers reflect not only the fact that 
third parties are instrumental in solving this conflict, but also that civil war in Congo 
could not be contained within its national borders. 
 The countries that comprise the Great Lakes Region of Africa have historically 
been intertwined in terms of population, culture, and economic relations. Despite the 
plethora of domestic grievances, the end to President Mobutu’s rule came from external 
calamity. One of the most tragic catastrophes in the recent history, the genocide in 
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Rwanda of 1994 has impacted the fragile balance in the DRC that was then called Zaire 
as almost 1.2 million Hutu refugees relocated to the Kivu, a region that is populated by 
Tutsis.
26
 Two years later, the Mobutu opposition, Alliance des Forces Democratiques 
pour la Liberation de Congo, led by Laurent-Desire Kabila and supported by Rwanda and 
Uganda, initiated a rebellion that resulted in removal of the decades long dictatorship and 
renaming the country to the Democratic Republic of Congo. Yet, Patricia Daley points 
out that the newly established leader not only failed at curbing systemic problems, which 
he inherited from the Mobutu regime, but also utilized state resources to strengthen the 
military and buy back the support of allies.
27
 These drawbacks in addition to the 
involvement of neighboring countries in the conflict inadvertently led to the outbreak of 
the second civil war in Democratic Republic of Congo.  
 In ironic twist of events, the rebellion against Kabila started in the same region of 
Kivu with the support from his former ‘friends’ where “the Rassemblement Congolais 
pour la Democratie (RCD-Goma) is supported by Rwanda, while the Mouvement pour la 
Liberation du Congo (MLC) and the RCD-Bunia, a break-away of the RCD-Goma, are 
sponsored by Uganda.”28 At the same time, Kabila was promised military assistance from 
Angola, Zimbabwe, and Namibia, which effectively elevated the scale of the conflict to 
the regional level. Support on each side came not due to friendly intentions, but as a 
strategic calculation which involved ethnic and economic dimensions. Elites on each side 
were eager to utilize insecurity to achieve their parochial interests at the expense of 
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peace. Filip Reyntjens underlines the paradox of the conflict environment in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo: “local, national and regional state and non-state actors 
indeed act rationally, engaged as they are in cost-benefit analyses, whose outcome often 
shows that war, instability and state decay are more attractive than peace, stability and 
state reconstruction.”29 
The anti-Kabila rebellion further destabilized the Democratic Republic Congo, 
while the scope of parties involved and a deteriorating humanitarian situation attracted 
greater attention from international community. Rwandan troops march toward Kinshasa 
in 1998 with the aim of the quick toppling of Kabila, but were thwarted by the 
involvement of the DRC allies Angola, Zimbabwe, and Namibia. With neither side able 
to achieve decisive victory, the DRC was de facto divided between three warring 
counterparts: the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie (the Rwandan supported 
rebel group) controlled the east; Mouvement pour la Liberation du Congo with the 
backing from Uganda dominated northern parts; and Kabila forces securing the rest of the 
country.
30
 In light of the stalemate, all sides agreed to the peace dialogue that culminated 
with signing the Lusaka Accord in 1999. The military component of the agreement 
outlined “a cease-fire, the deployment of a UN force, the neutralization of ‘negative 
forces’ (including Rwandan and Burundian rebel groups) and the withdrawal of foreign 
armies,” while the political provision focused on the “the organization of an ‘inter-
Congolese dialogue’ aimed at agreeing on the terms of a transition to a democratic form 
of government, and the re-establishment of the authority of the state throughout the entire 
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national territory.”31 The fragile ceasefire was constantly under the threat of relapse as 
every side regularly accused the other of violations. The United Nations Security Council 
was equally concerned about the domestic application of the accord specifically in 
regards to the exploitation of natural resources by external actors.
32
 
The assassination of Laurent-Desire Kabila in 2001 and the succession of his son, 
Joseph, as the leader of a state symbolized a new stage in the history of the DRC. While 
gradual steps were taken to ameliorate the conflict, withdraw foreign presence, and 
institute provisional government, the country again faced a crisis as the results of the 
2006 Presidential elections, which Kabila won, were not accepted by the opposition 
candidates.
33
  A new rebellion erupted in the ill-fated province of Kivu and other regions 
of the DRC. For the past seven years the national army, FARDC, has consistently 
attempted to address the rising tides of secessionism and instability. The involvement of 
the United Nations in the conflict since 1999 as the Mission in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo or MONUC and following the new stage in operation as the Stabilization 
Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo or MONUSCO appeared to be 
instrumental in addressing one of the most violent and complex intrastate conflicts in the 
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Several factors that I have analyzed in the model of initial conditions have been 
present at the onset of the civil war in the Democratic Republic of Congo. First and 
foremost, the spillover of the conflict from nearby intrastate wars that ravaged the states 
surrounding the DRC made direct causal contributions. Thus, refugees that were escaping 
genocide, rebels that failed in their countries, and foreign armed forces that brought to 
power President Kabila all contributed to the onset of civil war in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo. The factor of contagion in the Africa’s World War is consistent with 
the model of path dependence in intrastate conflicts that focused on the impact of initial 
conditions on the outcome. Thus, spillover of civil war in the DRC has a cascading effect 
that resulted in the third party intervention. Interestingly, various neighboring states 
provided first indirect and in the later stages direct military support both to the 
government forces and insurgent groups. The stalemate between different factions in the 
war prompted brokerage and subsequent involvement of regional and international 
organizations culminating in a compromise settlement. Arguably, the onset factor of 
contagion is associated with the compromise outcome because it prompts interventions 
from the UN and regional IGOs to curb the spread of violence, which was the case for 
Africa’s World War. 
While the Democratic Republic of Congo has vast fuel resources including oil, its 
primary export commodities include copper, cobalt and other non-ferrous minerals.
34
 At 
the same time, the presence of lootable resources in the conflict areas has been identified 
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by the United Nations Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources 
and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo as the source of 
financing rebel activities as well as criminal elements that were interested in perpetuating 
the conflict.
35
 The Panel’s Report has highlighted the complexity of the civil war and 
post-conflict reconstruction in the DRC as not only rebel groups, but also states that 
intervened and supported them militarily in the conflict had a stake in the resources-rich 
neighbor. According to the Report, Rwanda, Zimbabwe, and Uganda anticipating the 
involvement of the United Nations peacekeeping missions altered their approach to 
controlling the DRC resources by withdrawing armed forces, but leaving criminal 
elements to sustain illegal extraction and, as a result, the propensity for conflict 
reoccurrence.
36
 While my quantitative models of path dependence found no connection 
between diamonds and intrastate conflict outcome, the case of Africa’s World War 
implies the connection between lootable resources and third party intervention by states. 
Furthermore, focusing exclusively on diamonds and oil may limit the explanatory 
potential of the models as in the case of the DRC such lootable resources as tantalum, 
gold, and coltan were instrumental in causing and sustaining conflict. 
The civil war in Democratic Republic of Congo was largely driven by ethnic 
violence rather than religious differences. Thus, spillover of the conflict between Hutus 
and Tutsis in neighboring Rwanda into the DRC led to the continuation of the interethnic 
conflict that then involved local tribes that were dissatisfied with the influx of 
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 As the conflict ravaged the country, old ethnic rivalries reemerged and 
were exacerbated by the vacuum of power after the withdrawal of warring sides 
according to the ceasefire agreement. The stark example of such ethnic confrontation was 
the Ituri conflict in the eastern province of the DRC that “erupted in the wake of Ugandan 
Army withdrawal in compliance with peace agreements and international pressure.”38 
Since the existing scholarship on civil war in the DRC does not provide any insights into 
the role of religion in affecting conflict dynamics, it is problematic to extrapolate further 




After the end of the Cold War, the long lasting authoritative grip of the President 
Mobutu that ruled the Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire at that time) slowly 
diminished. Since 1990 the POLITY IV Project has identified the DRC as anocratic. The 
regime type that is neither democratic nor autocratic has lasted in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo after Mobutu’s death in 1997 and surpassed the period of the second 
civil war itself. Since the civil war erupted only a little more than year after the First War 
in Congo, President Kabila had not only a limited time to implement democratic changes 
that were desired by Congolese people, but even less incentive to do so given the 
increasing fear of the presence of foreign troops.
39
 Thus, stuck in a regime limbo Kabila 
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did not have avenues to use democratic institutions to establish credible commitments 
with the warring sides or autocratic instruments to topple unpopular moods within the 
country. Furthermore, he relied militarily on Rwandan and Ugandan strength to topple 
the previous government of Mobutu and thus failed to establish effective national armed 
forces. While the regime type and military capacity are useful dimensions for examining 
an intrastate conflict in the DRC, it is the exogenous tipping points that played a decisive 
role in the initiating the war, sustaining the violence, and eventually locking in the 
particular civil war outcome. 
Indeed, the name of an intrastate conflict, African World War, implies the 
involvement of the regional parties that had their security, financial, and political interests 
in influencing the dynamics of the conflict. The analysis through the lens of path 
dependence dynamics is rather complex in this particular case since third party 
interventions supported both government and rebels troops as well as involved 
peacekeeping missions from the United Nations and regional IGOs. Yet, the key factor in 
solving the puzzle is focusing on the sequence and timing factors, or in other words in 
what order did the interventions occur. The significance of timing and sequence has been 
stressed by Paul Pierson in this analysis of the narrower notion of path dependence and 
confirmed by my models of the intrastate conflict. 
The results of the competing risks models indicated that rebel-biased interventions 
tend to result in the rebels’ victory. As the Rwandan and Ugandan governments became 
dissatisfied with the newly established Kabila’s regime, they backed up the 
Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie (RCD) rebel group and instigated the 
conflict. The swiftness and scale of the attack almost granted rebels a victory, but the 
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involvement of government-biased intervention from Angola and Zimbabwe prevented 
Kabila’s demise. 40 In the presence of support for government and rebel troops, combined 
with the diversification of rebel groups and their motives, the possibility of decisive 
military victory of either side appeared to be highly unlikely.  The ensuing Lusaka 
Accord of 1999 that established a ceasefire was regularly violated by warring sides and 
the assassination of President Kabila in 2001 imbued conflict with reinvigorated fervor. 
Yet, it was the involvement of the United Nations peacekeepers that played the pivotal 
role in the emergence of the compromise outcome in the African World War. In the next 
section, I outline the evolution of UN missions and mechanisms that locked in the 




The United Nations has been involved in the peace operations in Congo since the 
early years of its independence from Belgium. As the transition period was marked with 
violence, Belgian forces moved troops to Congo to restore order, which were not 
welcomed by the Congolese government that in turn asked the United Nations to provide 
protection from foreign aggression.
41
 The United Nations Operation in the Congo 
(Opération des Nations Unies au Congo or ONUC) was established in July 1960 and at 
its apex consisted of 20,000 personnel that were “originally mandated to provide the 
Congolese Government with the military and technical assistance it required following 
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the collapse of many essential services and the military intervention by Belgian troops” 
and later had to expand their mandate due to the complex conflict situation.
42
 The 
secessionist trends within Congo became a prominent topic on the agenda of ONUC that 
initially been tasked with protection from external forces. The situation has deteriorated 
even further after the tragic events on September 17, 1961 when the airplane that carried 
Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld crashed in the region of the nowadays Zambia en 
route to the meeting to discuss the future of the secessionist Katanga province.
43
 In 1964, 
following the prevention of secessionist movements and external aggression, the ONUC 
finished its operation in Congo, but structural problems that arose during their four-year 
mandate not only threatened the future of peacekeeping, but also jeopardized the 
feasibility of the United Nations in general.
44
 
 The role of the United Nations was equally crucial for mediating the Second 
Congo War following the instability spawned by the removal of the three-decade-long 
regime of Mobutu and rise to power of Laurent-Desire Kabila. After the signing of the 
Lusaka Accord in 1999 that culminated the internal conflict exacerbated by the 
participation of neighboring countries, the United Nations Security Council adopted 
Resolution 1279 and established an Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo (MONUC). Two weeks prior to the inception of the MONUC operation, on 
November 16, 1999, the Organization of the African Unity dispatched a Joint Monitoring 
Commission to observe the fulfillment of the Lusaka Accord.
45
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Initially, MONUC was tasked with traditional peacekeeping functions, ceasefire 
monitoring, but not surprisingly had to update the initial mandate due to the complex 
situation in the field. Observers of this intrastate conflict highlighted the need for a more 
robust approach to peacekeeping given the complexity of the situation that would require 
introduction of the Chapter VII peacekeeping.
46
 According to article 42 of the UN 
Charter, in cases where peaceful settlement of conflicts is not attainable the UN can 
authorize enforcement mechanisms “by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to 
maintain or restore international peace and security.”47 Indeed, following the 2002 
agreement between warring sides to form a transitional government, MONUC was 
authorized to disarm the rebel groups but still lacked the enforcement mechanisms.
48
 Not 
only the mandate but also the undersized peacekeeping mission prevented MONUC from 
swiftly responding to the increasing levels of violence in the eastern provinces of the 
DRC. Under the deteriorating peace conditions, the UN Security Council adopted the 
resolution 1484 (2003) which authorized deployment of European Union troops under the 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
49
  French-led Operation Artemis was the first instance of 
the independent European Union crisis management mission and was successful in 
providing security in the Bunia region, weakening militia groups, delivering humanitarian 
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aid, and ultimately saving time for establishing a more reinforced UN peacekeeping 
presence in the area.
50
 
While officially the African World War ended on December 16, 2002 with 
government and rebel groups singing of the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement to form 
transitional government, local conflicts in Kivu, Ituri, and Katanga provinces continued 
despite the presence of international peacekeepers. In this light, it is critical to emphasize 
both the role of the United Nations as the mediator of the compromise outcome for the 
civil war and also as an active enforcer of the peace process during the post-compromise 




In the light of the findings regarding the role of international involvement in 
shaping the compromise outcome in civil wars, it is imperative to investigate further path 
dependent dynamics in the DRC. Thus, in this section I will focus on the evolution of 
MONUC into MONUSCO and elaborate on how actions of the UN intervention brigade 
helped secure the compromise outcome through active enforcement measures. 
The need for a “robust force” in the secessionist regions of Democratic Republic 
of Congo forced the UN Security Council to expand the mandate of MONUC with 
Security Council Resolution 1565 (2004) that authorized the increase of personnel by 
roughly 6,000 peacekeepers with the tasks of protection of civilians, discouraging 
violence, providing security to the UN personnel, ceasefire observation, and 
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 As of 2010, the MONUC was 20,000 peacekeepers strong and expanded 
its mandate to assisting with electoral process, training the Congolese national army 
(FARDC) and gradually preparing for the transition that would reflect the realities of the 
modern situation in the DRC.
52
  
The United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) was established in May 28, 2010 on the basis of 
MONUC to reflect the ‘new stage’ in the history of the Democratic Republic of Congo.53 
In reality, however, MONUSCO was not different from its predecessor since its mandate 
emphasized similar provisions: “to use all necessary means to carry out its mandate 
relating, among other things, to the protection of civilians, humanitarian personnel and 
human rights defenders under imminent threat of physical violence and to support the 
Government of the DRC in its stabilization and peace consolidation efforts.”54 Moreover, 
the composition of the peace operation, “a maximum of 19,815 military personnel, 760 
military observers, 391 police personnel and 1,050 personnel of formed police units,” 
remained similar to MONUC, even though suggestions have been made about reducing 
the number of peacekeepers.
55
 With the approved budget of almost $1.5 billion for 2013-
2014, MONUSCO remains by and large the largest external guarantee of security in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo. Yet, addressing the structural roots of intrastate conflict 
is a slow process and would require participation of various non-state actors that must 
operate in a secure environment. The recurring attacks from rebel groups backed by 
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neighboring countries jeopardize peacebuilding attempts. While the United Nations peace 
operations traditionally relied on protecting rather than enforcing, it was imperative in the 
case of the DRC to reformulate current postulates in order to address efficiently the 
transnationally supported rebel groups. 
The idea behind a more muscular vision of the United Nations is not new. 
According to Article 45 of the UN Charter, “to enable the United Nations to take urgent 
military measures, Members shall hold immediately available national air-force 
contingents for combined international enforcement action.”56 The UN Military Staff 
Committee that was charged with coordinating military actions of the UN was paralyzed 
by the Cold War stalemate and to this day remains largely dysfunctional. As an 
alternative, the United Nations authorized the creation of the peacekeeping forces that 
have evolved from merely ceasefire observers to the complex instrument aimed at 
preventing conflict, mediating reconciliation, and addressing the roots of conflict. 
However, peacekeepers have generally lacked the enforcement component and this 
limitation was effectively utilized against them in various intrastate conflicts. 
 In Congo, the situation has been drastically different both during the first 
involvement of the UN (ONUC) as well as during the recent peace operations (MONUC 
and MONUSCO). The creation of the UN Force Intervention Brigade in the spring of 
2013 with the aim of neutralizing armed groups in the DRC was viewed as a 
paradigmatic shift not only for peace operation in Congo, but also for peacekeeping in 
general. While certainly a more offensive mandate was a required measure in the light of 
deteriorating conflict environment in the eastern provinces, UN considerations about 
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using stronger actions are not novel in this particular case, but in fact the topic of 
enforcement measures have been on the agenda since the UN’s first involvement during 
the early years of Congo’s independence. Thus, the United Nations Operation in the 
Congo (ONUC) that was established in July 1960 and consisted of 20,000 peacekeepers 
became a victim of the Cold War rhetoric and de facto “became an enforcement army for 
the central government, which the UN Secretariat created with Western support.”57 The 
refusal of the USSR and France to pay the fees and resistance of other troop contributors 
to UN control led to a major split within this organization. That not only cast a shadow on 
the role of peacekeepers in offensive operations, but also undermined the UN’s 
involvement in the whole region of Great Lakes of Africa.
58
 
 The seminal Brahimi Report on the future of peacekeeping criticized the current 
peace operations that oftentimes lack personnel or sufficient authority to respond 
efficiently to the modern crises. The call for a “robust force” has been reflected in the 
changing mandate of MONUC that was initially tasked with ceasefire observance, but 
later incorporated disarmament, electoral assistance, and security of civilians and UN 
staff. Durch and his colleagues in The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peace 
Operations posit that “the first operational test of these new principles and force 
requirements awaited the Security Council’s July 2003 expansion of MONUC’s mandate 
to ‘use all necessary means’ in the DR Congo’s northeastern district of Ituri, where 
extreme inter-ethnic violence had erupted in the wake of Ugandan Army withdrawal in 
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compliance with peace agreements and international pressure.”59 Following the adoption 
of Resolution 1565 (2004), the UN Security Council authorized the expansion of the 
MONUC staff and strengthening the enforcement provisions of the mandate. 
 However, in comparison to the previous cases the UN Force Intervention Brigade 
had one important distinction. It was the first time in peacekeeping history that the 
mandate permitted direct offensive operations against rebel forces. The initiative to create 
the intervention brigade came following high-level talks between all the Great Lake 
region countries, United Nations, African Union, and other African regional 
organizations that culminated in signing of the Peace, Security and Cooperation 





 The next month the UN Security Council adopted resolution 2098 (2013) in 
which it condemned the activities of rebel groups such as “the M23, the FDLR, the ADF, 
the APCLS, the LRA, the National Force of Liberation (FNL), the various Mayi Mayi 
groups and all other armed groups and their continuing violence and abuses of human 
rights, including summary executions, sexual and gender based violence and large scale 
recruitment and use of children.”61 Article 9 of this resolution authorizes the creation of 
an intervention brigade which would be directly subordinate to the MONUSCO 
commander and be responsible for “neutralizing armed groups as set out in paragraph 12 
(b) below and the objective of contributing to reducing the threat posed by armed groups 
to state authority and civilian security in the eastern DRC and to make space for 
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stabilization activities.”62 Reference to paragraph 12(b) outlined the possibility of 
working jointly with or independently from FARDC (Congolese army) and the obligation 
to follow international law when engaging with combatants. 
 The actions of the Intervention Brigade that was initially viewed by international 
NGOs as rather another problem than a real solution to the crisis in Congo has proven its 
effectiveness in a joint operation with Congolese army that pushed rebel group 
Movement of March 23 (M23) outside of Congo and virtually led to its collapse. The 
3,000-strong brigade that consisted of Tanzanian, Malawi, and South African troops 
under the UN command after successfully combating M23 has pledged to combat other 
rebel groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
63
 While clearly a game changer, the 
UN Intervention Brigade’s future largely depends on its success in addressing remaining 
rebel groups. The government of Democratic Republic of Congo and FARDC are still not 
able to provide political and security guarantees for the whole nation without the external 
support from international organizations such as the UN. Even though the situation that 
the UN found itself in the 1960s is unlikely to occur, both the Congolese government and 
foreign forces have to be rather cautious about the Intervention brigade’s tactics and its 
interaction with local population. 
 The involvement of the United Nations peacekeeping mission and Organization of 
African Unity’s observation commission has been pivotal in establishing a fertile ground 
for the dialogue between the warring sides in the light of the military deadlock. At the 
same time, international and regional organizations lacked enforcement mechanisms to 
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prevent the outbreak of violence following the ceasefire of 1999. Gradually, the scope 
and size of the mission increased, thus contributing to the compromise between rebel 
groups and government forces in 2002. If not for the UN that sustained fragile peace after 
the peace agreement, the intrastate conflict in the DRC probably would have continued at 
the national level rather than been isolated to local provinces. Transformation of the 
MONUSCO and actions of the UN intervention brigade proved to be crucial in securing 



















The Second Sri Lanka Tamil Civil War of 2006-2009 
 
Table 21. Overview of the Second Sri Lanka Tamil Civil War. 
Outcome Government wins 
Regime Type Democracy 









State intervention for 
government 
No 
State intervention for 
rebels 
No 
Secondary diamonds No 
Oil exports No 
Contagion No 






Overview of an intrastate conflict 
 
 There are different approaches toward outlining the temporal dimensions of the 
Second Sri Lanka Tamil Civil War. One approach argues for treating the entire period of 
confrontation in Sri Lanka as a continuous process, in which the Second Sri Lanka Tamil 
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Civil War that is also called Eelam War IV is the last stage of the war that lasted almost 
26 years.
64
 In fact, this makes civil war in Sri Lanka one of the longest periods of 
intrastate violence since the end of the Second World War. In this study, I adhere to the 
classification developed by Correlates of War project that treats the period of conflict 
from 1983 to 2002 as the first Sri Lanka Tamil War and conflict that started in 2006 as 
the ongoing Second Sri Lanka War.
65
 The Correlates of War Dataset v.4.1 was published 
before the end of the Second Sri Lanka Tamil War. The intrastate conflict has effectively 
culminated with the victory of the government forces over the remnants of Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) on May 18, 2009.
66
 
 Undoubtedly, the Second Sri Lanka Tamil War has its roots in the previous 
periods of the intrastate conflict as the same factors that sparked violence two decades 
before led to the outbreak of conflict in 2006. After gaining independence in 1948 from 
the British government, Sri Lanka found itself facing the classical post-colonial dilemma 
of managing the redistribution of the power between ethnic groups. Tamils that are the 
minority ethnic group in Sri Lanka enjoyed dominant status during the colonial period, 
but after the independence Sinhalese who represent the biggest ethnic group have stated 
their claim on power. Initially non-violent Tamil protests gradually transformed into 
violent separatist movements and brought to the stage militarized groups such as the 
LTTE in the 1970s.
67
 Full-fledged intrastate conflict that officially erupted in 1983 has 
been characterized by periods of intense violence and ceasefires as well as third party 
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intervention by India in the late 1980s.
68
 After two decades of fighting, government and 
rebel forces agreed to enter a peace process that was supported by the mediation efforts 
of the international community.
69
  
 Despite the high hopes from all sides of conflict for the peace process and joint 
efforts to address the consequences of the 2004 tsunami disaster, mutual distrust, internal 
struggle within the rebel movement and ascension to power of the nationalist Sinhalese 
parties eventually jeopardized reconciliation efforts.
70
  In 2006, government forces 
launched an offensive operation against LTTE formally starting the Eelam War IV.
71
 
Gradual advancement of the Sri Lankan troops in the eastern and northern regions of the 
country in 2007 culminated in the spring of 2009 when the Tamil Tigers acknowledged 






 In the case of civil war in Sri Lanka, adopting the terminology popularized by 
Collier and Hoeffler, grievance inducing factors such as ethnic cleavages and religious 
differences have a better explanatory power regarding the onset of conflict than control 
over natural resources. Sri Lanka is not an oil exporting economy and does not possess 
lootable resources that can be a potential source for conflict. At the same time, a long 
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history of ethnic violence that is complicated by the religious mosaic of Sri Lankan 
society has been identified as the culprit of instability in the country. Traditional 
interpretations of the civil war in Sri Lanka picture an inherent feud rooted in the colonial 
past between Buddhist Sinhalese and Hindu Tamils. Yet, another faction of Muslim 
Tamils joined the conflict dynamics in the eastern provinces.
73
 In a sense, ethnic and 
religious factors are by and large aligned when it comes to differentiating government 
troops and rebels. Indeed, ethno-religious differences in Sri Lanka are consistent with my 
analysis of the broader definition of path dependence that focuses on the initial 
conditions. Religiously diverse societies are less likely to find a compromise solution to 
their intrastate conflicts. While some argue that the first civil war in Sri Lanka ended in a 
compromise, it is valid to argue that an end of hostilities in 2002 was a mere prelude 
before the final act of the civil war. This also explains why other sources do not divide 
Sri Lankan civil war into two separate instances of intrastate conflicts, but rather treat it 
as a continuous process.  
 Another interesting perspective on the conflict dynamics was proposed by 
Benedikt Korf in the article “Greed and Grievance in Sri Lanka” in which he argued that 
ethnic and religious differences determine the line between territories that each warring 
side claims to control for political and economic benefits.
74
 In turn, these “gains made by 
conflict entrepreneurs and war winners feed grievances caused by perceived 
discrimination, exclusion, and inequality among ethnic groups.”75 The mutually 
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reinforcing greed and grievance dynamics provide enough momentum for the prolonged 




The international response to the crisis in Sri Lanka has been limited to the 
declarations and statements by the United Nations, European Union, United States and 
other major players to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe. At the onset of the conflict, 
third parties were hesitant to support openly the Sri Lanka government, but as the 
outcome of the war seemed clear Iran, China, and India pledged military, economic, and 
political support for the ruling regime.
76
 Toward the end of the war, the UN Human 
Rights Council witnessed a heated confrontation between the Western powers who 
proposed a resolution that will label actions by Sri Lankan armed forces and LTTE alike 
as war crimes, while a counter-resolution supported by India, Russia as well as other 




In the light of the increasing power of the Responsibility to Protect and human 
security principles, the involvement of the third parties was nevertheless highly unlikely 
not only because of the impasse at the UN level, but increasingly because of the swiftness 
of government’s military offensive on the rebel positions. In the case of Second Sri 
Lanka Tamil Civil War, external forces had minimal effect on the outcome of an 
intrastate conflict, yet in terms of post-conflict process Sri Lanka remains largely under 
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the heavy pressure from the Western powers for its negative record of violating human 
rights during the conflict. 
 According to the POLITY IV dataset, during the period of second civil war Sri 
Lanka was a democratic state. Indeed, Sri Lanka is considered to be one of the oldest 
democracies in South Asia.
78
 Yet, during the Second Sri Lanka Tamil Civil War 
observers have argued that the President Mahinda Rajapaksa has used the fear of the 
LTTE to maintain a firm grip over the government.
79
 After the conflict ended, the UN 
High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay expressed her concerns with 
deepening of the authoritarian direction in Sri Lanka as the new legislation provided the 
president with more power over the judiciary branch.
80
 Despite Rajapaksa’s popularity 
after winning a three decade conflict, he lost the 2015 Presidential elections and the 
newly elected government vowed to curb authoritarian legislation and guide Sri Lanka 
toward a more democratic society.
81
  
Although technically Sri Lanka was a democracy during the civil war, 
authoritarian elements – which according to my analysis in the previous chapters are 
pivotal for increasing the chances of the government’s success – were present during 
President Rajapaksa’s rule. In this light, it is valid to argue that the Sri Lankan 
government had used an image of LTTE as an enemy to garner more control over 
political checks and balances and to ignore pressures from domestic and international 
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communities. In the case of Sri Lanka, an internal tipping point of regime type was an 
indirect cause of the government’s success. The primary determinant of the intrastate 
conflict outcome was the continuous military offensive on the rebel forces with no 
intentions for a compromise solution. It is imperative to examine the role of military 
actions as the mechanism of path dependence in intrastate conflict given that the 




Aside from reliance on military power to solve the intrastate conflict, the factor of 
the previous war outcome and the factor of the “War on Terror” appear to be the main 
elements of the path dependence dynamics during the Second Sri Lanka Tamil Civil War. 
Jayadeva Uyangoda points out the resilience of the government military forces that not 
only gradually captured territories under the LLTE control, but also did not hesitate to 
target civilian areas where rebels were hiding.
82
 It is also important to note that despite 
the decrease of the size of the armed forces during the war, the rise of military 
expenditures and military performance resulted in “a qualitative change in the capabilities 
(enhanced force multiplier) of the Sri Lankan forces, as the Sri Lankan Armed forces 
destroyed, killed or captured most of the LTTE forces.”83 While across all instances of 
intrastate conflicts since the Second World War the size of the armed forces was not 
related with a particular civil war outcome, in the case of Sri Lanka, decisive actions of 
                                                        
82
 Jayadeva Uyangoda, “Sri Lanka in 2009: From Civil War to Political Uncertainties,” Asian Survey Vol. 
50, no. 1 (January/February 2010): 104. 
83
 Fabio Andres Diaz and Syed Mansoob Murshed, “‘Give War A Chance’: All-Out War as a Means of 
Ending Conflict in the Cases of Sri Lanka and Colombia,” Civil Wars Vol. 15, no. 3 (2013): 297. 
196 
 
government forces even in the face of a humanitarian disaster have predetermined its 
victory in the conflict. 
The Second Sri Lanka Tamil Civil War was a recurrence of the protracted conflict 
and as I argued earlier can be considered as a last episode of the conflict that lasted for 
almost thirty years. The war that started in 1983 and ended in the compromise in 2002 
was characterized by periods of ceasefire and active combat. The volatility of the 
settlement attempts made both sides distrustful, which coupled with the lack of 
mechanisms to sustain commitments, led to the resurgence of conflict. The government 
and the LTTE consistently violated the 2002 truce and as the full-fledged war erupted in 
2006, military victory appeared to be the preferable war outcome. 
Finally, the global response to the terrorist attack on a World Trade Center in 
New York on September 11, 2001 was the critical shift that minimized the chances of the 
negotiated settlement and led to the government’s victory. The US-led “War on Terror” 
has not only changed the geopolitical map in the Middle East, but also affected large 
number of separatists groups around the globe. The addition of the LTTE to the US State 
Department terrorist list put it among such notorious groups as Al Qaeda, Hizballah, and 
Shining Path, which dramatically altered its image in the world community.
84
 Diaz and 
Murshed further suggest that the new discourse on the war between Sri Lankan armed 
forces and the LTTE has labeled the government’s struggle as “a virtuous campaign, 
where the violence of war could be justified as a moral obligation against terror.”85 
Labeled as the terrorist group, the LTTE lost an important source of funding from Tamil 
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Diaspora as the international community started targeting their sympathizers and 
sponsors.
86
 Therefore, a change of attitudes from the international community toward the 
LTTE, justification of the military actions, and loss of financial support justify the 
argument about the path dependence of the government success outcome in the Second 




Three case studies reviewed in this chapter addressed the variation of factors, both 
at the early stages of conflict and in the later phases, that shaped different outcomes of 
civil wars. One immediate observation following the comparative analysis of intrastate 
conflict is the caution with the reliance on the large-n statistical results. It is evident in the 
qualitative overview of three conflicts that statistically and substantively relevant 
indicators of path dependence are useful as the first place to look for explanation of 
causal mechanisms, yet the reality proves that relationship behind the civil war dynamics 
is rather complex. 
In the case of First Chechen War, causal mechanisms behind the onset factor of 
oil appeared to be complicated by the existence of illegal trade between rebel forces and 
criminal elements from the Russian Federation. Moreover, the outcome of intrastate 
conflict can be interpreted both as the success of rebels and also a compromise since de 
jure Chechnya remained part of Russia. The decisive role in determining the outcome of 
an intrastate conflict can be attributed to asymmetric warfare of Chechen rebels such as 
terrorist attacks that paralyzed Russian political establishment. In this regard, it is 
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possible to trace parallels with the First Sri Lanka Tamil War that also ended in a 
compromise after the LTTE started using asymmetric tactics.  
Furthermore, both the Second Chechen War and the Second Sri Lanka Tamil 
Civil War ended in a decisive victory of the government as it was able to cut international 
support for the rebels, label them as terrorist organization after the US-led “War on 
Terror,” and, ultimately, conduct ruthless military operations that bordered on violations 
of the human rights. In contrast, the Second Congo War is the example of how 
international involvement by the modern UN peacekeepers that have the mandate for 
active military engagement can establish the mechanisms for a stable peace. In all three 
cases, initial conditions, tipping points, or small events shaped the path dependent 















 Intrastate conflicts are complex and multifaceted phenomena. Existing analytical 
approaches tend to deconstruct intrastate conflicts into phases and evaluate each stage 
separately. While such a method generated valuable inferences about the nature of civil 
war, it ultimately lacks the overarching understanding about how the stages of war 
interact with each other. This dissertation overcomes this limitation by integrating the 
theory of path dependence into the intrastate conflict discourse through outlining the 
patterns where a particular outcome of a civil war is conditioned by the initial character 
of a conflict, internal features of a state, and intervening factors. Indeed, viewing an 
intrastate conflict as a dynamic, continuous process that is shaped by internal and external 
forces allows the construction of the set of testable hypotheses about path dependence in 
intrastate conflicts. The theory of path dependence proved to be an innovative framework 
for analyzing intrastate conflicts.   
The research design of the dissertation that is shaped after the mixed methods 
approach provides the comprehensive evaluation of path dependence conjectures while 
controlling for the drawbacks of the large-n analysis and focusing on individual cases. 
The results of quantitative tests provide considerable evidence for both the broad 
conception of path dependence that emphasizes the role of the initial conditions in 
framing the outcomes of the process as well as the narrow conception that highlights the 
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critical role of exogenous and endogenous tipping points. Case studies analysis has 
supported the validity of the quantitative findings, yet also hinted at the potential 
limitations of the large-n approach. Instead, focusing on individual cases of civil wars 
provided an insight into the causal mechanisms that shape the outcome of the conflict. In 
the next sections, I provide a synthesis of the empirical findings, discuss theoretical and 




 A quantitative inquiry into the broad concept of path dependence has provided 
sufficient evidence to support several hypotheses that tested the impact of the initial 
conditions on the outcomes of civil wars. The logic behind the design of this particular 
methodological framework was partially informed by the motive-opportunity paradigm 
of conflict onset. Thus, I have identified secondary diamonds and an oil-exporting 
economy as the opportunity structures, while religious and ethnic diversity of the society 
as the motive (grievance) agencies. The factor of contagion does not fit within this 
classification, yet remains a decisive determinant of the civil war initiation. Finally, the 
control variable for the Cold War is introduced in the dataset to capture the impact of the 
bipolar system of international relations. 
 To account for the impact of the initial conditions on the outcomes of a civil war, 
I have conducted a series of multinomial logistic regressions. The findings of these tests 
have provided substantial evidence for the interrelation between the onset and 
termination phases of the conflict. Unlike previous studies that focused on the greed and 
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grievance paradigm in which opportunity determinants were found to be closer related to 
the onset of civil war than motive-based factors, my inquiry into path dependence 
dynamics has found little evidence for this clear-cut distinction. On the contrary, when it 
comes to explaining the outcome of the civil war, the opportunity factor of oil; the motive 
factor of religious fractionalization; the factor of contagion; and, the Cold War era have 
been found statistically and substantively significant.  The eclecticism of the relevant 
onset factors can be explained by the fact that there are different calculations and 
expectations about the war before and after the initiation of hostilities.  
Thus, in the recent scholarship on conflict onset, secondary diamonds that are 
easily extractable and tradable were found to be related with the start of the civil war as 
they can serve a lucrative source for financing the rebel cause. My analysis found no 
support for the role of secondary diamonds in determining the outcome of the intrastate 
conflict. Indeed, while the decision to rebel can be explained by the presence of lootable 
resources, secondary diamonds  do not provide sufficient dividends for the success of 
rebels’ cause nor do they prolong or shorten the duration of the conflict itself. The factor 
of oil, however, has been consistently relevant in increasing the chances of war onset and 
in shaping the path to its termination. Thus, if a third of the country’s export revenue is 
from oil, the chances that the rebels succeed go down by a quarter. It is also interesting 
that previous studies have found that oil-exporting economies are more likely to 
experience a civil war, although as my analysis suggests the chance of rebels’ victory are 
very slim.  
The spillover of the conflict from troubled neighboring states appears to be 
undermining the chances of the government to topple the rebellion. I have argued that the 
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reasons behind government’s defeat might lie in the spread of innovative practices and 
techniques as well as in rallying the resolve and strength of the rebels after witnessing the 
success of similar uprisings in the neighboring areas. However, the results of the 
multinomial logistic regression analysis indicated that the civil wars caused by contagion 
are also likely to end in a compromise. The logic here is that war spillover incentivizes 
other states and international organizations to intervene in the conflict to prevent the 
outbreak of a civil war in their own states or the region in general. Further investigation 
into impact of the third party interventions confirmed my assumptions. 
Finally, an investigation into the impact of the international environment in which 
civil wars occurred provided strong evidence for the influence of the Cold War dynamics 
on the outcome of intrastate conflicts. During the period of bipolar system of 
international relations, proxy wars that were waged by US or Soviet Union or intrastate 
conflicts where superpowers were indirectly involved had less of a chance to end in a 
compromise and were more likely to be won by government forces. With the collapse of 
the USSR, the evolution of the UN peacekeeping, the ascent of the globalization era and 
the human security paradigm, the dynamics of the intrastate conflict have been altered. It 
is imperative to further investigate the nature of the contemporary international system 
and its impact on the dynamics of civil wars. 
The empirical inquiry into the narrow concept of path dependence supported the 
hypotheses about the impact of endogenous and exogenous tipping points on reinforcing 
the chances of a particular outcome of a civil war. This research design is aimed at 
investigating the temporal dimensions of conflict, the sequence of events, and 
explanatory factors that “lock in” a unique path to the civil war outcome. Through 
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applying various event history (survival) models that were utilized in the previous 
scholarship and introducing a novel approach that accounts for the dependence of 
competing risks between three intrastate conflict outcomes, I have examined the 
consistency of results across the methods. Table 13 summarizes the findings of the Fine 
and Gray model that I have utilized to test the narrow concept of path dependence in 
intrastate conflicts. In sum, it outlines whether or not a particular tipping point or control 
factor reinforced a hypothesized outcome and what its effect was on the duration of that 
particular outcome. 
 






Exogenous Tipping Points 
   
UN intervention Compromise Yes Decrease 
Regional intergovernmental 
organizations intervention 
Compromise Yes Decrease 
State intervention for government Government No None 
State intervention for rebels Rebels Yes Decrease 
Endogenous Tipping Points 
   
High military capacity Government No None 
Low military capacity Rebels No None 
Democratic regime Compromise Yes Decrease 
Autocratic regime Government Yes Decrease 
Control Factors 
   
Secondary diamonds Rebels No None 
Oil exporting economy Government No None 
Ethnic heterogeneity Rebels No None 




 The empirical investigation of intrastate conflicts through the lens of the narrow 
concept provided not only strong support for the theory of path dependence in civil wars, 
but also informed about causal mechanisms behind a particular civil war outcome. As 
hypothesized, both the interventions by the United Nations and regional 
intergovernmental organizations increased the chances of the compromise solution and 
decreased the duration of conflict. While this finding implies the efficiency of 
international peacekeepers, in reality, the UN and regional IGOs’ interventions are 
conditioned upon their mandate that presupposes ceasefire observance and monitoring of 
disarmament as well as the presence of the environment that is already conducive to 
peace. Thus, these organizations intervene only when the prospects of a compromise are 
high. Although this hypothesis calls for the discussion of selections effects, it is also 
worth of noting that each peacekeeping operation is preceded by extensive diplomatic 
efforts to ameliorate the conflict, which can be distinguished as the early stage of the 
third party intervention. Mechanisms and instruments of the international involvement in 
intrastate conflicts are complex, yet it is clear that their participation increases the 
probability of a negotiated solution. The endogeneity problem that is evident with these 
types of interventions requires a detailed investigation in future research. Subsequent 
studies should include a distinction between peacekeeping missions that have an observer 
status and those that require an active enforcement as in the case of the intervention 
brigade in the DRC. 
Unlike international and regional intergovernmental organizations, interventions 
by individual states are geared toward the support of one of the warring sides. Thus, 
rebel-biased state interventions tend to maximize the chances of the rebellion’s success, 
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while minimizing the overall duration of conflict. Contrary to my assumption, state-
biased interventions in fact did not increase the chances of government forces 
succeeding, yet they prolonged confrontations that resulted in a rebels’ victory. These 
findings differ from the previous scholarship on intrastate conflict outcomes, which can 
be attributed to the difference in codifying civil wars, methodological frameworks, and 
historical periods under review. Ultimately, the results of this dissertation have to be 
interpreted in terms of this particular research design and inferences drawn here are 
pertinent to the most recent dataset available. 
The event history analysis found no support for the degrees of state military 
capacity, codified in term of the armed personnel as a fraction of total population, in 
determining the outcome of the civil war. It appears that neither maintaining a sizable 
army guarantees the success of the government, nor the presence of limited military 
contingent presupposes the victory of rebels. In contrast to state capacity, regime type has 
been closely associated with a particular civil war outcome. In autocratic states, 
government forces have a higher chance of success and the civil war tends to be shorter. 
The logic behind the prevalence of the government’s victory stems partially from the 
repressive capabilities of the autocratic state that is aimed at rallying public support and 
catalyzing resources. In contrast, in democratic societies the government is affected by 
public opinion that prefers peace to a prolonged warfare. In the presence of democratic 
institutions, warring sides can utilize credible mechanisms for establishing a dialogue to 
address grievances. The results of the event history models supported this expectation by 
indicating that a democratic regime decreases the duration of the intrastate conflict and 
eventually leads to the compromise outcome. 
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None of the hypotheses about the initial conditions of the intrastate conflict that I 
have adapted to the analysis of the narrow concept of the path dependence were 
confirmed. I aimed at observing the effect of several onset factors that had the capacity to 
retain their impact on the outcome of civil wars such the presence of secondary 
diamonds; an oil-exporting economy; ethnic fractionalization; and religious 
fractionalization. While I have not found the support for the hypothesized interactions, 
the onset (control) factors have, in fact, influenced the odds of certain civil war solutions. 
Intrastate conflicts in oil-exporting economies and religiously diverse societies tend to 
end in a compromise. Substantively, however, the effect of these explanatory variables 
was only relatively significant. Given the plethora of statistical findings, it was 
imperative to develop the causal narratives of the path dependence mechanisms by 
analyzing how initial conditions and tipping points influenced the outcomes in a specific 
case of a civil war. 
To account for the variation in the conflict outcomes, three cases of civil war 
reviewed in this dissertation are the First Chechen War of 1994-1996; Africa’s World 
War of 1998-2002; and the Second Sri Lanka Tamil Civil War of 2006-2009. The first 
two wars are part of the OTIC and TPIC datasets that I have used to test empirically the 
path dependence in civil wars. The intrastate conflict in Sri Lanka is the out-of-sample 
case that I have selected to test the predictive power of the empirical findings. Ultimately, 
case studies analysis allowed moving beyond the framework of initial conditions and 
tipping points and investigating the power of small events and their sequence. 
The crisis in Chechnya in the early 1990s occurred against the backdrop of the 
decentralization tendencies that were caused by the dissolution of the Soviet Union. 
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Weakness of the federal political apparatus, the failed military campaign, and the 
unpopularity of war ultimately forced Moscow into negotiations, which de facto meant 
the victory of Chechen separatist. Conflicts in the nearby republics, the presence of oil, 
and religious fractionalization have been contributing to the onset of the civil war. Yet, 
the in-depth analysis of the empirical findings through the lens of the Chechen case 
suggested the relationship between onset conditions and conflict outcomes to be more 
complex than anticipated earlier. While none of the significant variables were able to 
predict the outcome of the conflict, a closer look at the dynamics of war revealed that oil, 
for example, was not used to finance rebels directly, but served more as a payment for 
loyalty of different warlords for the rebel causes. It also was a part of the illegal resource 
trade that involved both Chechen rebels and Russian criminals. Spillover of war tends to 
result in compromise, and technically after the Moscow Peace Treaty of 1997, the 
Chechen crisis ended in a negotiated settlement as de jure Chechnya still remained part of 
Russia. 
Endogenous tipping points had a minimal effect on shaping the path of the war 
given the fact that Russia was neither a democratic nor fully autocratic state. Since the 
Russian Federation retained a seat on the UN Security Council and possessed a vast 
nuclear arsenal, neither peacekeeping mission nor foreign interventions were viable 
options in the First Chechen War. From the path dependence standpoint, the pivotal 
determinant of the civil war outcome appeared to be the asymmetric warfare that 
Chechen rebels utilized after they failed to confront Russian federal forces in a 
conventional way. Two major terrorist attacks by Chechen separatists, the Budennovsk 
and Pervomayskoe hostage crises, shifted the scales of war in favor of the rebels. These 
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attacks were poorly handled by Russian forces and sent political ripples across the 
Kremlin. The power of small events such as the acts of terrorism has had a considerable 
role in shaping the outcome of the First Chechen War. 
Unlike the intrastate conflict in the Northern Caucasus, the dynamics of the 
Second War in Congo or “Africa’s World War” were shaped by the regional and 
international interventions. Moreover, the region of the Great Lakes has been 
characterized by the persistence of intrastate and interstate warfare for decades. Rooted in 
the colonial past, the history of the Democratic Republic of Congo has been written by 
violent conflicts, autocrats, and natural resources. Africa’s World War can be considered 
a continuation of the previous hostilities that revolved around the demise of the President 
Mobutu’s authoritarian regimes. Only two years after Zaire was renamed the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, revolutionary forces that brought Laurent-Desire Kabila to power 
attempted another power shift. Rebel forces supported by Rwanda and Uganda who were 
dissatisfied with the state of affairs in the new country came close to their goal, only to 
witness how other regional powers such as Angola, Zimbabwe, and Namibia provided 
military assistance to President Kabila that led to the stalemate between warring sides.  
The path dependence dynamics in this intrastate conflict have been shaped by 
both initial conditions and tipping factors. Thus, the spillover of conflict from 
neighboring states was an important determinant for the uprising in the eastern provinces 
of the DRC. The empirical findings from the test of the broad concept of path dependence 
are consistent with outcomes of this war as a factor of contagion was associated with the 
compromise outcome. Yet, as I have argued earlier, the causal mechanism behind the 
contagion-compromise link lies in the probability of third party intervention such as UN, 
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which was the case in the Africa’s World War. A similar connection can be traced to the 
conflict over the lootable resources that are abundant in the DRC. While secondary 
diamonds were not found to be statistically or substantively significant in determining the 
outcome of the conflict, in this particular case they have been closely associated with the 
decision of regional powers to intervene and even retain their influence. A report by UN 
experts confirmed the connection between the persistence of conflict, lootable resources, 
and neighboring states’ decision to intervene.  
The pivotal dimension in determining the path of the conflict outcome in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo was the involvement of foreign states, regional 
intergovernmental organizations, and ultimately the United Nations. Since the event 
history analysis highlighted the connection between civil war outcomes and third party 
interventions, it was imperative to investigate the sequence of their involvement and 
causal mechanisms in play. According to empirical findings, rebel-biased state 
interventions tend to result in the rebellions’ success. Indeed, the existing evidence 
suggests that President Kabila’s forces were in full retreat and if not for the foreign 
military support, would have quickly lost the war. Therefore, in Africa’s World War the 
stalemate resulted from the involvement of the third parties on both sides of conflict. The 
compromise was possible, however, only with the involvement of the United Nations that 
possessed instruments for establishing the ground for negotiations and mechanisms to 
upheld commitments between the warring sides. Moreover, after the compromise was 
successfully brokered, the Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo or MONUC gradually evolved into a proactive force that had the capacity not only 
to guarantee security, but also act militarily against the remaining rebel groups. 
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Finally, the analysis of the out-of-sample case of the Second Sri Lanka Tamil 
Civil War has revealed the importance of the regime type and state capacity in 
determining the path of the government’s victory. An intrastate conflict in Sri Lanka was 
one of the most prolonged periods of internal armed violence in the twentieth century. 
The Second Sri Lanka Tamil Civil War is often considered as a last phase of the conflict 
that lasted almost three decades. I use the classification that distinguishes two wars since 
the negotiated settlement that was reached between Sri Lankan government and Tamil 
rebels in 2002 was rather promising in solving the conflict, while the war that lasted 
between 2006 and 2009 represented a qualitatively new level of confrontation.  
Sri Lanka is neither an oil-exporting country nor it is rich in secondary diamonds, 
yet the conflict dynamics were driven by the ethno-religious cleavages between Buddhist 
Sinhalese and Hindu Tamils. Greed and grievance symbiosis in the case of Sri Lankan 
civil war is responsible for the persistence of conflict in this republic. Yet, this analytical 
framework cannot explain the outcome of the second civil war. The key element of the 
government’s success in toppling LTTE lies in the combination of resilient political 
regime, the military capacity of a state, and the absence of international involvement. 
While Sri Lanka is the oldest democracy in South East Asia, during the period of civil 
war, the incumbent government was characterized by the firm grip on power 
mechanisms, which many observers have classified as having authoritarian elements. 
Indeed, the administration of the President Rajapaksa utilized an image of LTTE as an 
enemy to gain control over the political system and to ignore pressures from domestic 
and international communities.  
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The experience from years of conflict has discouraged the government from 
attempting to use military means to subdue LTTE to enter into negotiations. The 
international community that has consistently pressured the Sri Lankan government to 
follow this course of action has also lost its credibility after peace talks broke down in 
2006. In this light, decisive military actions against rebel forces appeared to be the only 
logical conclusion. Unlike previous decades of conflict, the government gained an upper 
hand over the LTTE not only militarily, but also through labeling them as a terrorist 
organization and, thus, cutting international channels for financial and military support. 
In sum, understanding the path dependent dynamics in the case of Sri Lanka requires a 
closer look at the factors that were not included in the statistical inquiry as well as 
elaboration of elements that had an indirect influence, such as military tactics or the 
absence of international support. 
All three cases of intrastate conflict have revealed the complexity of the war that 
oftentimes cannot be captured by the large-n studies. Nevertheless, the mixed methods 
approach allowed a comprehensive examination of civil wars at the micro and macro 
levels, while revealing the underlying causal mechanisms and overarching trends. For 
example, investigation of the civil war in Chechnya and Sri Lanka through the prism of 
path dependence has revealed critical similarities between the two instances. Thus, in 
both cases, the first episode of conflict ended in a compromise decision (de jure in 
Chechnya) as the rebel forces utilized asymmetric warfare tactics such as hostage-taking 
and suicide attacks. In both scenarios, despite the government’s military superiority, 
terrorist tactics sent ripples across political and economic systems forcing warring sides 
to enter into negotiations. During the second phase of conflict, both governments 
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answered with resilient military attacks that bordered on human rights violations against 
the asymmetric tactics of the rebels. Furthermore, both governments labeled the rebel 
groups as terrorist organizations after the United States announced its global War on 
Terror. In both cases, the rebel cause was compromised by the change in international 
perception, which in turn led to dissipation of financial support from abroad. The absence 
of international involvement, as in the case of the Africa’s World War, has also 
determined the success of the government. To conclude, the research design that follows 
the logic of mixed methods provides mutually reinforcing analytical tools to evaluate a 
complex phenomenon like an intrastate conflict while controlling for different levels of 
analysis. 
 
Theoretical and Methodological Implications 
 
The contemporary scholarship on intrastate conflicts relies on well-developed 
theoretical and methodological discourse to analyze the complex nature of civil wars. The 
study of intrastate conflicts is arguably moving in the direction of becoming a discipline 
in itself not only because this type of conflict dominates over other forms of violence, but 
increasingly because of the analytical and practical resources devoted to this topic by 
various entities ranging from the United Nations and states to major think tanks and 
individual scholars. Under these circumstances, it is imperative to connect the existing 
piecemeal inquiries into the nature of civil wars and develop an overarching theory of an 
intrastate conflict. The theory of path dependence, which in a broader sense argues that 
previous stages of conflict influence the subsequent phases and as a narrower concept 
213 
 
focuses on factors that lock in a unique outcome of war, is a potential candidate for 
analyzing intrastate conflict as a continuous process. 
Aside from outlining a unifying theoretical framework, the theory of path 
dependence provides methodological instruments to devise testable hypotheses. In this 
dissertation, I have operationalized the broad and narrow concepts of path dependence 
through outlining the factors that lead to the onset of civil wars and tipping factors that 
shape the outcome of the civil war respectively. To test the relationship between the 
initial conditions of and solutions to civil wars, I have applied multinomial logistic 
regression analysis. While evaluating the coefficients for government victory, rebels’ 
success, and compromise with three different base outcomes was useful to observe the 
pairwise dynamics, I found the analysis of marginal effects to be better suited for 
interpreting the magnitude of the explanatory variables. 
An empirical evaluation of the narrow definition of path dependence requires a 
different approach since this research design focused on the temporal dimensions. The 
existing scholarship on civil war dynamics and outcomes applied event history (survival) 
models as a method to investigate the duration of the conflict. In this regard, the 
transition from the approaches that focused on parametric models to articles that used 
Cox competing risks model implies the continuing search for more appropriate tools to 
capture the dynamics of civil wars. In this dissertation, I have introduced a model 
developed by Jason P. Fine and Robert J. Gray that accounted for the interdependence of 
civil war outcomes. The application of the proportional hazards model for the 
subdistribution of a competing risk provided estimators for the cumulative incidence for 
the explanatory variables in a particular conflict outcome while holding other outcomes 
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as competing risks. I have conducted a comparative analysis of the Weibull parametric, 
Cox competing risks and Fine and Gray models to investigate the robustness of estimates 
across the methods. The results suggest that while the statistical significance of 
explanatory variables does not differ considerably, hazard and sub-hazard ratios vary 
across the models. Thus, the interpretation of the magnitude for a particular variable 
appears to be related to the methodological tool that the researcher is using. Given the 
fact that the Fine and Gray model is better suited for analyzing the competing risks of 
civil war outcomes, it is valid to give this model a preferred position for the interpretation 
of the explanatory variables’ magnitude. 
Finally, case study analysis proved to be instrumental in outlining causal 
mechanisms behind the relevant as well as overlooked determinants of the path 
dependence dynamics in civil wars. Only in combination with inquiries into individual 
cases of civil war it is possible to develop the narratives for the empirically significant 
factors. While methodological pluralism is critical to advance the knowledge of civil 
wars, it is equally imperative to acknowledge differences in the analysis while making 




This dissertation identified patterns of path dependence in intrastate conflicts, 
which can be directly implemented in devising tactical responses to the existing internal 
crises as well as drafting strategic policy prescriptions for generating a particular civil 
war outcome. It is beyond doubt that the pervasiveness of intrastate conflicts in global 
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conflict dynamics requires a solid systematic response not only from great powers and 
international organizations, but also from state leaders as well as commanders of rebel 
forces in the countries ravaged by civil wars. As of 2015 there are more than a dozen 
major intrastate conflicts on four continents where the count of fatalities passed a 
thousand deaths threshold. Civil wars in Yemen, Eastern Ukraine, Syria and Iraq, 
Somalia, and Nigeria among others are unique in their own right, yet share similarities in 
regards to the initial conditions and tipping points that can shape their outcome.  
Given the history of the United States’ involvement in the intrastate conflicts 
during and after the end of the Cold War, it becomes clear that recent actions by the 
world’s only superpower lack not only strategic but increasingly tactical consistency. The 
Obama Administration’s poor record of handling recent outbursts of internal violence 
from the Middle East to Eastern Europe can be partially attributed to the lack of grand 
strategy. However, it is valid to assume that the existing approaches to dealing with 
insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan has created the atmosphere of hesitance in dealing 
with intrastate crises that is reminiscent of the US withdrawal from the international 
scene after the 1993 Mogadishu debacle.  
The findings of this dissertation highlight the role of the United Nations and 
regional intergovernmental organizations peacekeeping missions in generating 
compromise outcomes. In the light of the US uncertainty about its posture in global 
security governance, it appears imperative for UN to assert its status and enhance the 
capacity of its peacekeeping forces as was demonstrated through the creation of the 
intervention brigade during the crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Obviously, 
the UN Security Council remains the hostage of the power play and ill-fated reform 
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attempts will hardly allow this international body to become a dominant force in solving 
intrastate conflicts across the globe. The prospects of the regional IGOs taking the vacant 
spot of the UN appear to be equally bleak considering the crisis of identity of NATO; 
political and financial instability within the EU; and the lack of cohesion among the 
members of the African Union. In this light, governments and rebels in civil wars of the 
twenty-first century appear to be the smiths of their own destiny. Understanding the 
initial conditions of the war, capitalizing on the internal features of the state, and 
managing the involvement of the third parties give either side an advantage in shaping the 
path of an intrastate conflict. 
Investigation into the future of civil wars is another dimension of this study. 
Recent academic inquiries into the dynamics of civil war have been actively explored by 
the US policy-making community. For example, the CIA sponsored the Political 
Instability Task Force, a joint group of political scientists, to investigate the quantitative 
dimensions of states’ vulnerability to lethal violence. The findings of major think tanks 
and academic projects such as the Peace Research Institute Oslo and the Correlates of 
War project have been actively used in understanding intrastate conflicts and formulating 
policy approaches. Therefore, the current dissertation contributes in a similar fashion to 
the tacit symbiosis between the academic and policy discourses on intrastate conflicts. 
The analytical and methodological framework devised in this study can be used to 






Recommendations for Future Research 
 
 As I have argued earlier, the introduction of the path dependence theory into the 
study of intrastate conflicts generates a new analytical debate about the continuity of and 
change in civil wars. While this dissertation rests on the well-established civil war 
discourse, integration of the path dependence paradigm requires further discussion about 
applicability of its central assumptions to the study of war. It is imperative to further 
develop a theory behind causal mechanisms of initial conditions, intervening variables, 
and the power of small events. Given that the central theoretical tenets of path 
dependence are extrapolated mainly from the economic literature, it is equally important 
to analyze the dynamics which are unique to the study of intrastate conflicts. 
 From the methodological standpoint, future inquiries have to account for the 
wider spectrum of civil wars that are not limited to the period from the Second World 
War to 2007. Another potential avenue for improvement lies in utilizing a different 
classification of civil wars that lowers the death threshold per year from 1,000 to 25 such 
as in the dataset developed by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program. Future studies can also 
benefit from expanding the state capacity factor to include bureaucratic and 
administrative components. While the current research design focused on the democratic 
and autocratic regime types, it is also critical to investigate the role of anocratic regimes. 
Further inquiries into the broad concept of path dependence will benefit from expanding 
the explanatory factors beyond those that are tested in this dissertation. 
   Finally, the ultimate test for the findings of this study lies in devising policy 
relevant suggestions. The case studies chapter of this dissertation provides a tentative 
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framework that combines the evaluation of the statistical results with outlining causal 
narratives of a unique civil war path. Subsequent policy analysis can utilize this 
framework, while also capitalizing on the features and practical applications of the path 
dependence mechanisms.  
 
Limitations of the Study 
 
To investigate the patterns of path dependence in civil wars, this study has utilized 
a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods. Given the nature of the empirical 
approach, this dissertation relied on generating the dataset based on secondary sources. 
As a direct consequence, the findings of this study are contingent upon the validity of the 
data gathering techniques of other scholars. Even though conflict dynamics in the past 
seventy years were characterized by the prevalence of civil wars, the total number of 
observations is relatively small for detecting strong correlations between explanatory 
variables and civil war outcomes. Thus, the results of several models of path dependence 
may have been skewed as the test sample has not contained a sufficient number of civil 
wars with required parameters. 
By and large, present and previous inquiries into intrastate conflict have been 
limited by the availability of data and relevance of proxy variables. For example, the 
current study did not find a sufficient link between military capacity and the civil war 
outcome. Part of the reason may be the choice of proxy variable that could be better 
represented by either military spending or the quality of armed forces. Similar drawbacks 
can be attributed to the indices of ethnic and religious fractionalization. In this 
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dissertation, these variables have not been associated with the particular solution to a civil 
war, even though the conflict narratives were fueled by ethnic or religious grievances. 
The central conundrum, however, is to interpret the absence of statistical or substantive 
significance as the indicator of the actual dynamics of civil war or to search for the 
measure that would appear to be relevant. 
Finally, despite certain theoretical and methodological limitations, the findings of 
this dissertation remain credible. With the mantra that correlation is not causation in 
mind, the mixed methods approach mitigates the drawbacks of quantitative and 
qualitative methods by capitalizing on their symbiotic interaction. Empirical results that 
were provided by the large-n analysis have been examined in a specific civil war 
environment, while mechanisms that have been uncovered in the case studies will be 




The onset of the intrastate conflict, its development, and termination do not exist 
separately in the vacuum. The contemporary literature on civil wars created artificial 
stages of conflict that appear to be independent from each other. This dissertation 
introduced a theory of path dependence that provides analytical and methodological 
instruments to analyze an intrastate conflict as a continuous process. The primary 
contribution of the new discourse on civil wars lies in connecting initial conditions, 




The mixed methods approach introduced in this dissertation offers a constructive 
analysis of path dependent dynamics through the prism of multinomial logistic 
regression, an event history model, and a series of case studies. The evaluation of the 
broad concept of path dependence that focuses on initial conditions in shaping the 
outcomes emphasized the relevance of conflict spillover, non-lootable resources, and 
character of the international system. The analysis of the narrow concept, which describes 
the factors that “lock in” a particular civil war outcome, pointed at the role of the UN and 
regional intergovernmental organizations in accelerating the compromise; highlighted the 
dynamics behind democratic and autocratic regimes; and, found no support for the 
relationship between the size of the armed forces and conflict outcome. Finally, case 
studies of three civil wars, which ended in different ways, revealed unique intrinsic 
causal mechanisms behind each outcome. 
Path dependence theory is a useful tool for understanding civil war as a process 
where preceding stages and tipping points can determine the outcome of conflict. The 
analysis of conflict dynamics in Chechnya, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Sri 
Lanka revealed the complex nature of war and significance of timing and sequence of 
interventions as well as power of small events. Research design outlined in this study has 
the potential to generate new insights into the future of ongoing intrastate conflicts in 
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